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INTRODUCTION

Thousands of times a day, in hospitals and physicians' offices
throughout the country, patients or their surrogate decisionmakers decide to accept or refuse suggested diagnostic or therapeutic procedures.
Only in a very small number of instances where the patient or his surrogate decides to decline the proposed treatment, does the treating physician or the hospital file a legal action seeking to overturn the decision.
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A. 1969,
DePauw University; J.D. 1973, Washington University. I wish to thank Sheila K. Hyatt,
Professor of Law, University of Denver and Kathleen Mills for helpful comments on a
previous draft of this article.
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Judicial opinion's in these cases warrant our close scrutiny because of
their far-reaching effect. The fact that these cases are brought by healthcare providers and decided by judges in the name of beneficence 1 is no
2
reason to accord them any less attention.
In this article I will argue that the concepts of privacy and autonomy
are both literally and constitutionally involved in healthcare decisionmaking. Their application in that context has been complicated by a
number of factors. Privacy, in particular, has longstanding recognition
in tort law, 3 as well as in constitutional law, at least with regard to the
fourth amendment; however, since the recognition of a separate and distinct right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,4 the concepts of autonomy and privacy have been used interchangeably. I shall illustrate that,
at least in the context of treatment refusals, autonomy and privacy in the
constitutional sense should be treated separately.
The tide of this article is not intended to be polemical, but strongly
suggestive of the fact that there has been an assault on privacy in healthcare decisionmaking. 5 I intend to show the means necessary to defeat
this assault, which exist within the currently accepted principles of contract, procedural and constitutional law. First, I will explore the fundamentally contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship and
demonstrate that the legal implications of that relationship have either
been dismissed or intentionally disregarded in most, if not all, of the
treatment-refusal cases. Second, I will elucidate the four state interests
and the questionable procedural posture in which they become decisive
factors in the outcome of treatment refusal cases. I will argue that an
appropriately rigorous application of the concepts of justiciability and
case and controversy, as well as the rules of procedure applicable to determination of the real party in interest, would significantly reduce the
number of cases decided by the courts. At the very least, such application would compel the state to ensure the responsibility for asserting its
interests as an actual party to such litigation. Thirdly, I will elucidate
1. Beneficence is a bioethical term indicating a focus on whether the giving or withholding of a particular treatment would be in the patient's best interest. It is often utilized
in contradistinction to autonomy in situations in which the patient's actual wishes cannot
be communicated or otherwise determined. For a thorough analysis and discussion of the
principle of beneficence see T. BEAucHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 194-255(3d ed. 1989).
2. As Justice Brandeis observed: "Experience should teach us to be most on our
[For] [t]he
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent ....
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 51 (1967).
3. Seegenerally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 849-869 (5th ed. 1984) (on
the Right of Privacy).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. Among those commentators whose recent works support the thesis of this article
are: Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court Ordered Caesareans, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); Johnson, From Medicalization to Legalization to Politicization:
O'Connor, Cruzan, and the Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1989);
Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV. 375 (1988); and Nelson, Buggy &
Weil, ForcedMedical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the
Rest, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 703 (1986).
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and critique the state interests and the questionable manner in which
they become decisive factors in the outcome of treatment-refusal cases.
Finally, I will make the case for a constitutional right to privacy in
healthcare decisionmaking that distinguishes privacy from autonomy.
This approach protects those who are temporarily or permanently mentally incapacitated from unwarranted governmental intrusion and preserves the proper role of the family.
As a frame of reference for this analysis, I propose the following
hypothetical factual situation: A thirty-eight year old male with a wife
not employed outside the home and two minor children presents to his
physician with a number of physical complaints that have become increasingly troublesome during the past few months. The physician performs a battery of diagnostic procedures which lead to a conclusive
diagnosis of intermediate stage Hodgkins disease. 6 The patient's prognosis is presented to him in the following manner. If he immediately
submits to intensive chemotherapy, there is a sixty to seventy percent
likelihood of complete remission in nine to twelve months. Without this
treatment regimen, there is a ninety percent probability that he will not
survive more than eighteen months.
The patient gives full and complete consideration to all of the relevant information provided by his physician, discusses the matter at
length with his wife and adult parents who live in the same community,
and then advises his physician that he declines to undergo the therapy.
The patient submits a letter of resignation to his employer and prepares
to devote the remaining months or years of his life to quality time with
his family.
Upon receiving this declaration from his patient, and having failed
in his repeated efforts to dissuade the patient from a course of inaction,
the physician contacts the attorney who provides legal services to his
clinic. The physician files an action in a state court of general jurisdiction seeking an order "compelling the patient to submit involuntarily to
the chemotherapy deemed necessary by competent medical authority to
save his life and prevent the wanton, willful, and malicious abandonment
of his dependents."
The distinctions between the hypothetical situation and the factual
background of most reported cases are as follows: 1) the patient is not
currently hospitalized; 2) the patient's refusal of treatment is unequivocal and not based on any alleged incapacity to understand and appreciate the consequences; and 3) the patient's refusal of treatment is not the
product of religious scruples. I will argue, however, that in light of the
applicable substantive and procedural principles, none of these distinctions should have a material impact upon the outcome of the legal
7
proceeding.
6. Hodgkins disease involves malignant tumors of the immune system. For a thorough discussion of the epidemiology, etiology, natural history, clinical manifestations, and
treatment, see HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1555-60 (11 th ed. 1987).

7. Another factor which may influence the ultimate disposition of the case is the pa-
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THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

Implied Contract

How the physician-patient relationship is characterized varies with
the orientation of the person making the characterization. From the
standpoint of a legal analysis, there is virtual unanimity of opinion that
the essential nature of the relationship is contractual. 8 In the typical
physician-patient relationship the contract is established by implication
when the patient visits the physician complaining of some ailment and
the physician performs an examination usually coupled with other diagnostic procedures in order to determine the cause of the symptoms. At
this point the only written evidence of a contractual relationship is a few
standard forms which indicate the essential aspects of the patient's medical history and the nature of his insurance coverage. There has probably been no discussion between physician and patient of important
matters such as the physician's customary charges, the patient's religious
or philosophical views that might impact upon modes of treatment, respective views on informed consent and the nature and extent of the
information to be exchanged in the process of medical decisionmaking,
or other issues that may have life and death implications for the patient.
The amorphous nature of this unwritten contract is rooted in the
historically paternalistic nature of the relationship. 9 In the past, the patient sought out the physician in much the same way as the New Age
pilgrim approaches the guru, in a posture of awe, reverence, and submission. The physician unilaterally defined the nature and conditions of
the relationship. The role of the patient was limited to answering the
physician's questions, strictly adhering to his admonitions, and seeing to
it that the charges for his professional services were promptly paid.
There is much ongoing debate as to the extent to which society has
moved away from this paternalistic model;' 0 however, with the exception of a few cases having to do with refusal of treatment by women in
the third trimester of pregnancy, I the appellate decisions in all jurisdictions uphold the legal right of the competent patient to accept all, some
tient's gender. A recent article has analyzed "all appellate-level, civil, state 'right-to-die'
cases involving incompetent, adult patients" and concluded that gender profoundly affects
judicial analysis of right-to-die cases. Miles & August, Courts, Gender and 'The Right to Die',
18 LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
8. See, e.g., S. FISCINA, MEDICAL LAw FOR THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN: A CASE ORIENTED ANALYSIS 3-8 (1982); A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw 1-7 (2d ed. 1978).

9. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalismand PatientAutonomy: A Model of Physician Consciencefor the Physician-PatientRelationship, in BIOETHICS: READINGS AND CASES 113 (B. Brody

& H. Engelhardt 1987).
10. One of the most articulate and persuasive works that addresses this subject is J.
KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). Although the overall topic of

this work is the doctrine of informed consent, Professor Katz, a physician, carefully explicates the paternalistic nature of the physician-patient relationship and convincingly establishes it as the basis for the late and grudging acceptance among the medical profession of
the "shared decisionmaking" approach to the physician-patient encounter.
11. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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or none of the physician's recommendations unless a countervailing
12
state interest is found to be superseding.
As with most other contractual relationships, that between physician and patient is mutually revocable. The patient can, without question, withdraw from and terminate the relationship at any time with
payment for services rendered to date as the only obligation; however,
in recognition of the special vulnerability of a patient in need of medical
care, the physician's ability unilaterally to terminate the relationship is
significantly more circumscribed. If the physician is to avoid being subject to an allegation of patient abandonment, he must give the patient
reasonable notice of his withdrawal, assist the patient in securing another physician, and provide essential treatment to the patient for an
interim period of reasonable duration. 13
B.

Fiduciary Relationship

The wide disparity of knowledge and experience in medical matters
between physician and patient justifies the characterization of the relationship as fiduciary. A recognition of this disparity and an effort to redress the imbalance is found in the evolving doctrine of informed
consent. 14 Before a physician can undertake any mode of diagnosis or
treatment that involves significant risks, he must first provide the patient
with a package of relevant information regarding such things as the nature and purpose of the procedure or treatment, its anticipated risks,
benefits, and consequences, the feasible alternative procedures and
treatments and their risks, benefits, and consequences, and the consequences to the patient if nothing is done. 15 There have been a significant number of medical malpractice cases in which the major issue was
the alleged failure of the physician to provide the patient with the appropriate amount of information so as to render his consent truly "informed."' 6 The legal recognition of the applicability of the doctrine of
informed consent to the physician-patient relationship suggests that
17
shared decisionmaking should replace paternalistic decisionmaking.
The actions of the physician in our hypothetical case, as well as actual
12. See, e.g., A. MEISEL, THE RxGHT TO DIE 45-46 (1989).

13. See S. FiSCINA, supra note 8, at 19-30 and A. HOLDER, supra note 8, at 372-389.
14. There is a wealth of literature on the subject of informed consent. For this reason,
I will eschew a detailed discussion and analysis of the doctrine, and refer the reader to the
following recent and comprehensive treatments of the subject. F. RozovsKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT. A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2d ed. 1990); R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); A. RoSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (1981).

In addition to reducing the knowledge gap between physician and patient, the doctrine of informed consent (and hence refusal) is a judicial assertion that the principle of
patient autonomy, rather than physician paternalism, should govern the relationship.
15. A. RosOFF,supra note 14, at 318.
16. An exhaustive list of the cases would be neither useful nor practical; however, the
following cases discuss the major considerations: Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cerL. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal Rptr.
505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
17. Paul Ramsey, a medical ethicist, argues that the proper characterization of the
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cases discussed in section III infra, demonstrate the persistent paternalistic perception of the relationship by many physicians.' 8
C.

Confidentiality and Privacy

Another significant feature of the physician-patient relationship is
the patient's expectation of confidentiality. The law recognizes and reinforces this expectation in a number of ways. The records which document the patient's care and treatment, whether they are in the custody of
the individual physician or a hospital, are deemed confidential. Only
with the written consent of the patient may any portion of the records be
made available to a third person. Furthermore, in almost every jurisdiction there is a statutory recognition of the physician-patient privilege
which provides that the physician may not be required to divulge private
and personal information about his patient without that patient's prior
consent. 19 There are limited exceptions to the rule, of course, such as
when the patient is a party to the litigation and may reasonably be presumed to have put his medical condition or the particulars of the medical care and treatment in issue. Additional exceptions to the general
rule of confidentiality are statutory reporting requirements in circumstances such as contagious disease, wounds inflicted by deadly weapons,
and child abuse. These latter exceptions are clearly instances in which
as to override
certain societal interests have been deemed so significant
20
the patient's need for and expectation of privacy.
physician-patient relationship is that of partnership rather than contract. His reasoning is
as follows:
I suggest that men's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause
makes possible a consent to enter the relation of patient to physician .... This
means that partnership is a better term than contract in conceptualizing the relation
between patient and physician.... The fact that these.., people are joint adventurers is evident from the fact that consent is a continuing and repeatable requirement. We can legitimately appeal to permissions presumably granted by or
implied in the original contact only to the extent that these are not incompatible
with the demands of an ongoing partnership sustained by an actual or implied
present consent and terminable by any present or future dissent from it. For this to
be at all a human enterprise-a covenantal relation between the man who performs these procedures and the man who is patient in them-the latter must
make a reasonably free and an adequately informed consent. Ideally, he must be
constantly engaged in doing so. This is basic to the cooperative enterprise in
which he is one partner.
P. RAMSEY, THE PATENT AS PERSON 6 (1970).
18. Although many fine opinions have been written by judges in medical malpractice
cases alleging a lack of informed consent, this purported judicial recognition of a person's
dominion over his own body shrinks to virtual invisibility in the treatment-refusal cases.
19. The Colorado statute is typical. It provides generally that:
A physician, surgeon, or registered professional nurse duly authorized to practice
his profession pursuant to the laws of this state or any other state shall not be
examined without the consent of his patient as to any information acquired in
attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for
the patient ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987). The statute creates certain exceptions, such
as when the healthcare provider is sued for malpractice by the patient, or when the provider's clinical services are under review by appropriate administrative agencies charged
with insuring professional competence.
20. Perhaps the furthest extension of the duty of a physician to disclose what would
otherwise be privileged and confidential aspects of his relationship to a patient is the line
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Except for the situations mentioned above, government's role has
been to foster and protect the relationship between physician and patient. State licensing requirements protect the public from unskilled or
incompetent physicians, and Medicaid, Medicare and medical indigence
legislation promotes the formation of the physician-patient relationship
by subsidizing the cost of care to disadvantaged groups of citizens.
None of this suggests, however, either the right or the responsibility of
government or society to dictate the terms of the relationship between
21
the individual patient and his physician.
The fact that today a much larger portion of physician-patient encounters take place in hospitals than ever before does not, as a matter of
law, alter the privileged nature of the relationship. In a major medical
center the individual practitioner is augmented by a "team" comprised
of an attending physician from one or more departments, senior and
junior residents, staff nurses, technologists, therapists, and social workers. 22 The inclusion of these additional parties facilitates the relationship between the primary attending physician and the patient. It does
not, however, diminish the patient's right to and expectations of privacy,
23
confidentiality and autonomy.
When a physician seeks to override a competent patient's refusal to
consent to a recommended treatment, he breaches the privacy and confidentiality of the relationship. Challenging a patient's decision involves
filing a petition with the court documenting the patient's medical condition. Unless special procedures are followed, private and personal information about the patient becomes a matter of public record. Beyond
the pure legalities of this breach of an implicit element of privacy and
confidentiality, the psychological impact upon the interpersonal dynamof cases flowing from Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976), in which an imminent threat of harm to an identifiable
individual was communicated to a psychiatrist. The physician, in such a situation, was held
to have a duty to warn the person at risk, or appropriate authorities, which took precedence over patient confidentiality.
21. Leon Kass, a physician and bioethicist, emphasizes two important aspects of the
physician-patient relationship. First, that it encompasses the "intimate life-world" of the
patient which includes the family or household. Second, that the patient adrits this professional stranger into his"life-world" in the hope of a cure, and upon the condition
"that he keeps private what he sees and hears." L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SciENCE: BIOLoGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS,

237-38 (1985).

22. See Rich, Malpractice Issues in the Academic Medical Center, 13 J.C.U.L. 149, 153-56
(1986).
23. As medical care has become more technologically complex, tort law has attempted
to adapt by recognizing the changed circumstances. For example, the "Captain of the
Ship" doctrine, which holds that the surgeon in the operating room is ultimately responsible for the acts and omissions of the entire surgical team, including the anesthesiologist,
has all but disappeared in recognition of the independent roles and responsibilities of each
member of the surgical team. But see Schultz v. Mutch, 165 Cal. App. 3d 66, 211 Cal. Rptr.
445 (1985). Also, the doctrine of "corporate negligence" was created in recognition of the
fact that the modem hospital is not simply a building in which physicians treat their patients. Rather, it is a corporate entity that undertakes separate and independent responsibilities toward patients who are admitted by members of its medical staff. Johnson v.
Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981); Darling v.
Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966).
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ics of the relationship is devastating. How can the requisite mutual trust
and confidence ever be restored when the physician takes an adversarial
24
posture with regard to his patient?
There is an exquisite irony in such scenarios when one considers
the antipathy that physicians have historically demonstrated for lawyers
and judges. Physicians have taken the position that the law should stay
out of the medical practice, that the physician-patient relationship is an
area in which the law is neither competent, sensitive, nor has legitimate
authority. Despite such uniformly expressed protestations, over the last
three decades a growing number of physicians have invoked the legal
process when the intransigence of their own patients differs from the
technological imperative of modem medical practice.2 5 The Hippocratic admonition: "Above all else do no harm" has been amended to
read: "Above all else do something," even if you must breach the confidentiality of the relationship, transform your patient into a legal adversary, and write your prescription in the form of a court order for
treatment against the patient's will.
What motivates the physician who seeks to impose treatment upon
a non-consenting patient? Surely, the sociological phenomenon of employing a remedial measure simply because it exists (Technological Imperative) is an insufficient explanation. Modem physicians are more
than simply technocrats. The reason most often mentioned by individual physicians and hospital administrators (hospitals are often the petitioners in such proceedings), is the fear of a subsequent malpractice
claim by a member of the patient's family.2 6 The gravamen of such a
24. The evils of coercive medical practice, made possible through the agency of the
judiciary in treatment refusal cases, are the same as the evils of coercive legislation enacted
for the allegedly noble purpose of maintaining the moral fiber of society. Physicians, in
practicing their art, are supposed to be guided by compassion for the patient and his condition. Yet, as Michael Perry has observed:
To coerce someone to make a choice she does not want to make is to cause her to
suffer. [C]oercing someone to do something she not merely does not want to do,
but believes destructive of her well-being to do, even forbidden for her to do...
causes extreme suffering. And extreme resentment. A moral community that values individual conscientiousness or personal integrity-that believes that ultimately, after careful, informed deliberation, a person should choose on the basis
of conscience-will be wary, therefore, about pursuing a legislative strategy of
extreme coercion.
M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAw: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 100-01 (1988).

25. Eric Fromm posits two principles of the technological system or "technetronic
society," the first of which is the maxim that "something ought to be done because it is
technically possible to do it." Fromm also credits a paper by Hasan Ozbekhan entitled "The
Triumph of Technology: 'Can' Implies 'Ought,'" for this lucid observation of the phenomenon: "Thus, feasibility, which is a strategic concept, becomes elevated into a normative concept, with the result that whatever technological reality indicates we can do is taken
as implying that we must do it." E. FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE: TOWARD A HUMANIZED TECHNOLOGY 33-34 (1968).

For a discussion of the operation of the principle in the medical context, see R. WEIR,
ABATING TREATMENT wrrH CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTs 30-33 (1989).

26. Professor Alexander Capron, in a recent article adapted from a presentation to
the National Conference of the State Judiciary on Bioethical Issues, addresses this
concern:
Frankly, this fear seems greatly exaggerated.... First, if informed decisionmaking
has occurred.., there is little likelihood of a suit being brought and even less of
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civil suit would be that the patient was "incapacitated" to such an extent
that his refusal of consent was not valid. Thus the failure of the healthcare providers to recognize this situation and obtain judicially-approved,
substituted consent resulted in harm to the patient for which they could
be held liable in damages.
Undermining this "justification," however is the fact that most of
the refusal-of-treatment cases, regardless of whether they involve competent or allegedly incapacitated patients, do not end with a ruling by a
trial court judge, even when the healthcare provider brings the action.
The losing healthcare provider regularly appeals these cases to the highest court of the jurisdiction. 27 Such prosecutorial zeal can hardly be explained by a fear of malpractice claims, for surely a trial court ruling
upholding the patient's refusal of treatment would constitute an adequate defense to any such suit and would be an even more compelling
defense to criminal prosecution. 28 Furthermore, concern over future
litigation cannot legally or ethically justify seeking to override a competent patient's refusal of consent any more than it would justify "dump29
ing" a patient in dire condition on another hospital.
Another argument physicians assert in justification for taking their
patients to court to seek authorization of treatment in the face of an
informed refusal is that not to do so would violate the Hippocratic Oath
and assist the patient in suicide. The Hippocratic Oath portrays the
physician as a benign, authoritarian, paternalistic decisionmaker who
takes full responsibility for determining what the patient requires in the
way of medical care. It contains no recognition that the patient has any
decisionmaking role in determining his medical fate.3 0 This anachronistic view of medical decisionmaking has clearly been superseded by the
common law of informed consent and therefore cannot reasonably be
asserted by physicians as justification for litigating treatment refusals by
patients. 3 '
its succeeding. As for the risk of criminal prosecution, physicians are never convicted for carrying out decisions mutually made with qualified surrogates, much

less patients. Thus, there should be little cause for judges to intervene simply to
dispense advance absolution for health care providers.
Capron, The Burden of Decision, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876
(1990); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534
N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
28. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
29. "Dumping" is a new term of art in health care delivery referring to the practice of
private hospitals which do not want to render necessary treatment to uninsured or underinsured patients inappropriately transferring them to public hospitals in the area. The
practice became so widespread that Congress enacted federal anti-dumping legislation as
part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L.
No. 99-272, § 9121, 100 Star. 82, 164-67 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986)). For a
discussion of the patient-dumping phenomenon and the effects of COBRA, see Enfield &
Sklar, Patient Dumping in the Hospital Emergency Department: Renewed Interest in an Old Problem,
13 AM. J.L. & MED. 561 (1988).
30. E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF
BENEFICENCE IN HEALTHCARE 4 (1988).

31. Faden and Beauchamp observe that:
[M]edicine was jolted from an exclusive preoccupation with a beneficence model
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As for the notion that accepting the patient's decision would be tantamount to assisting suicide, the American Medical Association and major medical specialty organizations have promulgated ethical rulings and
other statements of principle to the effect that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment does not constitute homicide, suicide, or aiding, abetting or assisting suicide, and that rather, the2
3
underlying disease process is the ultimate cause of the patient's death.
Furthermore, in situations where the attending physician is uncomfortable with following the patient's decision the patient can usually be transferred to a physician who can abide by the patient's wishes.
III.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT REFUSAL CASES

Customarily, when an individual or an entity initiates a legal action
against another individual or entity, the purpose is to endorse a legal
right that the plaintiff has vis-a-vis the defendant. Except for instances
in which one party is legally empowered to bring an action on behalf of
another, such as a parent on behalf of a child or a guardian on behalf of
an incompetent, courts will dismiss a legal action which is not prosecuted by "the real party in interest."'5 3 The treatment refusal cases,
however, constitute a curious exception to this general principle of the
law of civil procedure. In most of these cases, the healthcare provider
does not assert per se a legal right to treat the patient over her objection
or a legal duty on the part of the patient to submit to the treatment
directives of the healthcare provider. The reason they do not will be
discussed later in this section. Rather, the health care provider purports
to assert certain interests of the state that may override the common law
and constitutional (state & federal) rights of the patient to refuse treatment. Because of the pivotal role these interests play in the judicial
analysis and outcome of treatment refusal cases, I will analyze them at
some length in the first part of this section. I will then discuss the process by which courts transform treatment refusal cases into actions
which balance certain state interests against the patient's privacy and autonomy interests. It is important to remember that such cases typically
arise in one of two formats. Either the physician or the healthcare instito awareness of an autonomy model of responsibility for the patient. Physicians
had heretofore considered the physician-patient relationship by beginning from
the patient's submission to the physician's professional beneficence. The law enlarged that perspective by viewing the relationship within a wider social framework, emphasizing instead that patients voluntarily initiate the relationship and
have the right to define its boundaries to fit their own ends.
R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 142-43.
32. See e.g. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.18 (1986).

33. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides in pertinent part that:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.... No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party
in interest.
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tution as plaintiff seeks a court order authorizing treatment over the defendant patient's objection, or the patient as plaintiff seeks a court order
requiring the defendant healthcare provider to honor the patient's refusal of treatment. My position is that there are significant procedural
infirmities which should preclude the courts from granting the relief
sought by the plaintiff in the former situation, and substantive infirmities
which should preclude the courts from denying the relief sought in the
latter situation.
Courts circumvent these infirmities by balancing the interests of the
patient and the state. Since in most cases the courts do so without the
state being a party to the litigation, I argue that this approach is contrary
to the fundamental procedural law and inures to the detriment of the
patient. Throughout the section I also highlight procedural tools available to the patient and her counsel when attempting to slow-down and
reverse the juggernaut that treatment refusal cases tend to become.
A.

The Four State Interests
1. Origins of the Interests

The case most often cited for the existence, identity and applicability of overriding state interests is Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz;34 however, as in many other cases that cite it as authority,
Saikewicz merely names the four interests without giving any historical,
philosophical, or legal analysis. It then proceeds to apply them to the
facts of the case at bar. Although many commentators have correctly
pointed out that in the case of a competent adult these state interests
rarely prevail, only one commentator has seriously challenged their ac35
tual validity or applicability.
It has also been suggested that Saikewicz actually derived the four
state interests from the Georgetown College case.3 6 Certainly Judge Skelly
34. 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977). The four state interests are: "(1)
the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the
prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."
This case involved a profoundly retarded, non-verbal 67 year old man. He suffered these
afflictions all of his life. After being diagnosed with leukemia, chemotherapy was recommended by his physician. Although the court acknowledged that the average person
would, in all likelihood, consent to the treatment, in Mr. Saikewicz's situation it was held to
be inappropriate. Several factors influenced the court's decision: the patient would not
understand the nature and purpose of the treatment, and therefore, would probably resist
it; the pain, nausea and vomiting it would engender would appear to Mr. Saikewicz as
torture; and even with the treatment the prognosis was very poor - only a 30% to 50%
chance of a brief remission.
Although this case is heavily relied upon for the application of the four state interests
in treatment refusal cases, the reasoning of the court in applying a substituted judgment
standard to a patient who has never been competent has generated unprecedented criticism-both in terms of volume and harshness-in the literature. See, e.g., Ramsey, The
Saikewicz Precedent: What's Goodforan Incompetent Patient, 8 Hastings Center Rep., Dec. 1978,
at 36, 39.
35. Oberman, Withdrawal of Life Support: IndividualAutonomy Against Alleged State Interests
in PreservingLife, 20 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 797 (1989).
36. Morgan & Harty-Golder, ConstitutionalDevelopment ofJudicial Criteriain Right-to-Die
Cases: From Brain Dead to Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 721, 736 (1988).
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Wright, in his opinion supporting the order of the transfusion over the
patient's objection, justifies his ruling by the parens patriae power of the
state. This power protects the lives of children and adults whose capacity to make decisions is impaired. Further, it promotes society's legal
and moral sanctions against suicide. Additionally, it facilitates the
state's interest in preventing parents from abandoning their minor
37
children.
While the doctrine of physician-patient privilege provided a basis
for Judge Wright's decision, the urgent circumstances of the case clearly
precluded a careful study of the legitimacy of the state's interests in this
situation. It is evident that these circumstances played a role in Judge
Wright's decision. In reviewingJudge Wright's decision, Judge Miller of
the court of appeals stated:
[Judge Wright was] ... impelled, I am sure, by humanitarian
impulses and doubtless was himself under considerable strain
....
In the interval of about an hour and twenty minutes between the appearance of the attorneys at his chambers and the
signing of the order at the hospital, the judge had no opportunity for research as to the substantive legal problems and procedural questions involved. 8He should not have been asked to
3
act in these circumstances.
Sadly, many appellate courts have reviewed similar hasty trial court rulings and have not bothered carefully and critically to analyze the dubious origins of these four state interests which remain obstacles to
39
patients who wish to refuse necessary medical treatment.
The moral and political basis of government in the United States is
indisputably the promotion of respect for and protection of each citizen's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 40 Cases such as
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,4 1 upholding compulsory vaccination against
smallpox, limit a person's right to refuse medical "treatment" on the
grounds that the general public safety and welfare would be unreasonablyjeopardized. 4 2 Conversely, there are no public health, safety, or wel37. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007-09 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
38. Id. at 1014. In treatment refusal cases there appears to be ajudicial imperative to
act that parallels the medical one. It seems that judges, like the physicians who petition
them, all too readily succumb to the admonition "above all else, do something." Cf. infra
notes 76 and 77 and accompanying text.
39. This includes the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cruzan, which lists and gives
constitutional stature to these interests without critical analysis or discussion. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1990).
40. Declaration of Independence.
41. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
42. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonableconditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the
safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal
enjoyment of the same right by others.
Id. at 26-27 (Emphasis added) (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
It is interesting to note, in the context of the discussion of forcing treatment on unwilling
patients, that the Supreme Court prioritized liberty, not life, as the greatest of all rights.
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fare issues raised when an individual patient declines treatment
proffered by a healthcare provider.
2.

Preserving Life

The first state interest is said to be that of "preserving life" or, using the ecclesiastical phraseology, maintaining the sanctity of life. This
interest involves two separate but related concerns. The first is an interest in preserving the life of the particular patient in the case at bar; the
second is a more generalized interest in maintaining the sanctity of all
life. 43 The implicit assumption justifying this state interest as one which
must be considered in treatment refusal cases, is that if the state, through
its licensed medical practitioners, hospitals and courts, allowed patients
to decide to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it would inevitably result in
a widespread trend which would ultimately undermine the proposition
that life is sacred. Without invading the province of the next section of
this article, it is important to note the implications of judicially confronting a patient who has refused a recommended medical therapy after due and informed deliberation with the long term societal
implications of this most private and personal decision. By introducing
this element into the equation, the courts are asserting that a competent
adult may be commandeered into service as living proof of his government's regard for life by being forced to undergo treatment that she has
consciously rejected. 44 To do so, even in only one case out of a hundred, is to violate the fundamental Kantian principle that individuals are
45
to be treated as ends and not as means.
Certainly those who question the legitimacy of and beneficent motivation for asserting such a countervailing state interest could take some
comfort if the courts were openly to refuse to discuss the state's interest
in the sanctity of life on the ground that it did not apply to at least some
portion of treatment-refusal cases. There are, however, no reported decisions in which a court has refused to accept jurisdiction on the
grounds that a private physician has no legal right to force treatment on
a competent patient, or that the state is not a party to the proceeding so
as to properly invoke either the parens patriae power or the four state
interests.
This view, or course, is consistent with the perceptions of the Founders, most memorably
stated by Patrick Henry, that a life lived in the absence of freedom is not preferable to
death. Furthermore, the human bondage inflicted by many diseases rivals and often surpasses any other kind known to man.
43. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
44. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan: "However commendable may be the State's interest in human life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes." Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2892 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H. Paton trans. 1949).
The instances in which this proposition is more frequently violated involve pregnant women. See generally Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Caesareans,supra note 5.
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Prevention of Suicide

The second state interest is the prevention of suicide. The weight
of authority currently supports the proposition that refusing life-saving
46
medical treatment, whether it is the amputation of a gangrenous limb
or the use of a mechanical ventilator,4 7 does not constitute suicide. The
ensuing death is deemed to be the result of the underlying medical condition, not the patient's act of refusing treatment.4 8 The moment we
attempt to qualify the right to consent or refuse to consent to treatment
based upon the purported "wisdom" of the decision or its potentially
lethal consequences (when they are wholly or primarily self-regarding),
the right disappears in a swarm of qualifications and judgmental characterizations. The right to choose should not be limited by the stipulation
that it be a wise choice. 49 It simply must be a choice that does not invade the rights of others. Neither physicians, hospitals, nor even immediate family members have rights that are in any way invaded by a
patient's exercise of such a choice. To argue to the contrary, in the case
of the members of the immediate family, for example, would be to assert
that a spouse or minor child could prevent the other adult parent from
engaging in any inherently dangerous activity, such as skydiving, hanggliding, or mountain-climbing, on the grounds that he or she created an
unreasonable risk of death or grave injury that could deprive the family
of its "right" to his or her continued existence in the home. We have
never, as a society founded upon the principles of liberty and self-determination, embraced such a proposition.50
4.

Protection of Innocent Third Parties

The third state interest is the protection of innocent third parties.
In treatment refusal cases, the third party is usually a fetus or minor
child of the patient. 5 1 As discussed in the next section, it is this author's
46. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 NJ. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136
Misc. 2d 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
47. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Leach
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Grant, 109
Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
48. See generally A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 66-69 (1989).
49. Bouvia v. Superior Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986).
50. J.S. Mill's statement regarding private decisionmaking is even more compelling in
the refusal of treatment context:
[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or
woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else. The interference of society to overrule his judgment and
purposes in what only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which may be altogether wrong and, even if right, are as likely as not to be
misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those who look at them merely from without.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 74 (E. Rapaport 1978).
51. The issues raised by the refusals of pregnant women to consent to procedures
necessary to save the life of their fetuses are sufficiently complex to be beyond the scope of
this article. Therefore, the discussion that follows will be restricted to refusals of treatment
by the parents of minor children. For cogent discussion of the issues with regard to fe-
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view that there are significant constitutional problems inherent in the
contention that being the parent of a minor child, particularly a single or
an indigent parent, somehow circumscribes one's right to give or withhold consent to his or her own medical treatment as opposed to that of
the minor child. 52 Beyond the constitutional dimension, however, is
the fact alluded to above that society does not purport to circumscribe
fundamental life choices of adults solely on the grounds that they are
parents. Fathers and mothers of minor children can engage in the full
range of lawful but nevertheless inherently dangerous activities - they
can use tobacco products and consume alcoholic beverages, they can
even separate, divorce, and permanently remove themselves from the
minor child's life, subject only to state laws governing financial support.
Indeed, the state even countenances the ultimate voluntary abandonment, placing the child in an adoptive home. Logically an individual's
right to autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity inherent in the informed
consent doctrine should hold with the same vigor for parents of minor
children as it does for any other competent adult.
5.

Medical Ethics

The last of the four interests, maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession, is perhaps the most perplexing of all. Given the
contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship, 58 one might
reasonably ask how abiding by a competent patient's decision whether
or not to consent to a particular procedure could ever compromise the
ethics of the physician. Unfortunately, the courts have given credence to
the proposition that abiding by patient refusals may compromise the
ethics of the profession. 54 Judicial recognition of the merits of such an
argument is tantamount to creating a common law right of physicians to
tuses, see: Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 5; Rhoden, supra note 5; Note, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection,
95 YALE LJ. 599 (1986).
52. See infra note 208-210 and accompanying text. The legal basis and ethical propriety of precluding parents from withholding necessary medical treatment from their minor
children is well established. See generally Annotation, Power of Court or Other Public Agency to
OrderMedical Treatment over ParentalReligious Objections for Child Whose Life Is Not Immediately
Endangered, 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
53. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
54. The case of United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965), involved
far more than a mere allusion to the interest. In what appears to be a shocking instance of
judicial duplicity, the federal judge who decided the case went to the bedside of a hospitalized patient who was refusing on religious grounds a transfusion as part of the treatment
for a bleeding ulcer. After reassuring the patient that the court had no power to force a
transfusion upon him, and that he was free to continue to decline the transfusion, the
judge thereupon signed an order allowing the hospital to administer such transfusions as
the attending physicians deemed necessary to save the patient's life. In the opinion issued
in conjunction with the order, the judge explained his ruling as follows:
In the difficult realm of religious liberty it is often assumed only the religious
conscience is imperiled. Here, however, the doctor's conscience and professional
oath must be respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted
himself to and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he sought to dictate to
the treating physicians a course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice.
To require these doctors to ignore the mandates of their own consciences, even
in the name of free religious exercise, cannot be justified under these circum-
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practice paternalistic medicine. This so-called state interest gives new
55
meaning to the concept of "therapeutic belligerence."
Lurking beneath this state interest is an attitude that individuals
who are not prepared to submit fully to the recommendations of physicians or hospitals should stay away from both. In justifying the hospital's action in bringing the Georgetown College case, Judge Wright says:
"Mrs. Jones sought medical attention and placed on the hospital the
legal responsibility for her proper care. In its dilemma, not of its own
making, the hospital sought judicial direction."' 56 Judge Wright ignores
the fact that part of the hospital's legal responsibility to each patient is to
undertake invasive procedures only when the patient has given a valid
consent.
In the same vein, a commentator has admonished the independentminded patients and patients whose religious convictions conflict with
some aspects of accepted medical practice requiring them to stay out of
hospitals. 57 In one final example, the court in Long IslandJewish-Hillside
Medical Center v. Levitt, 5 8 states, "The Court takes note that once Mr.
Levitt became a patient at [the hospital], it was the responsibility of the
hospital and doctors to treat him" (impliedly even without his consent).
Such language transcends even the most rigid views of medical paternalism by suggesting that entering a hospital or initiating a physician-patient relationship is akin to indentured servitude in that the patient is
denied any decisionmaking responsibility. 59 Fortunately, we have advanced our thinking somewhat since the above examples. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
has promulgated a "Patient's Bill of Rights," 60 and the major medical
stances. The patient may knowingly decline treatment, but he may not demand
mistreatment.
Id. at 754. It is hard to imagine a case in which a patient's refusal of medical treatment
necessary to save his life would not come within this court's definition of "mistreatment."
55. E. PELLEGRINO & D. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF
BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 94 (1988).

56. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom., Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
57. Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatmentfor Unwilling Patients, 36 FORDHAM L. REV.
695, 706 (1968). Interestingly, elsewhere in this article the authors acknowledged that the
standing of physicians and hospitals in treatment refusal cases, either to assert their own
interests or those of the state, is highly questionable in light of the fact that treatment
refusals are the exception and citizens do not have a legal responsibility to submit to medical care either to please healthcare providers or to maintain themselves for society's benefit. Id. at 698-704.
58. 73 Misc. 395, 396, 342 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
59. At one point the Hippocratic Oath describes the physician-patient relationship as
being between one who orders and one who obeys. "Oath of Hippocrates," in HipPoCRATEs, LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY 289 (W. Jones trans. 1972).

60. In order to be accredited, hospitals must adopt a statement of patients' rights that
provides, in pertinent part:
The patient shall not be subjected to any procedure without his voluntary,
competent, and understanding consent or that of his legally authorized
representative....
The patient may refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law. When refusal of
treatment by the patient or his legally authorized representative prevents the provision of appropriate care in accordance with professional standards, the relationship with the patient may be terminated upon reasonable notice.
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organizations have issued statements that it is not a violation of any ethical principles of medicine to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment at the request of the patient or a proper surrogate, or when such
treatment cannot reasonably be expected to benefit the patient. 6 l
B. Justiciabilityand Standing
The vast majority of treatment refusal cases are decided by state
courts. The immediate and significant distinction between state and federal courts is jurisdiction. Federal courts are characterized as courts of
limited jurisdiction. The practical significance of this characterization is
that a person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must,
as a condition precedent, demonstrate that the case which he is bringing
"is within the competence of such a court."' 62 This requirement is based
upon the presumption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless the plaintiff or petitioner has demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation exists. 63 A finding of
subject matter jurisdiction, however, is simply the first step. Questions
of justiciability and standing must also be answered in the plaintiff's
favor before the court may properly proceed with the case. Furthermore, federal subject-matter jurisdiction extends only to "cases" and
"controversies."6 These terms denote two distinct requirements. The
first is that the question at issue in the litigation must be presented in a
genuinely adversarial context as well as in a form which has been historically accepted "as capable of resolution through the judicial process." 65
The controversy requirement recognizes the tripartite allocation of
power in the federal system, and requires the judiciary to steer clear of
areas committed to the legislative and executive branches of the
66
government.
The next hurdle for the would-be federal litigant is the question of
standing. One who seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction must demonstrate "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly un'6 7
lawful conduct likely to be redressed by the requested relief."
Although standing is a well established requirement for federal jurisdiction, federal courts sometimes down play its importance. A case in point
is In re President Georgetown College, Inc. 68 In that case, a teaching hospital
sought an order from federal Judge Skelly Wright allowing the treating
JCAHO, Accreditation Manual XIII (1988).
61. See infra note 62.
62. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 15 (2d ed. 1970).

63. Id.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
65. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-7, at 67 (2d ed. 1988).
66. Id.
67. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Professor Tribe, referring to the language quoted from this opinion, observes that: "Were the case-or-controversy inquiry focused on the existence of a concrete dispute and vigorous advocacy, a litigant alleging no
injury to his own 'interests,' whether statutory or otherwise, might nonetheless have standing." L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 3-15, at I11 n.4 (citation omitted).
68. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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physician to administer transfusions to an adult patient over her religiously-based objections. In the course of his discussion of the facts and
the applicable legal principles, Judge Wright at no time discussed the
issues of standing and justiciability. Instead, he focused on his personal
view that the refusal of life-sustaining treatment was tantamount to suicide, and that the patient had a responsibility to the community to care
for her infant. Therefore, he concluded, the people had an interest in
preserving the patient's life which presumably was a more compelling
interest than the patient's interests in autonomy, self-determination, and
69
bodily integrity.
The most significant aspect of this case for purposes of this article is
the dissenting opinion written by Justice Burger in the decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denying rehearing en banc. Justice Burger asserted that courts "have an
obligation to deal with the basic question whether any judicially cognizable issue is presented when a legally competent adult refuses, on
grounds of conscience, to consent to a medical treatment essential to
preserve life."'70 Since the "touchstone" ofjusticiability is "'injury to a
legally protected right,' [t]he threshold issue... [must be] whether the
hospital had a right which it was entitled to require the court to enforce." 7 1 It was undisputed in this case that both the patient and her
husband had offered to provide the hospital with a written release from
liability for any adverse consequences that might flow from honoring the
patient's refusal to authorize the transfusions. Since apparently the only
"injury" the hospital could put forward was a potential lawsuit by some
other party claiming to have suffered an economic loss from the death of
found the hospital's assertion of economic
the patient, Justice Burger
72
damage unsupported.
Justice Burger's discussion of the justiciability issue is instructive for
right to refuse treatment cases in state courts as well. Quoting Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
Burger asserts:
Limitation on "the judicial power of the United States" is expressed by the requirement that the litigant must have "stand69. Id. at 1008. In his opinion judge Wright also makes reference to the parenspatriae
power of the state. As will be discussed at greater length hereinafter, the judge in this and
virtually every other case assumes that the healthcare providers, even when they are private institutions or individuals, can invoke and assert this sovereign power of the state.
This is an assumption that is subject to serious question.
70. 331 F.2d at 1015 (Burger, dissenting).
71. Id (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 841 U.S. 123
(1950)). A review of the right to refuse treatment cases painfully demonstrates that this
question is one which state and federal trial and appellate judges rarely, if ever, bother to
ask in such cases.
72. Id. at 1015-16. Without any regard to procedural or jurisdictional niceties, the
courts in such cases allow the plaintiff healthcare provider, without legitimate portfolio, to
don the cloak of the state and assert its supposed interests. In criticizing this phenomenon, I am, of course, excluding those cases which are properly decided in the procedural
posture of a guardianship hearing which seeks to demonstrate that the patient, because of
decisional incapacity, is an appropriate subject of the state's parens patriae power.
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ing to sue" or, more comprehensively, that a federal court may
entertain a controversy only if it is "justiciable." Both characterizations mean that a court will not decide a question unless
the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted,
and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial
determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking,
the business of the Colonial courts and the
courts of Westmin73
ster when the Constitution was framed.
Justice Burger goes on to interpret the above language as addressing
more than merely the well-established concept of limited federal jurisdiction as compared with broader state court jurisdiction since the Colonial courts and the Courts of Westminster of the 1780's were courts of
general jurisdiction. Frankfurter's point, according to Burger, is that
there are matters of "strictly private concern" that do not fit properly
within the legitimate authority of any of the three branches of government. Addressing the appropriateness of any federal or state court taking jurisdiction over cases brought by healthcare providers when
presumably competent patients refuse life-sustaining procedures, he
opines:
[W]e must inquire where an assumption of jurisdiction over
such matters could lead us. Physicians, surgeons and hospitals
and others as well are often confronted with seemingly irreconcilable demands and conflicting pressures. Philosophers and
theologians have pondered these problems and different religious groups have evolved different solutions; the solutions
and doctrines of one group are sometimes not acceptable to
other groups or sects.... May the physician or hospital require
the courts to decide? A patient may be in a critical condition
requiring, in the minds of experts, certain medical or surgical
procedure. If the patient has objections to that treatment...
are the courts empowered to decide for him?
Some of our greatest jurists have emphasized the need for
judicial awareness of the limits on judicial power which is simply an acknowledgement of human fallibility.
[W]e should... reconcile ourselves to the idea that there are
myriads of problems and troubles which judges are powerless
to solve; and this is as it should be. Some matters of essentially
private concern and others of enormous public concern, are
beyond the reach of judges. 74
In 1964 Justice Burger was a voice crying in the wilderness. To a
disturbingly significant degree, few judges at any level have expressed
similar concerns about the encroachment of government and the courts
into matters of private decisionmaking. 7 5 Perhaps, like Judge Skelly
73. 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (1964) (Burger J., dissenting) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1950)).
74. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1017-18 (D.C.

Cir.)(footnote omitted), cert. denied sub norm.,
Jones v. President of Georgetown College,
Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
75. Treatment refusal cases are replete with judicial references to the "unacceptable"
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Wright, they are unable or unwilling to maintain their judicial demeanor
and detachment when the healthcare provider's lawyer calls and says:
"We need an order for treatment stat!"' 76 Judge Markowitz of New
York, one of the few state court judges to have demonstrated sensitivity
to issues of jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability, nevertheless succumbed to the pressures of a life or death situation in at least one of
several such cases that came before him during his years on the bench.
His anxiety is evident in the reported opinion:
Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my
shoulders. Years of legal training, experience and responsibility had added a new dimension to my mental processes - I,
almost by reflex action, subjected the papers to the test ofjusticiability, jurisdiction and legality. I read Application of President
and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. and was convinced of the
proper course from a legal standpoint. Yet, ultimately, my dethis woman's life was rooted in more fundacision to act to save
77
mental precepts.
UnlikeJudge Markowitz, most state court judges do not make a distinction between general and unlimited jurisdiction. If left unchalposition in which patients place health care providers when they seek medical assistance
but then proceed to pick and choose the types of treatment they accept and those they
reject. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
76. Consider, for example, the following case of a 72 year old female who was hospitalized for pneumonia. A week after admission she was found to have gangrene in both
legs and was told she would need to undergo bilateral, below-the-knee amputations in
order to have more than an estimated 10% chance of survival. The patient refused to
consent to the amputations, whereupon a psychiatric consult was immediately sought, requiring the consulting psychiatrist to drive through a snowstorm to the hospital to examine the patient and give an immediate opinion. In all likelihood, the surgeons would
have performed the amputations without such a consult and based only on the patient's
consent, if the patient had in fact consented. But because she refused her consent, a psychiatric consult was ordered. The psychiatrist concluded, solely on the basis of the patient's refusal of consent despite the bleak prognosis, that her refusal was persuasive
evidence of her incapacity to give an informed consent or refusal. The very next day the
state department of human services, having been brought into the matter by the hospital,
sought custody of the patient and authority to consent to the surgery. The trial court
judge, who granted the custody petition which resulted in the patient's legs being amputated, acknowledged later that he had allowed himself to be misled by the way in which the
case was presented. He was given the impression that the surgeon was waiting with scalpel
in hand by the telephone. The consulting psychiatrist, when subsequently queried, similarly acknowledged that he had not adequately examined the patient when he reached his
conclusion, but that was because he was in a time crunch because of the purported lifethreatening situation. Abernathy, Compassion, Control, and Decisions About Competency, in
BioETcs: READINGS AND CASES 60 (B. Brody & H. Engelhardt 1987).

77. Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 267
N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (1965). This case, like Georgetown College, involved a Jehovah's Witness
patient who would not consent to a transfusion but who did not necessarily regard one
administered over her objection as placing her in a religious quandary.
Judge Markowitz also decided a case in which an elderly female patient who clearly
was incapacitated refused to consent to an amputation. In denying the guardianship petition, he observed that there was "serious doubt here as to the existence of a truly justiciable legal controversy, despite the claimed vital factor of a human life hanging in the
balance." In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 621, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 628 (1966). He went on
to state, in the same vein asJustice Burger in Georgetown College: "Confronted by a situation
such as this, I am of the opinion that the time has come for courts to inquire where a
continued condonation of such action and where a continued assumption of jurisdiction
over such matters lead." Id. at 623, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
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lenged by the defendants in refusal-of-treatment cases, judges operate
on the presumption that they have jurisdiction over such controversies. 78 The question remains nevertheless, at least in those cases in
which the patient-defendant is represented by competent counsel, why
issues ofjurisdiction and standing are not raised. Even in cases of bedside hearings by the judge, those issues can and should be raised,
thereby preserving them for appeal if the court refuses to consider them
at the time. The absence of jurisdictional discussion in the growing
body of appellate decisions is perplexing and troubling. Mootness cannot be the answer. Appellate courts often refuse to dismiss the appeal
on the grounds of mootness in order to assure that important issues
79
which are likely to recur are ultimately resolved.
C. Elements of a Cause ofAction
The case or controversy doctrine is based upon the principle that
courts exist (federal and state) for the determination of actual and presently existing controversies, and not, except under special and limited
provisions for declaratory judgments, to provide a basis for judicial
opinions upon discrete points of law. It is, therefore, axiomatic that unless a claim presented to a court contains all of the requisite elements of
a cause of action, it must fail and should be dismissed. An examination
of the essential elements of a valid cause of action clearly demonstrates
the fatal flaws in most refusal-of-treatment lawsuits.
The first element is the existence of a "primary legal right" with
which the law has invested the plaintiff and for which the law provides a
remedy against the party infringing that right.80 Thus, in the case of a
competent patient refusing to submit to an invasive procedure by a physician, the law must invest the physician with a legal right to perform the
procedure with or without the patient's consent. The law of informed
consent provides exactly the opposite. Without valid consent, actual or
presumed, the physician has no right to perform such a procedure, and
in fact can be held liable to the patient on a theory of battery or medical
malpractice.
Since the first element of a cause of action is absent, the physician's
petition should be dismissed because it is defective. If the physician has
no legal right to treat a patient without his consent, then clearly the second element, violation of a right or duty owed to the plaintiff by the
defendant, is absent as well. Patients, once they engage in the contractual physician-patient relationship, have no duty to submit to any treatment recommended by the physician. As set out in the previous section,
the relationship must be constantly reaffirmed at every stage, and the
patient must be the final arbiter. 8 1 If the physician considers himself
78. C. Wright, supra note 62.
79. See, e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 221 n.1, 551 N.E.2d 77, 78 n.1, 551
N.Y.S.2d 876, 887 n.l (Ct. App. 1990).
80. Granahan v. Celanese Corp., 3 NJ. 187, 191, 69 A.2d 572, 574 (1949).
81. See supra note 17.
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ethically compromised by the patient's refusal, his only legitimate recourse is to withdraw from the relationship. By filing an action in pursuit of a court order compelling the patient to submit to the physician's
recommended treatment, the physician seeks specific performance of a
purported contractual obligation of the patient to accept treatment. No
such contractual obligation exists.
Finally, it is a well-established principle that the proper exercise of a
legal right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
even if the other party can demonstrate an adverse consequence.
Therefore, since the patient has the right to refuse medical treatment,
the exercise of that right cannot be actionable on the part of the physician even if he can demonstrate some damage, such as compromising his
perception of medical ethics or creating a fear that ultimately the nontreatment may be the subject of a malpractice claim. Such damage is to
82
be considered damnum absque injuria. ("Damage without wrong.")

D. ProceduralChallenges to Actions Seeking to Force Treatment
The rules of civil procedure in effect in every jurisdiction, and particularly Federal Rule 12(b), provide a theoretically effective means to
83
challenge efforts to force treatment on unwilling, competent patients.
Rule 12(b) (1), for example, authorizes the filing of a motion to dismiss a
petition or complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. Similarly, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) asserts that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Once
filed, the court must rule on the motion before proceeding further with

the case.8 4 In the context of such motions a patient can properly assert
that his refusal of treatment does not constitute a civil wrong to the hospital or his treating physician, or a breach of contract. To the contrary,
the bringing of such an action is an attempt by the healthcare provider
to extend the contractual relationship beyond the limits of mutual consent in violation of the fundamental principles which govern the physi-

82. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d
70, 73 (1966).
83. Similar rules exist in most, if not all, states. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) states in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack ofjurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.... If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
84. See, e.g., 4 R. HARDAWAY & S. HYA-r, COLORADO PRACTI1CE 108 (2d ed. 1985). Even
if the patient does not make a formal motion, the court may sua sponte (on its own motion)
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.
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cian-patient relationship and the doctrine of informed consent. 85
When the issue is whether the physician has a legitimate cause of
action against the patient, a motion for summary judgment is a more
expeditious and effective method to achieve the prompt termination of
an action that lacks substantive merit. Usually there are no disputed issues of material fact in these cases unless the patient's competence has
been called into question. Therefore, the facts alleged in the healthcare
provider's petition, as opposed to conclusory allegations that do not
necessarily follow from the facts, will be assumed to be true, and the
86
ultimate question of law decided.
In the typical case, the healthcare provider initiating the action does
not assert interests of a private or personal nature. Were that the case, it
is very difficult to imagine how the petition could survive a Rule 12(b)
motion. Rather, the healthcare provider attempts, in most cases successfully, to characterize its role as spokesperson of or surrogate for society and/or the state. No reported cases have been found in which the
patient-defendant, or the court on its own motion, has challenged the
standing of a healthcare provider to assert the interests of the state in
the litigation without any special designation or without the formal intervention of a party for the expressed purpose of representing the
state. 8 7 Since this issue never seems to be raised and discussed in the
cases, one can only speculate how this procedural sleight of hand is accomplished. Perhaps the state court judge presumes to "look after"
these purported state interests.8 8 As a matter of impartiality and judicial
ethics, however, one might well ask how the patient is to receive a fair
hearing if both the plaintiff healthcare provider and the judge are making certain that the interests of the state are respected. Despite the efforts of healthcare providers and judges to assert the contrary, these are
adversarial proceedings-one party seeks to compel the other party's
submission to an invasive medical procedure with inherent risks. In re85. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
86. FED. R. Civ. PRo. 56(b) provides: "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any
part thereof."
87. Several cases, however, involve the states as a party because the trial court
brought the attorney general into the litigation on its own motion. See infra note 99.
88. One argument that has not been explicitly put forward but must be considered as
to how a court from a procedural standpoint can apply the interests of a non-party (the
state) so as to overcome the interests of an actual party (the patient) is that the state interests are in the nature of public policy. Courts routinely invoke such principles in litigation
between private parties in ways which affect the outcome of the case at bar without ever
making a representative of the public a party to the action. For example, conduct or contracts of an illegal or immoral nature cannot be a proper basis forjudicial relief at law or in
equity. In response to this rationale for application of the state interests in treatment
refusal cases, I would suggest three flaws: first, this justification has never been expressly
offered by the courts; second, the "void as against public policy" principle has always been
applied as an absolute bar to the action, never as a countervailing consideration; and third,
the right to refuse treatment as a general principle has too much support in the case law
and the legal and ethical literature to simply be dismissed as against public policy.
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gard to these purported state interests, the protection of its citizen's
rights to autonomy and bodily integrity is rarely asserted.
If, as a matter of fact and law, it is the state's interests and not those
of the healthcare providers that are actually counterpoised to the patient's well-established right to refuse treatment, then the court should
not proceed further without the state becoming a party to the suit. Rule
12(b)(7) provides as a basis for a motion to dismiss situations in which a
necessary party as defined by Rule 19 has not been joined. For such a
motion to be granted, the court must determine that disposition of the
action in that party's absence might prejudice the missing party or the
parties already before the court. Now that the United States Supreme
Court has recognized both the patient's constitutional right to refuse
treatment and the state's (not the healthcare provider's) right to assert
its countervailing interests, 8 9 the patient should insist that the state
come forward and affirmatively demonstrate in court what its interests
are in the matter and why they should prevail. Without the state's participation as an actual party, the patient is prejudiced by the speculative
nature in which these state interests are introduced. Although a civil
matter, there is a sense in which the patient has the same need to confront his "accuser" (who would override his constitutional and common
law right to privacy and bodily integrity) as a defendant in a criminal
90
case.
89. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2041 (1990). This case is the
first so-called "right-to-die" case that the Supreme Court has considered. Briefly, the case
involves an adult female patient, Nancy Cruzan, who has been in a chronic vegetative state
since an automobile accident in 1983. She receives nutrition and hydration through a
gastrostomy tube surgically implanted in her stomach. Based upon her physician's opinion that she will not return to a cognitive, sapient state, and her own statements while
competent that she would not want to be maintained in a vegetative condition, her parents
requested that the gastrostomy tube be removed. When the nursing home in which she
resides refused, the parents initiated legal proceedings. The hearing judge ruled, consistent with the position of the guardian ad litem appointed to represent Nancy Cruzan, that
her parents, as co-guardians of her person, were acting in her best interests and consistent
with her previously expressed wishes when they requested removal of the gastronomy
tube. Therefore, the respondents were ordered to follow their instructions. On appeal, a
divided Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan would have refused artificial nutrition and hydration,
her parents were without authority to order it.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
although competent patients have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment arising out of the liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment, the state may properly assert its countervailing interests and may constitutionally require, in the case of
incompetent patients, clear and convincing evidence of the patient's views before allowing
a surrogate to order the removal of life-sustaining treatment.
90. The decision in Cruzan suggests, in a brief and somewhat cryptic reference, that
the "guarantee of accurate factfinding that the adversary process brings with it" is not a
requirement imposed by the Constitution upon states in proceedings involving the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment for an incompetent patient. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct.
at 2853. This view, however, presumes that such proceedings could never result in a legally cognizable injury to the patient, a point which the dissenting justices and many other
thoughtful persons would contest. Arguably, an incompetent patient such as Nancy
Cruzan, who is maintained on life-support when her conscious and competent choice
would have been to the contrary, is seriously injured by governmental action, and hence is
entitled not merely to the rigors and formalities of an adversarial proceeding, but also to
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In cases where the trial court refuses to consider and rule upon a
Rule 12(b) motion, and instead wrongfully assumes jurisdiction ordering treatment over a competent adult's objection, most states provide an
avenue for speedy relief directly from the state supreme court before the
trial court order is carried out. For example, Colorado Rule of Civil
Procedure 106(4) provides that in a case in which it is alleged that an
inferior state tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, and there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law, the Colorado Supreme Court may
direct that tribunal to show cause why it should not be prohibited from
proceeding further. 9 1 The supreme court review is solely to determine
whether jurisdiction has been exceeded or abused. 92 The review is by
no means a cursory one in which the lower court's exercise ofjurisdiction is rubber-stamped or automatically assumed proper. In this regard,
the Colorado Supreme Court has stated:
"[n]o question of greater 'public importance' can arise than
one in which a court is proceeding without jurisdiction of the
person or subject matter." In the interest of justice, we consider it as much our duty, when our superintending control of
inferior tribunals is invoked, to keep such tribunals within their
errors of such tribunals exercisjurisdiction, as it is to correct
93
ing proper jurisdiction.
Clearly such a challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction by a trial
court in our hypothetical case would be appropriate. There is no allegation that the patient lacks capacity to make an informed decision; therefore, the court cannot base its assumption of jurisdiction upon a
guardianship proceeding for an incompetent adult. Neither can the
plaintiff physician demonstrate any common law claim, contractual right,
or tortious wrong suffered because his recommendations were not
94
followed.
E. Applying the State Interests
Returning to the hypothetical case, perhaps the only one of the four
state interests that cannot be applied is the last, and only because our
the due process protection of the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467
F.2d 755, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
91. This review is discretionary, and one would, of course, need to seek a stay of the
trial court's ruling pending any Rule 106 disposition by the supreme court.
92. Kellner v. District Court, 127 Colo. 320, 324, 256 P.2d 887, 889 (1953).
93. Id. at 324, 256 P.2d at 889 (quoting Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 343,
180 P.2d 525, 532 (1947)).
94. Relying for support on language in cases such as Bartling v. Superior Court, 163
Cal. App. 3d 186, 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 (1984) and In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
382, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), one article states unequivocally:
[N]o statute, regulation, or judicial decision places an affirmative duty on physicians ... to seek a court order that would override the wishes of any competent
adult patient, including a pregnant woman.... There is no reported case imposing civil damages or criminal penalties on any physician for failing to seek judicial
review of a competent adult's refusal of treatment. In fact, courts have flatly rejected the notion that a physician could be held civilly or criminally liable for
honoring the competent adult's refusal of medical treatment.
Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 5, at 724-25.
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patient is neither hospitalized nor seeking alternative treatment from the
physician. The state can claim an interest in his continued life, which is
a realistic possibility (beyond 18 months) only if he undergoes chemotherapy. If chemotherapy in his case would be life-saving, then those
with Judge Skelly Wright's viewpoint can call his refusal an act of suicide. 9 5 The most compelling of the three state interests as applied to
the situation of our hypothetical patient is that his acceptance of death
by cancer can be characterized as a form of abandonment of his economically-dependent wife and minor children, which might ultimately create
a financial drain on the state treasury. Proponents of the viability and
propriety of these state interests would find in this hypothetical a compelling case for a court order subjecting our patient to treatment against
his will.
The aspect of the hypothetical that might cause a court to hesitate,
even if presided over by a state interests advocate, is that the patient is
not in the hospital or, as yet, in a seriously debilitated condition. Consequently, if the order for treatment were issued but the patient refused to
comply with it, there would likely be only two practical alternatives open
to the judge, both of them highly repugnant to the citizens of a democratic society. The first alternative would be to hold the patient in contempt of court for failing to submit to treatment. Like journalists who
have been ordered but refuse to divulge confidential sources, he would
be placed in jail until he purged himself of contempt or obtained his
96
release on bond pending appellate review of the trial court's order.
The second option would be for the court, pursuant to the order, to
have the patient taken from his home by the police, hospitalized in a
locked unit, and perhaps even placed in four-point restraints for purposes of the actual administration of chemotherapy. Such "shock the
conscience" behavior by a court of law would reach far beyond what the
United States Supreme Court has upheld with regard to forced bodily
examination or treatment of criminal suspects, 9 7 thus most courts would
probably be convinced, in light of the logistical difficulties posed by the
hypothetical, that the four interests of the individual-in autonomy, selfdetermination, privacy, and bodily integrity-are more compelling in
this case. 98 The point, however, is that continued recognition of these
95. In his concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, Justice
Scalia joins the decimated ranks of those who still consider the refusal of life-sustaining
medical treatment to be suicide. 110 S. Ct. 2041 at 2059-62 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
96. This would hardly fulfill the patient's expressed desires to spend his remaining
days in quality time with his family.
97. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (disallowing law enforcement efforts
to force surgery on a suspect to remove a bullet); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (holding a forcible stomach pump to obtain swallowed narcotics to be
unconstitutional).
98. Professor Meisel makes the point that the proclivity of the courts in treatment
refusal cases to assert the state interests in an adversarial fashion against the liberty interests of the individual "erroneously" suggests that the state has no concern for the autonomy, self-determination, privacy, and bodily integrity of its citizens. However, he cites
only one case in which the state demonstrated any concern for those individual interests.
In that case, Mercy Hosp. v.Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated 306
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state interests in the case of a competent patient, and the willingness of
courts to overlook genuine issues of justiciability and proper parties,
means that every patient is at risk of having his or her refusal to consent
to recommended treatment subjected to judicial review. Furthermore,
the patient has virtually no recourse against the healthcare provider for
this fundamental violation of privacy expectations.9 9 The time has
come, therefore, as the Supreme Court recognized in Cruzan, to acknowledge the constitutional stature of the right to refuse treatment.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT

The constitutional dimension of the right to refuse treatment was
recognized by the NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan. 00 Since
then, commentators have noted a trend by state courts away from a constitutional basis for recognizing the right to refuse treatment and toward
primary, if not exclusive, reliance upon the common law. 0 1 In particuMd. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986), the state, in an amicus brief, opposed the hospital's effort
to override a competent patient's refusal of a potentially life-saving transfusion on the
grounds that in such a case fundamental individual liberty overrode the state interest in
preservinj life. A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 96-97.
In a case decided subsequent to Professor Meisel's book, Georgia v. McAfee, 259 Ga.
579, 385 S.E.2d 651 (1989), a similar conclusion was reached. That case involved a motorcycle accident victim whose spinal cord injury rendered him a quadriplegic and incapable
of spontaneous respiration. When, after four years of ventilator dependency, he requested
that the respirator be turned off, the public hospital and attending physician declined to
follow his request. The patient filed an action in the state trial court seeking an order that
the respirator be turned off and that he be provided with appropriate medication to alleviate the pain that he would thereafter experience.
The trial judge brought the Georgia Attorney General into the case to represent the
interests of the state; however, the Attorney General took the position that although the
state did not advocate or approve of the course of action the patient sought to pursue,
there was no basis on the facts of the case upon which the state could legitimately intervene and oppose the patient's exercise of his right to refuse treatment. The patient prevailed at the trial court level, as well as in the state supreme court, where an appeal was
taken by the Attorney General at the direction of the trial court because the case was one
of first impression in Georgia.
99. See Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Deveopments in the Law, 65 DEN. U.L. REv.
181 (1988) for a review of the dismal prospects for patients in such countersuits.
Although far short of a trend, two recent decisions as reported in 18 HEALTH L. DIG. 6
(1990) offer a glimmer of hope that the trend may be reversing. In Malette v. Shulman
(1990, 72 O.R. (2d) 417; [1990] OJ. No. 450; Doc. No. CA 29/88 (Ont. C.A.), a trial court
award of $20,000 was upheld in favor of a patient in an action in which she alleged that the
treating physician disregarded a card stating that she was a Jehovah's Witness and, as a
matter of religious belief, rejected blood transfusions under any circumstance. The plaintiff was unconscious at the time the transfusions were administered. In the second case,
Lunsford v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 837936, Cal. Sup. Ct., Co. of San Francisco
(April 13, 1990), the parents recovered $500,000 in a special verdict against the medical
center and surgeons for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs
were Jehovah's Witness parents of a child with kidney disease. In authorizing a kidney
transplant, they specified that transfusions were not to be used. When that was reported
to be unacceptable to the transplant team, the parents made arrangements for transfer of
their child to a hospital in Houston where the procedure would be performed without
transfusions. Thereupon, the parents were advised that the team in San Francisco would
perform the transplant without transfusions when in fact arrangements were being made
for court-ordered transfusions.
100. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 38, 355 A.2d 647, 668, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
101. See L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-11, at 1365.
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lar, it is noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy 102
expressly stated that it was relying exclusively on common law principles. 10 3 Although it may be sound judicial policy, particularly on the
part of a state court, to rely on a common law right of citizens in an area
in which the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken, such reliance should not be viewed as a denigration or denial of a constitutional
basis for the same right.
In this section I will first discuss the United States Supreme Court
decision in the Cruzan case. I will then propose that basing the right to
refuse treatment on constitutional privacy grounds provides a more rational and effective means of preserving and protecting the interests of
the individual from unwarranted intrusion by the state. I will discuss the
sources for such a constitutional right, and, in doing so, I will take issue
with recent commentators who argue that constitutional arguments are
superfluous in right-to-die cases. Finally, I will distinguish, on constitutional principles, between privacy and autonomy, and suggest that the
former, construed in the context of the historic nature of the physicianpatient relationship, is a proper basis for a presumed family guardianship that would drastically limit the role of the state in private healthcare
decisionmaking.
A.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health

The United States Supreme Court has just handed down its decision in the Cruzan case. 10 4 While it presumes that competent patients
have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, based upon the liberty interest of the fourteenth
amendment, it holds that Missouri law does not unconstitutionally encumber that right by requiring that the surrogate decisionmaker for an
incompetent patient present clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have refused nutrition and hydration under the current circumstances. As noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the opinion of the
Court, "determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his
liberty interests against the relevant state interests.' 105 Regrettably,
the Court saw no need to analyze these interests, not even the interest
relied upon by Missouri in Cruzan-preserving life.
102. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
103. Finally, in Quinlan. ...we indicated that the right of privacy enunciated by the
Supreme Court "is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances" even if that decision might lead
to the patient's death. While this right of privacy might apply in a case such as
this, we need not decide that issue since the right to decline medical treatment is,
in any event, embraced within the common-law right to self-determination.
Id. at 1223 (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976)) (citations
omitted).
104. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). See supra note
89 for the factual and procedural background of the case.
105. Id. at 2851 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).

1991]

PRIVACY IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONMAKING

29

There are several aspects of the Cruzan case which are particularly
relevant to issues raised in this article. The first is the particular source
in the Constitution for a right to refuse medical treatment. Later in this
section I will discuss in some detail the importance of recognizing a
Constitutional zone of privacy within which medical decisionmaking occurs. It is interesting to note that although the opinion of the Court
bases the right to refuse treatment on the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment, discussion of the
basis for to such a right for medical decisions is oblique and equivocal at
best. The Court's only reference to privacy is the following language in
a footnote: "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse
treatment is encompassed by a generalized right of privacy, we have
never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a
10 6
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."
In the same footnote, the Court cites language from Bowers v. Hardwick 107 which is critical of creating nontextual constitutional rights. It is
clear that the Court is not comfortable in declaring that constitutional
privacy does not encompass medical decisionmaking; however, by relying on the liberty interest, which equates with autonomy, the Court runs
headlong into the problems posed by the incompetent patient. The
Court notes that:
Petitioners go on to assert that an incompetent person should
possess the same right in this respect as is possessed by a competent person.
The difficulty with petitioners' claim is that in a sense it begs
the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to
refuse treatment or any other right. Such a "right" must be
exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.' 0 8
Later in this section I will argue in favor of a constitutional right to refuse treatment based on privacy as opposed to a right based on liberty
or autonomy, which not only avoids the question-begging criticism, but
also comports with the historical context of medical decisionmaking as
well as the overwhelming consensus of the American people. 10 9
Perhaps the most important language in the opinions written by the
various justices in the Cruzan case is that of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in which she discusses the holding of the Court:
[T]he Court does not today decide the issue whether a State
must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be constitutionally
required to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment. Few individuals provide explicit oral or
written instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 2851 n.7 (emphasis added).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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treatment should they become incompetent. States which decline to consider any evidence other than such instructions may
frequently fail to honor a patient's intent.
Today's decision, holding only that the Constitution permits a
State to require clear and convincing evidence of Nancy
Cruzan's desire to have artificial hydration and nutrition withdrawn, does not preclude a future determination that the Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a
patient's duly appointed surrogate.' 10
SinceJustice O'Connor is clearly a swing vote on the issues raised by the
Cruzan case, states seeking to legislate in the area of treatment refusals
by surrogates must carefully consider what would constitute clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's intent. This will not be any easy
task. Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard, which
O'Connor approves, "decline[s] to consider any evidence other than
[explicit oral or written] instructions." 1 I Since Justice O'Connor is
clearly concerned about the fact that few individuals provide such explicit directives as living wills, or duly appoint surrogates through durable powers of attorney for medical care, it is not readily apparent how
she believes states can simultaneously uphold the sanctity of human life
regardless of its quality and simultaneously safeguard the liberty interest
of the typical incompetent patient who has not left clear and convincing
evidence that he would decline life-sustaining treatment in his current
compromised condition.
If Nancy Cruzan had left a living will that rejected nutrition and
hydration should she be diagnosed as being in a chronic vegetative state,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence suggests that she would join the four
dissenting justices in holding that Missouri's refusal to give effect to
such provisions in its living will statute violates the liberty interests of
patients. 12 Whether ChiefJustice Rehnquist orJustices White or Kennedy would join in such a decision would depend upon how they balanced the state's interest in preserving the life of a patient in a chronic
vegetative state against the patient's right to refuse treatment. One of
the key issues left unresolved by the Cruzan case is the methodology for
balancing the conflicting interests of the patient and the state. In the
case of a patient who has left a living will, who has no dependents,
whose physicians agree that there is no likelihood of ever returning to a
cognitive, sapient state, and whose next of kin strongly urge the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, it is difficult to imagine what state
interests could prevail over the expressed wishes of the patient." 3
110. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
113. The Missouri Supreme Court gave a very strong indication as to how it would
balance Nancy Cruzan's right to refuse nutrition and hydration against the state's interest
in preserving life:
Given the fact that Nancy is alive and that the burdens of her treatment are not
excessive for her, we do not believe her right to refuse treatment, whether that
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The most disturbing aspect of the Cruzan decision is the total disregard of the patient as a person. The Court's ruling in Cruzan allows Missouri to totally disregard the best interests of an incompetent patient in
situations in which there is an absence of clear and convincing evidence
that life-sustaining treatment would have been refused. It is this abject
refusal to consider what is in Nancy Cruzan's best interests as a human
being that clearly demonstrates what interest Missouri deems paramount. That interest is not the protection of innocent, incompetent patients from abuse or neglect at the hands of ignorant or malevolent
surrogates, but rather an abstract, dogmatic, quasi-religious principle of
the sanctity of life. The failure of the Missouri appellate courts to ad1 14
dress the best interests of Nancy Cruzan with an objective test
prompted Justice Stevens to conclude that the heart of Missouri's policy
is an effort to define life. He states, in that regard:
Missouri insists, without regard to Nancy Cruzan's own interests, upon equating her life with the biological persistence of
her bodily functions.
The State's unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy
Cruzan's physical existence is comprehensible only as an effort
to define life's meaning, not as an attempt to preserve its
sanctity.
The failure of Missouri's policy to heed the interests of a dying
individual with respect to matters so private is ample evidence
of the policy's illegitimacy.
Only because Missouri has arrogated to itself the power to
define life, and only because the Court permits this usurpation,
are Nancy Cruzan's life and liberty put into disquieting conflict.
If Nancy Cruzan's life were defined by reference to her own
interests, . . . then her constitutionally protected interest in
freedom from unwanted treatment would not come into conflict with her constitutionally protected interest in life. 1 15
Much more can and certainly will be written about the strengths,
weaknesses and implications of the Cruzan decision. For purposes of this
article, however, the most compelling aspect of that case is that the
right proceeds from a constitutional right of privacy or a common law right to
refuse treatment, outweighs the immense, clear fact of life in which the state
maintains a vital interest.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S.CT. 2841 (1990).
114. ContraIn re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (1985) (discuss-

ing several best-interest tests).
115. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886-89 (StevensJ., dissenting). Such a mandate to preserve
life even at the expense of the person who must live it is religious in origin and nature.
Such was the basis upon which Paul Ramsey, infra note 124, argued that the individual
person holds his life in trust as a gift from God and therefore may not decline any medical
treatment necessary to maintain the gift. Only when this notion is openly acknowledged to
be religious, however, can the additional protection of the first amendment be marshaled
in support of patients who resist being held hostage to the state's concept of physicians as
the acolytes of a supreme being who declines to grant individuals dominion over their own
bodies. See also K. Clouser, Sanctity of Life, in MEDICAL ETHIcs 71 (M. Abrams & M. Buchner eds. 1983).
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states are free, but at the present time not required, to rely heavily upon
the family as surrogate decisionmaker. In this regard the Court stated:
"If the State were required by the United States Constitution to repose a
right of 'substituted judgment' with anyone, the Cruzans would surely
qualify. But we do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State
to repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient
16
herself." 1
B.

Refusal of Treatment Based on a ConstitutionalRight to Privacy

As discussed in section III above, once a healthcare provider declines to accept a refusal of treatment decision by a patient or his surrogate, the state government, primarily through the courts, becomes
heavily involved in the decisionmaking process. The outcome, even in
cases that are virtually indistinguishable on their facts, will vary from
court to court and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 11 7 If, as many litigants, judges, legal commentators, and bioethicists have argued, the
right to refuse treatment is fundamental, then that right should not vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."18 Let us examine the case for the
existence of a fundamental constitutional right to refuse treatment
based upon the right to privacy.
Thomas Jefferson observed that "It]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others." ' 1 9 This statement expresses the fundamental libertarian principle extant among the
Founders and those whom they represented that governments are instituted among free men for the purpose of securing the rights of the people, not to create such rights or infringe upon them when their exercise
is in the form of wholly self-regarding conduct. 120 Behind this principle
of democratic government is the basic concept that the individual, not
the state, ought to be the supreme judge of his own best interests. This
is an essential aspect of self-determination.' 2 1 The "moral fact" that a
person belongs to himself and not to the state is undermined by a routine balancing of state interests in an effort to determine whether a pa122
tient's refusal of consent to medical treatment should be upheld.
116. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
117. For example, in many jurisdictions courts have upheld the request of a close family member that life sustaining measures, including respirators and naso-gastric tubes, be
withdrawn from patients in an irreversible coma. Nevertheless, in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990) and In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d
607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1989) such requests were denied by the highest courts of the
respective states.
118. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-10, at 1358 (discussingjurisdictional variations in
treatment of fundamental rights as concerns abortion).
119. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, quoted in D. RICHARDS, TOLEAtION
AND THE CoNsTrrnTloN 246 (1986).
120. L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CoNsTrrrrnON 283 (1988).
121. "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, ifhe
be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery ..... Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 404, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
122. "Mhe concept of privacy embodies the moralfact that a person belongs to himself
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These purported state interests, particularly that of maintaining the
sanctity of life, strongly suggest the notion that the state is asserting a
proprietary interest in the lives and bodies of its citizens. Such a notion
is repugnant to the language of the Declaration of Independence that
"all men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights
[and] among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Governments exist for the purpose of securing these pre-existing rights. 1 3
An interesting argument has been proffered, primarily from a religious perspective, that the use of the word "inalienable" in referring to
the right to life indicates that one may not refuse life-saving medical
procedures, for to do so would be to attempt to alienate that which is
inalienable. Although purportedly speaking from an ethical rather than
a theological perspective, Paul Ramsey ultimately acknowledges the religious underpinnings of his conviction that a patient cannot morally re124
fuse treatment that will be likely to extend the patient's life.
Fundamental rights have never been conceived in such a one-dimensional sense.
The contrary argument, which is not only more consistent with a
secular-pluralist society, but also more consistent with the concept of
individual rights in Western societies in the last half of the twentieth
century, is that the right to die (which in the context of this article means
foregoing treatment intended to sustain life) is the other side of the
right to life. One cannot have, in any truly meaningful sense, a right to
125
life unless one is able to elect not to go on living.
Too much has been made, however, of the so-called "right to die."
Particularly in the context of a discussion of fundamental but unenumerated constitutional rights, one can be impaled upon such a semantic
and not to others nor to society as a whole." Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 776 n.5 (1986) (Stevens,J, concurring) (emphasis added).
123. L. LEVY, supra note 120, at 349. Professor Levy, in arguing for the existence of
unenumerated yet fundamental rights, takes issue with the views of those such as John Ely
in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) that the natural rights principles expressed in the
Declaration of Independence had, for all intents and purposes, disappeared by the time of
the Constitutional Convention.
124. Ramsey characterizes life as a gift from God, a perception based upon theJudeoChristian heritage that has influenced medicine toward a pro-life stance. Choosing any
course of action or inaction that results in death would be to throw the gift of life back in
the face of the giver. Similarly, Ramsey believes that religious faith affirms that life is a
trust; consequently we are only stewards and not owners of our lives. P. RAMSEY, ETmICS
AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 146-47 (1978).
125. Joel Feinberg makes this very point in his essay, The Concept of an InalienableRight:
The right to die is simply the other side of the coin of the right to live ....Just as
my right to live imposes a duty on others not to kill me, so my right to die, which
it entails, imposes a duty on others not to prevent me from implementing my
choice of death, except for the purpose of determining whether that choice is
genuinely voluntary, hence truly mine.... In exercising my own choice in these
matters, I am not renouncing, abjuring, forswearing, resigning, or relinquishing
my right to life; quite the contrary, I am acting on that right by exercising it one
way or the other.... To alienate the right would be to abandon my discretion; to
waive the right is to exercise that discretion. The right itself, as opposed to that
to which I have the right, is inalienable.
J. FEINBERG, RxIGTS,JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 249 (1980).
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sword. To argue for a constitutional "right to die" is to invite the con-

servative members of the Supreme Court to reply that there is no textual
support for the proposition that one may commit suicide and enlist

others to assist him, 1 26 just as they recently stated that there is no fundamental right of homosexuali to engage in sodomy. 1 2 7 As stated earlier,
I am not necessarily breaking any new constitutional ground in arguing
for a right to refuse medical intervention. 128 Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton,12 9 enumerates a few of the "Blessings of
Liberty" as that term is used in the preamble to the Constitution. The
first is the autonomous control over the development and expression of
one's intellect, tastes, and personality. The second is the freedom of
choice in the basic decisions of life such as marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education of one's children. The third is
the freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion and to care for one's
health and person.130 Decisions about whether to undergo major medical procedures, whether or not they are deemed life-saving, involve all
three of these liberties. They are an expression of one's individuality,
they are among the more important and basic decisions in one's life, and
most importantly, they are an exercise of autonomy.
In an effort to shift the focus from a narrow right to die to a broader
right to accept or refuse recommended treatment, which has a long and
distinguished history in our common law, I am compelled to address a
contention by the authors of a recent article to the effect that courts are
mistaken when they analyze right to die cases according to the same criteria as right to refuse treatment cases.1 3 ' Morgan and Harty-Golder, in
discussing the balancing of the four state interests against the patient's
rights of autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity, suggest that it is much
more likely that the state interests will prevail in treatment refusal cases.
The authors characterize treatment refusals as those cases in which medical treatment for curable conditions is rejected. Right-to-die cases, on
the other hand, they argue, are those in which life sustaining therapy for
an incurable condition is rejected.' 3 2 Different treatment by the courts
is warranted because the right to die, they contend, is a natural right,
superior even to fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore not
subject to balancing against state interests.' 33 Why the right to auton126. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). This is not to suggest, of course,
that Professor Tribe, who argued the case for Michael Hardwick, made any such simplistic
contentions. As another commentator has observed, by stating the issue in this fashion, it
is clear that the Court's conclusion preceded its analysis. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 747 (1989).
128. See supra notes 100 and 101 and accompanying text.
129. 410 U.S. 179, 209 (Douglas, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
130. Id. at 211-14.
131. Morgan & Harty-Golder, ConstitutionalDevelopment ofJudiaal Criteriain Right-To-Die
Cases: From Brain Dead To Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 721 (1988).

132. Id. at 724.
133. The courts in right-to-die cases have consistently maintained that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment must be balanced against the countervailing state interests

1991]

PRIVACY IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONMAKING

35

omy, privacy and bodily integrity are not natural rights, but the right-todie is, the authors do not explain. The inference is that the outcome is
determinative of the right. In other words, since by their definition
treatment refusal cases always involve a rejection of a presumed successful medical intervention, while right to die cases involve refusals of futile
medical interventions, then the latter constitute the exercise of a natural
right while the former do not. Yet, as a matter of sound jurisprudential
and philosophical analysis, rights, particularly natural rights that transcend the constitutions of men, ought to be outcome-independent. This
is particularly true if we assume, for the sake of a parallel discussion, that
the conduct of the patient in both situations is completely selfregarding.
Although Morgan and Harty-Golder use the term "emergencies" to
describe many of what they characterize as treatment refusal cases, they
do not appear to be referring to the presumed consent that is appropriate when the patient is brought to the hospital in extremis, as a result of
which consent is presumed because the patient is unable to give it and a
surrogate is not immediately available.1 3 4 As an example, they use the
Georgetown College13 5 case, which involved an adult female Jehovah's
Witness patient who, consistent with her religious beliefs, refused to
consent to a blood transfusion. Such cases do not qualify for the presumption of consent in a medical emergency because the patient has
already refused to consent. During the time in which a genuine emergency procedure would be performed, the physicians wait while their
attorneys attempt to persuade a judge to override the patient's wishes.
Finally, the authors assert that "[t]he refusal of life-prolonging procedures does not have the adverse impact on society or government that
is often involved in the compelled treatment situation."'1 3 6 Since no explanation for this remarkable statement is provided, the reader is left to
speculate what may have been intended. One might reasonably infer
that the authors contend that the state does indeed have a proprietary
interest in its citizens, but that the justification for asserting that interest
in the former situation is neglible because of the terminal condition of
such patients.
Another commentator, Professor Ellman, has suggested, in reference to the Cruzan case, that attempting to make constitutional the right
to refuse treatment is misguided and superfluous. 1 3 7 Ellman's contention is that the balancing of the individual's interests and the state's interests will take place in any event; however, he does concede that if the
right to refuse treatment has constitutional dimensions, then every state
regardless of their theoretical basis. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45,
549 N.E.2d 292,297 (1989); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321,348-9,486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
134. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 36.
135. In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Jones v. President of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
136. Morgan & Harty-Golder, supra note 131, at 764.
137. Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the DangerousClaim That Others Can Exercisean Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURiMEmcs J. 389, 393-4 (1989).
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must weigh these interests in the same fashion under Supreme Court
scrutiny.' 38 If the right to refuse treatment is a fundamental right, there
would seem to be much more significance to this point than Ellman acknowledges.' 3 9 Thereafter, he throws down the gauntlet with regard to
any purported constitutional right of surrogates to refuse life sustaining
treatment for incompetents, contending that it would require an entirely
different rationale than the patient's right to autonomy and "no such
rationale has been offered."' 40 Later in this section I will discuss such a
rationale.
The ultimate significance of a constitutional right to refuse treat-

ment is potentially reduced when one considers the state action requirement. This is because the constitutional guarantees of individual rights
were established to protect citizens from infringement by the government-state or federal. 14 1 Thus it would appear that a judicially recognized constitutional right to refuse treatment would not protect a

patient from forced treatment by private physicians or hospitals; however, consideration of the basis of treatment refusal case decisions
clearly demonstrates the error of such an assertion. Federal and state
14 2
courts invoke the four state interests in all treatment refusal cases
regardless of whether the parties to the litigation are private or public.
Therefore, so long as state interests are balanced by the court against a
and the federal
patient's right to refuse treatment, state action is present
1 43
applicable.
is
treatment
refuse
to
right
constitutional
C.

Sources of the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy

Before undertaking a discussion and analysis of the proposition that
the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the right to refuse treatment by both competent and incompetent adults, it is appropriate to
explore the purported constitutional sources of the general principle 14of4
privacy. The 1965 Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut
is widely regarded as the first in which the Court struck down a state
statute on constitutional privacy grounds that were based on a provision
other than the fourth amendment.1 45 The foreshadowing of the recog138. Id. at 394.
139. In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), the
Court stated: "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy .... Fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."
140. Ellman, supra note 137, at 395.
141. See generally, L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 18-1, at 1688-91.
142. See supra notes 34-52 and 86-94 and accompanying text.
143. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948), stand for the proposition that state court application of common law tort and
contract principles in an unconstitutional fashion will also serve as the basis for a finding
of state action even though the actual parties to the litigation are private.
144. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
145. Connecticut's law made it a criminal offense for married persons to use contraceptives, or for physicians to aid or abet the offense by providing couples with contraceptives
or information regarding their use. Such a regulation, it was held, invaded the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees (penumbras and emanations from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments).
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nition of a constitutional right to privacy dates back to the language of
46
Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States.1
One of the major problems with the constitutional right to privacy as
conceived by Justice Brandeis, established by Griswold, and subsequently
applied in cases such as Roe v. Wade, 14 7 is that its breadth and depth are
unknown. Whether it reaches far enough to preclude a particular invasive act of government will not be known unless the Supreme Court
agrees to rule on a case presenting the issue. Until Cruzan, lower courts
and litigants could only speculate upon a constitutional right to refuse
treatment.
Many commentators of the privacy cases and the constitutional
principles upon which they are or arguably should be based, look primarily to two provisions-the ninth amendment and the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. I shall consider them
in that order.
There is little written about the ninth amendment, 148 and so little
reliance upon it in constitutional jurisprudence, that when it is referred
to at all it is almost always as the "forgotten ninth amendment." Indeed, the only extensive scholarly treatment of the amendment bears
that very title. 14 9 It begins with an important observation: "There is no
clause in the Constitution except the ninth amendment which makes a
declaration of the sovereignty and dignity of the individual."' 150 Much
of the text consists of an argument for the proposition that the ninth
146. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967). Justice Burger, in his dissent in the Georgetown College case, found the
language compelling in its relevance to cases involving the refusal of medical treatment
and efforts by physicians and judges to overrule it:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satisfaction of life can be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (1964) (BurgerJ, dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
Justice Burger then went on to elaborate on the above language and bring it to bear
directly on the facts of the case before him:
Nothing in this utterance suggests that Justice Brandeis thought an individual
possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest that he intended to include a great
many foolish, unreasonable, and even absurd ideas which do not conform, such
as refusing medical treatment even at great risk.
Id. at 1017 (emphasis in original).
147. 410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
148. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
149. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NirH AMENDMENT (1955). Even the book itself
seems to have been largely ignored or forgotten, for more recent commentators have littie, if anything, to say about it. I will take issue with this neglect, for there is much in the
work which has relevance and significance to a purported constitutional right to refuse
treatment that would prevent state courts and legislatures from usurping a patient's right
to privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity in healthcare decisionmaking.
150. Id.at 1.
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amendment is the elucidation of the Founders' solemn belief that individuals possess natural rights that are antecedent and superior to any
specifically referenced in the Bill of Rights, and as such can not be revoked or materially circumscribed by either federal or state governments. 15 1 Patterson might well have been referring to the cases in
which state courts have forced treatment upon competent and unconsenting adults when he observed:
We shudder to think what might have been the result if our
human liberties had been left to find determination by the
courts of [the] states. The undisputed truth is that in practically all important instances where human rights have been deof the government of a state or its
nied, it has been at the15hands
2
inferior subdivisions.
Patterson's basic thesis is that the Founders placed the ninth
amendment in the Bill of Rights in a prescient recognition that man as a
social animal is evolving and advancing. Not only was it impossible to
enumerate all of the rights that an individual possessed as against others
or government, but it was even more difficult to anticipate the ways in
which those rights would need to be articulated three hundred years
later. The ninth amendment should be the principle vehicle for that
process. 153 In concluding words that bear great significance to the proclivity of courts, as the previous section has demonstrated, to persistently balance the countervailing interests of the state against the right of
the individual to make his own private medical treatment decisions, he
observes:
Whenever we lose the distinction between individual liberty
and the necessities of the general welfare, the virtue of our
form of government is lost, and we have nothing but the worst
form of tyranny, which is a despotism imposed by the force of
and under the name of the people themselves. We will have,
to any other form of tyranny or
then, nothing that is preferable
154
despotism elsewhere.
Another constitutional scholar, Leonard Levy, believes that Griswold
marks the inception of ninth amendment jurisprudence. 155 Like Patterson, Levy vigorously argues that the ninth amendment is compelling evidence of the Framers' distrust of all government, not just the federal
one. James Madison, in response to the contention that a Bill of Rights
was unnecessary because the states constitutionally protected freedom,
151. See id. at 7-20.
152. Id. at 42.
153. With his own piece of prescience, Patterson suggests that:
The right of privacy may be such a right [now making an appearance].... While
the courts seem to feel that it should exist, there is a great timidity and lack of
forthrightness in the protection of this right, because its existence is not to be
found in the written and enumerated law.
Id. at 55.
154. Id. at 61.
155. L. LEvy, supra note 120, at 267-68 (1988). Levy notes that prior to 1965 the ninth
amendment was the subject of only incidental references by the Court, whereas in the
fifteen years afterward it was invoked in over 1200 state and federal cases.
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asserted first that a number of the states had no, or at least a very defective, Bill of Rights, and second that the states constituted a greater danger to individual liberty than the national government.1 5 6 It is from this
historical perspective that one must argue for the proposition that the
rights "retained by the people" according to the ninth amendment cannot reasonably be interpreted as "retained by the state governments." 1 5 7 These unenumerated rights are of individuals as against
society or any level of government. As expressed by the late Judge Craven of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the principles embodied in
the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution and
the ninth amendment provide that the rights of persons in the United
58
States are not confined to those specifically enumerated.'
Clearly, the ninth amendment has no substantive content whatsoever. One commentator has described it as "a license to constitutional
decisionmakers to look beyond the substantive commands of the Consti59
tutional text to protect fundamental rights not expressed therein."'
The more conservative members of the United States Supreme Court
are decidedly uncomfortable with this "license" to the extent they even
acknowledge its existence. There is also apparent acceptance by the
same segment of the Court of the proposition that overturning state legislation that does not clearly contravene an enumerated right constitutes
"the mere imposition of the Justices' own values upon the States."' 60 I
shall address this contention further as I attempt to give credence to a
16 1
constitutional right to privacy in fundamental healthcare decisions.
The fourteenth amendment,' 62 as a source for an unenumerated
constitutional right, suffers from much the same "weakness" as the
ninth amendment in that the substantive content of phrases such as
156. Id. at 272-73.
157. Justice Scalia's arguments in Cruzan to the contrary notwithstanding.
158. Craven, Personhood: The Right To Be Let Alone, 1976 DuKE L. J. 699, 705.
159. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STA. L. REv. 703, 709 (1975).

Professor Grey goes on to point out that if the disciples of the "pure interpretive model"
such as the latejustice Black, ChiefJustice Rehnquist,Judge Bork, andJohn Ely prevailed,
a radical purge of established constitutional doctrine would be necessary, including fundamental procedural fairness in civil and criminal proceedings, prohibitions on racial discrimination by the federal government, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states,
and the requirement of strict scrutiny when fundamental interests are affected. Id. at 713.
160. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). Two concerns relating to the present discussion arise from this proposition. First, the sense that Justice White and his colleagues on the majority in Bowers equate "the States" with "the people" of the ninth
amendment. Constitutional history, of which Professor Levy contends most Supreme
Court justices have been abysmally ignorant (L. LEvy, supra note 120, at 300), is to the
contrary. Second, one must ask how the ninth amendment can ever be utilized to protect
individual rights against state infringement, lacking as it does any substantive content,
without that use being subject to Justice White's "imposition of values" charge.
161. See infra notes 162-180 and accompanying text.
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" and "life, liberty, or property" must be provided by the Court, and to do so requires
that the justices confront the current meaning of these phrases. The
Founders could not have anticipated that one of the perils faced by individuals in this era would be the onslaught of the technological imperative of modem medicine, and that the physician-patient relationship
might be transformed, through the imposition of court-ordered treatment, to a prison house in which manacles and chains are replaced by
tubes and wires. Does that mean that we, as a civilized society under the
rule of law of the greatest charter of freedom ever drafted, must look
away from this assault or pretend that it does not exist because the
Founders neglected to anticipate this scenario and enumerate a constitutional right to be free from unwanted medical treatment? 163 Professor Black, commenting on Griswold, observed that:
If our constitutional law could permit such a thing to happen,
then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional
limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous in itself,
and partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with
such an outrage would be too feeble, in method and doctrine,
to deal with a great amount of equally outrageous material.
Virtually all the intimacies, privacies and autonomies of life
would be regulable by the legislature .... 164
Such an autonomy and privacy is the right to refuse medical treatment,
which the state seeks to regulate by means of the imposition of its interests through the judiciary, and through legislation such as that in Missouri discussed in the Cruzan case. 16 5 Given the sentiments expressed by
the majority in the Bowers decision, it will be a daunting task to persuade
the Court in future cases that legitimate constitutional interpretation justifies the conclusion that the right to a wholly or predominately self-regarding determination to refuse medical treatment rests among the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Yet, are we
not embarking upon the ultimate totalitarian nightmare when we suggest that the constitutional right of privacy does not reach far enough to
protect the individual from forced medical treatment which serves the
16 6
interests of the state?
163. There is an ironic parallel between, on the one hand, the originalist view that if
the Founders did not elucidate a right to refuse treatment it is therefore not of constitutional dimensions, and the Missouri Supreme Court's view that if a patient, while competent, did not specifically and solemnly reject the treatment now being administered to him,
then his surrogate cannot lawfully refuse it on his behalf.
164. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 32 (1970).
165. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010 (1986).
166. In arguing thus, one admittedly is moving beyond a narrow and rigid concept of
what it means to be a citizen of a nation toward the concept of what it means to be a human
being, a person in the fullest sense of the word that transcends its historic constitutional
dimension. I do so, however, in good company. First, Professor Tribe, addressing the
constitutional dimension of personhood, states:
The Constitution... contains no discussion of the right to be a human being; no
definition of a person; and, indeed, no express provisions guaranteeing to persons the right to carry on their lives protected from the 'vicissitudes of the political process' by a zone of privacy or a right of personhood. . . . But the
Constitution's is not a totalitarian design, depending for its success upon the ho-
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D. Autonomy v. Privacy
The constitutional right to privacy suffers from many congenital infirmities, not the least of which is the long period of time which passed
in the history of our constitutional jurisprudence before it was discovered and applied. This late arrival of the principle suggests to some that
it is probably illegitimate, something created out of the skillful liberal
positioning of smoke and mirrors, rather than properly derived from
67
solid and long-standing principles of constitutional interpretation.1
Another infirmity, and one more critical to the right to refuse treatment,
courts and commentators of the terms
is the interchangeable use by
"privacy" and "autonomy."1 68 Professor Henkin correctly observes:
That the Court cites search and seizure cases as precedent for
its new zone of autonomy suggests that it does not distinguish
between privacy and autonomy and may be treating them both
as aspects of "the right to be let alone." But they are, I think,
different notions conceptually, with different philosophical,
political, social (and, one might have thought legal) assumptions and consequences; they may look different also if viewed
as aspects of the confrontation of private right with public

good.

169

mogenization or depersonalization of humanity. The judiciary has thus reached
into the Constitution's spirit and structure, and has elaborated from the spare
text an idea of the 'human' and a conception of 'being' not merely contemplated
but required.
L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-3, at 1308 (footnote omitted). Second, anticipating only
slightly the totalitarian nature of the imposition of the demands of the technological imperative upon unwilling patients by courts which worship at the altar of the interests of the
state, Professor Kurland observes:
[W]e have arrived at the stage of technological development that Orwell so
gphically described in his, to me, still shocking novel, 1984. The problem of
freedom is essentially the problem of avoiding the consequences of that technology so that Orwell's vision might, despite our technological achievements, be
frustrated. With government in control of so many essentials of our life, where in
the Constitution can we turn for haven against the impositions of 1984? Until
now, we have looked to the Bill of Rights, substantive due process, and substantive equal protection. But nowhere in these provisions is there a basis for claims
to the privileges and immunities that will become more and more necessary....
[M]ost of all, I should hope to find among the privileges and immunities of citizenship, that most fundamental of rights, still without a base in the Constitution,
the right that Mr. Justice Brandeis called 'the right to be let alone.'
Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: Its Hour Come Round at Last?, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 405, 419 (footnotes omitted).
167. John Ely, for example, in his critique of the extension of the right to privacy to a
woman's decision whether or not to maintain her pregnancy, laments: "What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the
Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general
value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure." Ely, The Wages of Cying Wo4 A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 935-36

(1973).
168. Consider, for example, the following: "Privacy will be defined here as an autonomy of control over the intimacies of personal identity. Autonomy, identity, and intimacy
are all necessary (and normally sufficient) for the proper invocation of the concept of privacy." Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977). As we know
from the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, a current majority of the Court does not agree,
at least when the issue is framed as "the fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
169. Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974). See also Allen,
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The compelling significance of this lost distinction shall become readily
apparent as I discuss the right to refuse treatment in the case of an incompetent as opposed to a competent patient.17 0 Before doing so, however, let us complete the review of privacy's infirmities. There is, of
course, the fact that it is among the unenumerated rights, one which had
to be discovered lurking amidst the penumbras and emanations of the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 17 1 The pall of illegitimacy that such rights have about them in the eyes of some members of
the Court is probably best expressed by Justice White in this language
from the opinion of the Court in Bowers:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process] Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to172
govern the country without express constitutional authority.
Proponents of a constitutional right to refuse treatment argue that it
should be beyond dispute that the right to accept or decline invasive
medical procedures cannot reasonably be regarded as a "redefinition"
of rights that are fundamental. It is, rather, a recognition of the fact that
control over one's body in such a way as to preclude being made the
slave of medical technology is absolutely and indisputably inherent in
73
the concept of ordered liberty.'
The final infirmity of the right of privacy is that it has been said to
174
apply only to those "matters ... fundamentally affecting a person."'
Demonstrating that one's identity as a person is unconstitutionally compromised by some state action spawns an analysis that is tortuous and
ambiguous at best, and always easy prey to the disciples ofJustice Black.
In a recent article, a commentator has suggested an analytical methodology that avoids legal forays into the existential thicket of personhood.17 5
Rather than focusing upon what the state is trying to forbid and asking
whether there is a fundamental constitutional right to do so, Rubenfeld
suggests that the focus be upon what is being produced by the state's
action or prohibition, "the real effects that conformity with the law proTaking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461,467
(1987), wheiein she argues that the Supreme Court's right-to-privacy jurisprudence is
flawed by the confusion of liberty with privacy. While she argues that abortion rights present issues of autonomy, not privacy, my contention is that refusal of treatment cases
squarely present both aspects of the concept of constitutional privacy.
170. See infra notes 191-199 and accompanying text.
171. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
172. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-5 (1986).
173. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
174. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
175. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HAsv. L. REv. 737, 783 (1989).
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duces at the level of everyday lives and social practices." 17 6 Applying his
analytical method to persons seeking to be disengaged from life-support
systems, Rubenfeld observes:
For right-to-die patients, being forced to live is in fact to be
forced into a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and
indeed rigidly standardized life: the life of one confined to a
hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and tended to by
medical professionals. It is a life almost totally occupied. The
person's body is, moreover, so far expropriated from his own
will, supposing that he seeks to die, that the most elemental
acts of existence-such as breathing, digesting, and circulating
177
blood-are forced upon him by an external agency.
It is the totalitarian nature of such state action, he argues, such as requiring that a woman bear an unwanted child or that homosexuals disavow or completely sublimate their sexual preferences, that should be a
sufficient basis for invocation of the right to privacy. One might ask,
however, in refusal of treatment cases, where the analogy is more that of
a strategic incursion rather than a total occupation by the medical professionals, whether this type of analysis would still result in an invocation of the right to privacy to protect the patient from court-ordered
treatment.
Let us turn, now, to the way in which the distinctions between autonomy and privacy, competence and incompetence, are interwoven.
The Supreme Court privacy decisions establish certain zones of privacy
in which the state may not dictate how an individual thinks, feels or acts
except where a compelling public interest can be shown and no less burdensome means are available to protect that public interest. The right
of privacy in the broad constitutional sense has also been characterized
as "the right to make choices and decisions." 178 Thus privacy takes on a
figure/ground kind of quality, with the background being zones of presumed state noninterference and the figure being the exercise of personal autonomy within these zones. Much of the discussion of privacy in
healthcare decisionmaking, at least as a purported constitutional right,
has concentrated on the incompetent or questionably competent patient. Focusing on the figure of autonomous decisionmaking and action
rather than the background of a zone of privacy, some commentators
argue that it belies truth and logic to discuss a constitutional right to
refuse treatment that survives incompetence. 179 Earlier in this article I
176. Id.
177. Id. at 795.
178. Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983).
179. Ellman supra, note 137, at 394. Professor Ellman, discussing the Cruzan case and
others involving permanently unconscious patients, contends that, "[a] constitutional right
to decide one's own treatment for oneself can thus have no application to her case." He is
particularly critical of Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), the most recent case
to permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on the basis of a patient's constitutional right to decide her own treatment. The fatal flaw in this reasoning, it is argued, is
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mentioned the gauntlet thrown down by Professor Ellman. 180 To be
precise, his contention is stated as follows:
Since the autonomy principle is foundational to any constitutional claim that individuals may decide for themselves whether
to accept or refuse life-sustaining treatment, the constitutional
claim fails in this [the Cruzan] case. The family's claim to decide
cannot be piggybacked on Nancy's autonomy. Their claim requires an entirely different rationale. Rather surprisingly, since
many have made the claim before the Cruzans, no such rationale has been offered.181
My position is that privacy in a broad constitutional sense, derived from
cases before and after Griswold, provides ample precedent for what I
shall hereinafter describe as a presumed guardianship of the family intended to protect incompetent patients, such as Nancy Cruzan, from unwarranted state intervention in their private medical affairs.
An important aspect of the physician-patient relationship is the
psycho-social quality deriving from its origins, particularly as described
by Leon Kass. 182 Dr. Kass correctly observed that in undertaking a therapeutic relationship with a patient, the physician unavoidably enters the
intimate life-world of the patient, which he indicates is the family. It is
an incontrovertible fact that in the great majority of cases, the patient
has close family involved with him in the process of contending with a
major illness. It has become the custom and practice of physicians over
centuries to work with the patient and his nuclear, and often even extended family, to help return the patient to health. It is, therefore, both
distressing and anomalous to find courts treating family involvement in
decisions declining treatment as inherently suspicious.' 8 3 Professor
that the patient never expressed a view on this subject while competent, so the actual
decision to discontinue treatment is being made by the patient's family.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, first in In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976), and more recently in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229
(1985), established what has become the majority view that the right of an adult who was
once competent to determine the course of her medical treatment remains intact even
when she is no longer able to assert that right.
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
181. Ellman, supra note 137, at 395 (footnote omitted). Ellman does not say whether
he agrees with the position of the Missouri Supreme Court that a guardian's power to
exercise third party choice arises from the state's parenspatriaepower rather than the constitutional rights of the patient when competent. In so holding, the Missouri Supreme
Court concludes that the other courts which permitted surrogates to order the withdrawal
of life-support from incompetents mistakenly assumed that the surrogate's authority to do
so was derivative of the incompetent's right to decide, if competent. Cruzan v. Harmon,
760 S.W.2d 408, 424-25 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub noa. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1190). In the discussion that follows I will contend that on this
point, as with so many others throughout the majority opinion in Cruzan, the Missouri
Supreme Court demonstrates its view that people exist to serve the interests of the state,
rather than the state existing to protect the rights of its citizens.
182. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
183. In New Jersey, for example, the legislature created the Office of the Ombudsman
for the Institutionalized Elderly (the "Granny Doe" squad) and charged it with the responsibility to guard against "abuse" of such patients. No life-supporting therapy may be withheld or withdrawn from institutionalized patients on the basis of a decision by a surrogate
decisionmaker unless the patient has been adjudicated incompetent and a court-appointed
guardianship created. Thereafter, the request by the guardian to withhold or withdraw
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Meisel, in his recent work, The Right to Die, discusses the crucial role of
the family in treatment decisions for incompetent patients:
The importance of the role of the family and the doctor is highlighted by the self-evident fact that the vast majority of treatment decisions relative to persons who are incompetent by
reason of senility or retardation are made for them, by their
family and the doctor, without court proceedings. This practice is sanctioned not merely by tradition but by the institutional limitations in the ability of courts to make day-to-day
treatment decisions, even if restricted to treatments of a potentially life-saving or life-prolonging nature. 184
A similar disrespect for the traditional role of the family in making
healthcare decisions on behalf of minors is evidenced by the entire Baby
Doe scenario. 1 8 5 In both instances, efforts on the part of state legislatures or federal regulators to cause any refusal of consent to automatically trigger governmental inquiry or a finding of neglect renders
surrogate decisionmaking authority meaningless. This also reflects the
profoundly paternalistic and pessimistic notion that political functionaries should be presumed better able to make private healthcare deci186
sions than the family.
The lineage of the family as the pre-eminent social unit, at least as a
general proposition, is long and distinguished. Consider, for example,
the observation that "the family unit does not simply co-exist with our
constitutional system but is an integral part of it, for our political system
is superimposed on and presupposes a social system of family units, not
just of isolated individuals. No assumption more deeply underlies our
life-support, even with the concurrence of the treating physician, must be reported to the
Ombudsman and treated by him as a case of potential abuse. In all such cases of potential
abuse, the Ombudsman must investigate and make a report to the Commissioner of
Human Services within twenty-four hours. The NewJersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy
98 NJ. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) approved of this entire process, which makes no effort
to distinguish between patients who have close family and patients who do not. Id. at 34143, 486 A.2d at 1239-42. What makes the ruling still more inexplicable is the language
from the same court in two cases decided only two years later. See infra note 190.
184. A. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 152 n.17.
185. For a concise review of the Baby Doe litigation and regulatory history, see FuRROW,JoHNSoN,JosT & ScHwARTz, HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS, 939-48

(West 1987).
186. Goldstein, Medical Careforthe Child at Risk: On State Supervention ofParentalAutonomy,

86 YALE LJ. 645, 651 (1977).
James J. Kilpatrick, a noted journalist and political commentator of conservative persuasion, offered this opinion of the federal government's role in cases such as Baby Doe:
It simply is no business of the federal government.., to intrude upon the informed and reasonable decisions of a family in such intimate matters as this one.
The federal rules say that surgery cannot be denied "when such denial is based
on anticipated mental impairment, paralysis or incontinence of such child rather
than on reasonable medical judgments that treatment would be futile or unlikely
of success."

In the name of the Constitution of the United States, how did we get into such
Orwellian nonsense? The surgeon general at the moment is a nice fellow by the
name of C. Everett Koop. He too must have the very best of intentions. But did
he run for God in some August primary? Did he get elected? What are his credentials-or what are a judge's credentials-for saying to the anguished parents,
"Thou shalt operate!"?
Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 17, 1983, at A5.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW

[V/ol. 68:1

society ... .,,187 It follows from this assumption that the privacy doctrine protects family relationships as much as, if not more than, individual autonomy. Indeed, it is through the proper nurturing role of the
family that individuals develop into mature adults with the sense of identity and unique personhood of which autonomous acts are the ultimate
definitional expression. As an institution that predates the state and
hence and has a raison d'lere separate and apart from it, the family cannot
be as easily dislodged as the primary decisionmaker for its own as the
Missouri Supreme Court suggests.18 8 The significance of the family as a
social phenomenon is not simply its role in the rearing of children. Nevertheless, in cases like Cruzan and O'Connor,the courts seem to be saying
that once a person reaches majority and the existential realm of individual autonomy, he is immediately and irrevocably jettisoned from the
protective and nurturing sphere of the family. Thereafter, if he should
ever again be legally incapacitated, as during his minority, then his family, immediate, nuclear or extended, shall be without legal or moral authority to act on his behalf except with the prior adjudication and
approval of the state.' 8 9 Such a principle is at odds with the history of
western civilization and the predisposition of a majority of the citizens of
90
the United States.'

187. L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-20, at 1414 (quoting Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest
and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its ritics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 772-73 (1973)).
188. The parenspatriaepower of the state to protect the interests of minors and incompetent adults was intended to protect those who, by virtue of unfortunate circumstances,
had no family that could or would look after them. It is a distortion of this original concept, at the very least, to suggest that when loving family members of formerly competent
adults are present and seeking to act in the best interests of their loved one who happens
to be a patient in an institution, the state can contravene their principled actions to further
interests of its own. In this regard, the authors of a recent article argue:
Instead of permitting families to make a decision to terminate treatment in circumstances where such termination is considered good medical practice under
standards promulgated by the A.M.A., among others, the Missouri court ruled
that Cruzan must continue to be treated for the sake of the state, in upholding its
"unlimited" interest in human life.
Annas, Glantz & Mariner, The Right of Privacy Protects the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 263J.
A.M.A. 858, 861 (1990) (emphasis added).
189. Professor Tribe refers to this phenomenon as "the recurring puzzle of liberal individualism: once the state, whether acting through its courts or otherwise, has 'liberated'
the child-and the adult-from the shackles of such intermediate groups as the family,
what is to defend the individual against the combined tyranny of the state and her own
alienation?" L. TRIBE, supra note 65, § 15-20, at 1418 (footnote omitted).
190. In this regard, consider the following language from recent New Jersey Supreme
Court decisions:
"The law has traditionally respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter .... We believe that this tradition of respect for and confidence in the family should
ground our approach to the treatment of the sick." In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 355-356,
529 A.2d 404, 414 (1987).
"The decisions of patients' families should determine what sort of medical care permanently unconscious patients [who have not left clear directives] receive." In reJobes, 108
NJ. 394, 417, 529 A.2d 434, 446 (1987).
"Public opinion ... support[s] th[is] approach to surrogate decisionmaking. Public opinion is relevant in the withdrawal-of-treatment cases that we decide today
because they present society with moral, social, technological, and philosophical
problems that transcend legal issues... Every recent survey that we have found
indicates that society believes that a patient's family members should function as
his or her surrogate decisionmakers."
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A long line of United States Supreme Court decisions stand for the
proposition that there exists a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter," at least not without a compelling reason.19 1 These
cases relate to the education of children,19 2 decisions regarding procreation, 195 and marriage and divorce.' 9 4 In most instances they strike
down legislative efforts to regulate critical life choices such as whom one
will marry, if and when one will become a parent, and how one will raise,
care for, and educate one's children. So long as no demonstrably serious harm will be done to the social order by such private decisions, and
so long as no abuse or neglect is inflicted on children, such determinations are to be made, in our constitutional scheme, by the affected individuals and not by the government. There is a recognition by the Court,
gleaned from the language in these opinions, of the vital role that privacy and intimacy play in the dynamics of the family not unlike the role
that Kass gives privacy in the dynamics of the physician-patient relationship. 195 The following is an apt description of the phenomenon:
The family project of childrearing requires intimacy, a blurring
of the boundaries of individual identity. Intimacy in turn requires privacy and autonomy from state intervention. To preserve the necessary intimacy, and the privacy it requires....
rights language [should be] reserve[d] for the interaction of the
family members with the outside world. But for interfamilial
matters.... [p]arents can be seen as representing the interest
of the family as an integrated whole in addition to representing
their own particular interests... even when what is at issue is a
conflict in interest 19between
the parent as individual and the
6
child as individual.
The role of the family in surrogate decisionmaking is a logical extension
of its nurturing role in the rearing of children. Schoeman posits several
beneficial effects from the proposition that families are entitled to a presumption of privacy and autonomy within the realm of their private decision making:
1. An intimate sphere is safeguarded from intrusions by third
parties;
2. An intimate group is able to foster meaningful autonomy
for its members;
Id. at n. 11. To put these fine sentiments in perspective, however, we must recall that this
same court mandates the involvement of the "Granny Doe" squads in every case of withdrawal of life support from the institutionalized elderly, even where close family members

are present. See supra note 188.
191. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
192. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
193. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
194. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
195. L. KASS, supra note 21.
196. R. GoLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOvE AND ABORTION 35-36 (1988) (quoting Schoeman,
Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHics 6, 9 (1980)).
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In the case of vulnerable and compromised persons, it
secures protection from decisions by third parties such as
patient's lived
courts, which are inclined to discount the
97
world and defer to objective standards.'
Schoeman and others 9 8 who argue for privacy and autonomy in personal and family decisionmaking are often criticized for promoting an
arbitrary and subjective decisionmaking process that is devoid of objective standards such as those that would purportedly be applied by
courts, ombudspersons, welfare agencies, and other arms of government. Our ultimate goal in surrogate decisionmaking should not be the
"right" result, for there is no such thing; nor a perfectly objective result,
for competent adults making such critical decisions for themselves are
never perfectly objective; but rather, the result that most closely approximates the one the patient would have reached if competent at the critical moment of decision. There can be no one better situated to reach
that result than the patient's loved ones.199
3.

197. Jecker, The Role of Intimate Others in Medical Decision Making, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST
65, 68 (1990). Number three, of course, reflects the fate of Mary O'Connor and Nancy
Cruzan, victims of the rigid application of the clear and convincing evidence standard. In
this seminal article on intimate personal relationships, of which the family is the pre-eminent example, Schoeman clearly regards freedom from outside intrusion-by third parties
or the state as an entity-as a condition absolutely essential to its existence. In this regard
he states:
Privacy and autonomy provide the moral space within which concrete personal
relationships can be formed independently of general social concerns. To give
the state authority to regulate such relationships would inevitably result in a redirection or 'socialization' of the relationships. We see evidence of this shift in the
doctor-patient relationship, wherein doctors are seen increasingly to have direct
responsibilities for the health of the population and not for the comfort of speit should be recognized and made part of our reckoning that
cific patients ....
systems of meaning can be uprooted in the process of realigning commitments.
Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parentsand the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETmICS 6,
15 (1980). Schoeman admonishes society against utilizing the instrumentality of the state
to invade and thereby disrupt institutions such as the family and other committed relationships built upon love and trust, except upon a showing of some clear-and-present danger,
for the very reason that such intervention drastically and perhaps irrevocably alters them
by violating their privacy and integrity. In Schoeman's own words, "[W]hile the state is
quite limited in its ability to promote relationships, it can do much to destroy them." Id. at
16.
198. See Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J.JURIs. 1 (1969). Buchanan and
Brock also argue against a narrow and rigid definition of family: "For purposes of surrogate decisionmaking, the family is whomever the individual is most closely associated with.
This point is especially important at a time when alternatives to marriage and the nuclear
& D. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS
family are becoming more common." A. BucmN~
136 (1989).
199. In their recent work devoted entirely to the ethics of surrogate decisionmaking,
Buchanan and Brock cogently reinforce the primacy of the family's role in medical decisionmaking for minors and the adult incapacitated over that of the medical profession or
the state. In particular, they emphasize the need to protect the family's zone of privacy:
The reasons for allowing this latitude in the family's [surrogate decisionmaking
for incapacitated adults] ... are the fact that the family is generally more knowledgeable about the patient's preferences and values, and more interested in his
or her good, and the need to protect the family from unnecessary intrusions.
... [S]uitable intervention principles will allow parents considerable leeway... in
order to protect the family from intrusions that would violate the privacy which it
requires if it is to thrive as an intimate union whose value to those who participate
in it depends in great part upon its intimacy.
A. BUCHANAN & D. BROCK, supra note 198, at 147, 237. For articulation of the viewpoint
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The commingling of autonomy in decisionmaking and privacy from
outside interference is essential to the foundation for a presumed guardianship of the family in healthcare decisionmaking. Some semblance of

autonomy survives incompetence to the extent that treatment decisions
are made by family who know the patient intimately and seek to decide
as he would have decided based on their personal knowledge of his
goals, beliefs and preferences. But more importantly, the coequal privacy aspect of the constitutional principle-freedom from interference
in one's private affairs by strangers in general, and the government in
particular - will be fully preserved. 20 0 Although not actually using the
term "presumed guardianship of the family," the President's Commission report on healthcare decisionmaking strongly affirms the primary
role of the family in surrogate decisionmaking for many of the reasons
20 1
already discussed.
Every public opinion poll taken in the last ten years indicates that a
clear majority of Americans believe that a patient's family members
should make medical decisions on the patient's behalf when he or she is
unable to do so. This appears to constitute the kind of evolving societal
consensus upon which the Supreme Court has historically based a determination that an unenumerated right is fundamental in a constitutional
that the family should not only be the surrogate decisionmaker, but should base such decisions on consideration of the family's needs and interests as well as the patient's, see
Hardwig, What About the Family?, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1990). Starting from the
premise that the lives of patients and those who are close to them cannot be detached for
purposes of making treatment decisions, Hardwig argues:
Instead of starting with our usual assumption that physicians are to serve the
interests of the patient, we must build our theories on a very different assumption: The medical and nonmedical interests of both the patient and other members of the patient's family are to be considered.... I would argue that we must
build our theory of medical ethics on the presumption of equality: the interests
of patients and family members are morally to be weighed equally; medical and
nonmedical interests of the same magnitude deserve equal consideration in making treatment decisions.
Id. at 7.
200. In the case of incompetent adults for whom treatment decisions are made by family surrogates, and minor children for whom decisions are made by parents, the decision
can be said to be that of the surrogate or the child in the sense that it most closely approximates his interests and hence should be free from state interference. For further elaboration of this viewpoint see Garvey, Freedom of Choice in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1756, 1782-84 (1981).
Other commentators have also alluded to a constitutional dimension to the role of the
family as surrogate decisionmaker for incompetent patients. See, e.g., Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtainedfrom Families of Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J.
A.M.A. 229, 234 (1987); Comment,Judicial Postponement of Death Recognition: The Tragic Case
of Mary O'Connor, 15 AM.J. L. & MED. 301, 327-28 (1989); Note, Privacy, Family and Medical
DecisionmakingforPersistent Vegetative Patients, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 713, 732-33 (1990).
201. The Commission report urges utilization of close family as surrogates, rather than
judges, guardians having no direct familiarity with the patient, or welfare agencies, because the family is most concerned and knowledgeable about the patient's goals, preferences and values, the family is entitled to recognition as an important social unit that
should be considered the responsible decisionmaker in matters intimately affecting its
members and the family is an institution that requires a protected sphere of privacy and
autonomy in order to flourish. For those reasons, the state should not intrude, except for
compelling reasons, in highly personal matters about which opinions in society range
widely. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BiOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 127-32 (1982).
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sense. 20 2 Given the weight of legal and ethical authority behind the surrogate decisionmaking role of the family, and its support among the
population generally, a plausible basis exists for finding a constitutional
dimension to a presumed guardianship of the family.
As other commentators who -have argued for a presumption of family decisionmaking for incapacitated adult patients have acknowledged,
such a presumption must be rebuttable in order to prevent the rare instances of abuse. 203 The important procedural difference under a constitutionally-based presumed guardianship of the family, at least where
the family is in agreement on the nontreatment decision, or there is a
hierarchy established and the highest-ranking person disagrees with the
physician's recommendation of continued treatment, is that the physician or institution must either accept the surrogate's decision or carry
the burden to challenge it in court. Liability would attach if neither were
done. The most significant difference from the practice currently followed in the majority of such actions is that in any litigation to challenge
the surrogate's decision, the physician or institution should have the
burden of proving, arguably by clear and convincing evidence, that the
surrogate's choice was unreasonable or not in the best interests of the
patient. 20 4 As Justice Brennan points out in Cruzan, if there is a fundamental constitutional right to refuse medical treatment that survives incapacity, then Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard is not
the least restrictive means for the state properly to protect patients from
20 5
abuse by uncaring or ignorant surrogates and unethical physicians.
To adequately protect the privacy of the patient, the state should have
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the surrogate is not what the now incompetent patient would
have chosen for herself or is not in her best interest if there is no evidence of what she would have decided. Furthermore, if the countervailing state interests are properly made an issue in the case, then the
proponent would have the burden of establishing a compelling reason
why they should prevail over the patient's constitutional right to privacy. 20 6 As noted earlier, the most tragic and demoralizing aspect of the
Cruzan decision is that the process that was upheld completely fails to
consider the patient's interests.
E.

Consequences of a Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment

Commentators such as Ellman predict dire consequences if such a
right, exercisable by surrogates on behalf of incompetent patients, were
202. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLICAL PROCEss 73-75
(1980).
203. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, supra note 5, at 440.
204. Id. at 441.
205. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I 10 S. Ct. 2841, 2872 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
206. For a detailed argument in favor of the proposition that there should be a rebuttable presumption that all citizens have a right to conduct their lives free of governmental
regulation, at least as to self-regarding conduct, see Craven, supra note 158, at 706.
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to be elucidated by the Supreme Court.2 0 7 Such "predictions," however, are based upon patently erroneous assumptions such as that of the
family being made "the unreviewable arbiter" of treatment decisions,
something which no one has advocated in any of the major right to refuse treatment cases.2 08 Ellman and others also argue that the Court
should abstain from finding a constitutional right in this area in order to
leave the state legislatures free to weigh competing considerations. 20 9
The arguments to the contrary are much more compelling in light of
events in the last decade. The New Jersey Supreme Court has decided
more significant "right to die" cases than any other court because the
NewJersey legislature has failed to produce any relevant legislation during the more than ten years between Quinlan andJobes.2 10 Furthermore,
phrases such as "right to life" and "right to die" are testimony to the
politicization of these issues to an extent which virtually insures that the
legislative outcome will not be the product of a trenchant, enlightened
and interdisciplinary interchange, but rather the strident clash of single2 11
issue politics.
Recognition of a constitutional right to refuse treatment and a presumed guardianship of the family as described above would almost certainly reduce the volume of litigation. First, it would give comfort to
responsible healthcare providers that they would not be held civilly or
criminally liable for respecting the constitutional rights of patients and
their families. Second, from the standpoint of benefits conferred against
burdens imposed, the choice between abiding by the decision of the patient or his family and seeking to override it in the face of a presumption
of validity would naturally limit the legal challenges to those appropriate
cases in which the patient is demonstrably incompetent and the family
unreasonably withholds consent to treatment that is clearly in the patient's best interest.
Another major impact of the recognition of such a constitutional
right may be the invalidation of a number of state living will statutes.
Most such statutes limit their applicability to patients who are terminally
ill. In addition to the problem that there is no medical consensus as to
when or if a particular condition may be considered terminal, there is
207. ElIman, supra note 137, at 400. See also Mayo, Constitutionalizingthe Right to Die, 49
Mo. L. REV. 103 (1990).
208. Ellman, supra note 137, at 400; Mayo, supra note 207, at 103.
209. Eliman supra note 137 at 401; Mayo, supra note 207, at 145.
210. Except, of course, for creation of the "Granny Doe" squads. See, e.g., McIntyre,
The Conroy Decirion: A Not-So-Good Death, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEAus 260 (Lynn ed.
1986).
211. In discussing abortion legislation, Tribe argues that "the customary assumption
that legislation reflects a balanced weighing of permissible objectives and is thus entitled
to judicial deference is brought to the breaking point when the challenged legislation has
been shaped in the cauldron of heated religious controversy." Tribe, Forward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process ofLife and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 31 (1973). The latest and
most grotesque example is the abortion bill which was passed by both houses of the Louisiana legislature. Intended to be the vehicle by which Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is
overturned, it provided no exceptions for cases of rape or incest. The same protagonists
in the abortion debates are present and accounted for whenever legislatures debate bills
that would empower individuals with regard to decisions affecting control of their bodies.
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the more compelling fact that there are no such restrictions on a competent patient's right to refuse treatment. Since the intent of the person
who executes a living will is to exercise his legal right to accept or decline certain procedures while competent, in anticipation of a time when
he might not be competent, the state may not limit that exercise without
a compelling reason. It is difficult to justify a statute that would force
incompetent patients to endure invasive procedures that are against the
wishes they expressed while competent when the same could not be
forced upon patients who never lose competence.
Similarly, a number of living will statutes exclude nutrition and hydration from the medical treatments that may be refused by this form of
advance directive. With the recognition of a constitutional right to refuse treatment, such a distinction between the rights of competent and
incompetent patients should be highly suspect. It is difficult to discern
why, as a matter of sound public policy, a competent patient should be
able to prevent the insertion of a nasogastric tube, but should be unable
to effectuate the same refusal by written directive in the event of future
212
incompetency.
The last significant change that would be likely to flow from the
constitutional stature of the right to refuse treatment is the manner in
which the courts have applied the third state interest, the protection of
innocent third parties. Thus far, a determinative factor as to whether
this state interest will overcome the autonomy of the patient depends on
whether the patient is the parent of any minor children who, without
her, might become wards of the state. If the patient has no children,
then of course the interest is held not to apply. If the patient has minor
children, but also has the other parent in the home to care for them, or
has at least provided for them financially in the event of her death, there
is a basis for the court to find that the state interest has been met or is
not sufficiently compelling to override the patient's interest in autonomy. 2 3i On the other hand, if the patient is a single parent with no
means to provide financially for her minor children upon her death,
then a court might be inclined to rule that this state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify overriding the patient's refusal of treatment. 2 14 Such an analysis, and the distinctions that it makes based upon
212. The ruling of the Court in Cruzan gives no clear indication of the situations in
which a state's generalized interest in maintaining the sanctity of human life may constitutionally override a competent patient's refusal of treatment or the dictates of an incompetent patient's living will. Under Missouri's living will statute, even if Nancy Cruzan had
properly executed a living will clearly declining tube feeding under such circumstances, it
would not have been enforced by the Missouri Supreme Court; however, it would appear
that at least five U.S. Supreme CourtJustices (the dissenters plus Justice O'Connor) would
hold that to be a violation of Nancy's liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
213. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (court refused to order transfusion of a 34-year-old man with two children who had a wife who supported his refusal and
who had materially provided for his two minor children).
214. See, e.g., Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976) (trial court
order for a blood transfusion over the competent patient's objection upheld because he
was the sole support of a two-year-old child).
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gender, marital status, and financial position, would be very unlikely to
withstand fourteenth amendment equal protection scrutiny. 2 15
It has been suggested that the issue of refusing medical treatment
has been evolving over the last two decades from medicalization in the
seventies to legalization in the eighties to politicization in the nineties. 2 16 The Cruzan ruling vindicates Johnson's prediction that the coming decade will shift the focus of treatment refusal to the state
legislatures, which, upon the invitation ofJustice O'Connor, will serve as
the "laboratories" wherein procedures for safeguarding the liberty in2 17
terests of incompetent patients will be tested.
Now that the Supreme Court has recognized that the four state interests can constitutionally be balanced against a patient's fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in determining what medical treatment he
will undergo, a puzzling question persists. If what is really at stake in
treatment refusal cases is one or more legitimate interests of the state
which, in at least some instances may be deemed sufficiently compelling
so as to overcome a citizen's fundamental constitutional right, why have
the states, even the most zealous among them, Missouri, tolerated such
a haphazard mode of assertion? I began this article with the acknowledgement that treatment refusal lawsuits represent a distinct minority of
the universe of instances in which patients or their surrogates decline
medical treatment necessary to prevent morbidity or mortality. Assuming, arguendo, that the state has one or more interests in overriding treatment refusals in all such cases, then in most of them the state's interests
will never be asserted or considered. It seems paradoxical at the very
least that the states, in view of this obvious and distressing fact, would
not at some point during the last decade have created a mechanism for
insuring that these interests are always factored into the equation.
For example, rather than relying upon the serendipitous manner in
which some physicians challenge some treatment refusals by some patients, legislation might be enacted (such as created the "Granny Doe"
squads in New Jersey) that establishes an affirmative obligation on the
part of all licensed physicians to immediately report any treatment refusal by a patient or surrogate that poses a likelihood of morbidity or
mortality. Once reported by the physician to the designated state authority, the Attorney General could then be charged with filing an action
in the proper court so that the state's interests could be balanced against
the right of the patient to refuse treatment.
The fact that no such proposal has been implemented, or even proposed to the best of my knowledge, may indicate several things. First,
such a mechanism would be extremely cumbersome and costly. Second,
it would provoke the wrath of organized medicine and civil liberties in215. For a discussion of the level of scrutiny required when state classifications burden
a fundamental constitutional right, see L. TRIBE supra note 65, § 16-7, at 1454.
216. Johnson, From Medicalizationto Legalization to Politicization:O'Connor,Cruzan, and Refusal of Treatment in the 1990's, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1989).
217. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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terest groups. But third, and I suggest most importantly from the perspective of this article, the state as the embodiment of the collective
political will of its citizens has no real or legitimate interest in such
Orwellian medical practice. Although it may be difficult to motivate citizens to rise up in righteous indignation when an isolated patient randomly finds his treatment decision challenged in court by his physician,
it would be quite another matter to attempt to systematically subject all
patient refusals with serious consequences to bureaucratic scrutiny and
legal action. Such a proposal would be political martyrdom for the
elected officials who had the temerity to suggest it.
Hopefully, the faith that Justice O'Connor has reposed in the state
legislatures will prove to be well-founded, and instead of the totalitarian
scenario described above, other states will follow the lead of those that
have already recognized the role of the family as surrogate decisionmakers for incompetent patients. 2 18 Such statutes can be drafted so
that individual and family privacy in healthcare decisions is preserved
and protected without unduly compromising the legitimate role and responsibility of the state as parens patriae when actual cases of abuse or
neglect of an incapacitated person are presented.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ivan Illich attacks the phenomenon of iatrogenic disease or illness
that results from medical interventions. 2 19 Since virtually all medical
procedures carry risks of adverse consequences, all medications have
one or more negative side-effects, and hospitalization presents the possibility of nosocomial infections, medication errors, and other untoward
patient incidents, they must be factored into any objective analysis of the
impact of medical interventions. Such outcomes are the antithesis of the
Hippocratic admonition that before all else the physician should do no
harm. Illich's contention is that the increasing medicalization of society
has the potential for causing more harm than benefit. Regardless of the
extent to which one accepts this proposition, it can also be said that
there has occurred a parallel and simultaneous process-the legalization
of medical practice. It is quite common for hospitals, once they reach a
certain critical mass, to establish in-house legal staffs. Also, as physicians increasingly practice in group settings, in the form of large clinics,
HMO's, or as actual employees of hospitals, their interactions with attorneys and reliance, if not dependence, upon legal advice in rendering
patient care has significantly increased. One area in which the advice
and counsel of attorneys has been increasingly sought and followed is
that of treatment refusals by patients or their families.
Just as physicians have a role as "gatekeeper" in modern healthcare
218. For examples of progressive legislation intended to cover situations such as that
in the Cruzan case, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1107.
219. I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1975). "latrogenic" is derived from the Greek roots
"iatros", meaning "doctor" and "genic" meaning "arising from". latrogenic illness
means one caused by a physician.
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delivery, counsel to hospitals and physicians are, in a very real sense, the
gatekeepers with regard to the legal system in general and the courts in
particular. This role has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism of
late. 220 The practice of defensive health law has often translated into
the seeking ofjudicial involvement whenever there is a conflict between
the physician's recommendation and the patient's decision. Virtually all
of the cases discussed in this article, including Cruzan, were precipitated
by the refusal of healthcare providers-physicians, hospitals, or nursing
homes-to accept the informed refusal of treatment by competent patients or the guardians or close family members of incompetent patients.
Few, if any, of these cases posed any actual and material threat of liability to those healthcare providers that legally or ethically justified litigating the refusal of treatment.
Nevertheless, represented by counsel, private medical treatment decisions became public legal controversies, in some instances with numerous amicus briefs filed on both sides of the issue. Since few, if any,
courts have ever refused to hear and rule upon these cases, it is not
surprising that they proliferate. Unless the more egregious cases are
dismissed with a finding that the providers were engaging in groundless
and frivolous litigation, no attorney for a health care provider will be
able to conscientiously advocate not resolving such disputes through the
courts.
The practice of defensive clinical and legal medicine, born of the
generally litigious nature of modern American society, in fact produces
yet more litigation of the type addressed in this article-iatrogenic litigation. The courts, facing overcrowded dockets and being generally illequipped to make the kinds of decisions foisted upon them by hospitals
and physicians, can stem this tide of cases through prompt and judicious
application of existing contractual, procedural, and constitutional principles. Furthermore, they have the ethical responsibility to do so. Only
then will the physician-patient relationship have any reasonable chance
of being returned to the realm of the private and personal encounter
that is based on confidentiality and mutual trust and respect.

220. See Nelson & Cranford, Legal Advice, Moral Paralysis,and the Death of Samuel Linares,
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MEDIA LIABILITY FOR PUBLICATION OF
ADVERTISING: WHEN TO KILL THE MESSENGER

By MATTHEW G.

WEBER*

"The first bringer of unwelcome news hath
but a losing office."
Shakespeare**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Given the budgetary restraints facing local and national regulatory
and law enforcement agencies, it comes as no surprise that these agencies occasionally attempt to shift the cost of regulatory enforcement to
the private sector. A recent case arising under the Fair Housing Act
("FHA")' suggests that newspapers may be forced to play an increasingly active role in monitoring and regulating advertising copy where
the advertisement itself is deemed to pose a substantive danger of racial
discrimination. In Ragin v. New York Times Co.,2 Judge Haight of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the New York Times' ("Times") contention that the first amendment prohibits imposition of liability on a newspaper for printing
advertisements for the sale or rental of residential real estate featuring
predominately white models. The court reached this conclusion in denying the Times' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' discrimination claim
3
arising under section 3604(c) of the FHA.
This article discusses the grounds for the Ragin court's rejection of
the Times' constitutional defense. The Ragin opinion will be contrasted
with a subsequent decision granting a similar motion to dismiss on behalf of The Cincinnati Enquirer in Housing Opportunities Made Equal v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, ("HOME").4 This article examines the conflict between the two decisions in light of two rationales articulated by the
Supreme Court as justifications for the greater regulation of commercial
* Matthew G. Weber (B.A., Colorado College; J.D., Northwestern University
School of Law) is an attorney with Dow, Lohnes & Albertson in Washington, D.C. The
author wishes to thank Brent N. Rushforth and Jonathan D. Hart of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, and Asim Varma, Esq. of Washington, D.C. for their support and comments. The
author also thanks summer associate Karen A. Post for her valuable research assistance.
** Henry IV, Part II, Act I, Scene 1, line 100.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
2. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), certifiedforinterlocutory appeal, Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328).
3. Judge Haight dismissed claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA, as
well as dismissing claims under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982 (1988) of the Civil Rights Acts of
1866 and 1870, and the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution.
4. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
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speech. The two rationales that have been articulated by the Supreme
Court for this greater regulation are: a commercial speaker's extensive
knowledge of his product and the hardiness of commercial speech. The
author contends that these two rationales provide the analytical tools for
determining whether advertising restrictions are constitutional as applied to newspapers or whether the restrictions constitute impermissible
attempts to shift the burden of regulatory monitoring to newspapers.
Accordingly, the final section of the article applies these two rationales
to the Ragin and HOME decisions and suggests that the latter decision is
more consistent with the Supreme Court's rationales.
II.

RAGIN v. NEW YORK TIMES Co.

In Ragin, individual black persons and Open Housing Center, Inc.,
a not-for-profit New York corporation devoted to promoting equal opportunity in housing in the New York metropolitan area, brought a discrimination action against the Times. 5 The Times, it was alleged, had
printed advertisements "featuring thousands of human models of whom
virtually none were black.... [T]he few blacks represented are usually
depicted as building maintenance employees, doorman [sic], entertainers, sports figures, small children or cartoon characters."'6 It was further alleged in the complaint that the Times had:
continued to print and publish numerous advertisements that
picture all-white models in advertisements for realty located in
predominantly white buildings, developments, communities or
neighborhoods. It has also printed and published a few advertisements that picture all black models in advertisements for realty located in predominately black
buildings, developments,
7
communities or neighborhoods.
The complaint alleged that the advertisements violated, inter alia, section

3604(c) of the FHA, 8 and various regulations promulgated thereunder. 9
5. Prior to filing suit, counsel for the plaintiffs met with the Times in 1987 to request
changes in the news paper's advertising policies. In February 1988, the Times published a
notice to its advertisers stating that it would not accept real estate advertisements failing to
display the "Equal Housing Opportunity" tag line recommended by the federal government or otherwise failing to comply with federal and state discrimination laws. The plaintiffs were not satisfied with these measures and filed suit. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 955.
6. Id, at 954 (quoting complaint,
12).
7. Id. at 955 (quoting complaint,
19).
8. Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful:
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
9. In implementing the FHA, the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") has promulgated regulations which provide, in part:
(a) Use of Equal Housing Opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan. All advertising of
residential real estate for sale, rent, or financing should contain an equal housing
opportunity logotype, statement, or slogan as a means of educating the homeseeking public that the property is available to all persons regardless of race [or]
color ....
(b) Use of human models. Human models in photographs, drawings, or other
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The Times moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute
did not proscribe the publication of the advertisements at issue. The
court rejected the Times' construction of the statute. The court noted
that the plaintiffs need not prove that the Times intended to express a
racial preference. 10 Rather, the court determined that the "ultimate issue for the finder of facts will be whether '[t]o an ordinary reader the
natural interpretation of the advertisements published [in the newspaper] is that they indicate a racial preference in the acceptance of tenMoreover, the court found the statute provided no
ants.' ' q
exemptions for newspapers. 1 2 Thus, the court concluded that the discrimination claim was not barred as a matter of statutory construction.
The court further found that the application of the statute to newspaper publishers would not violate the first amendment. Finding sup13
port in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,
the court reasoned that the facts alleged in the complaint, if found by
the jury to be true, would constitute unlawful activity, which would preclude the Times' constitutional defense, "since commercial speech con14
cerning unlawful activity is not protected by the First Amendment."
The Times sought to distinguish Pittsburgh Press on a factual basis,
arguing that the Times was more passive than the publisher in Pittsburgh
Press. In PittsburghPress, the publisher carried "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns (ie., "Jobs-Male Interest", "Jobs-Female Interest")15 in violation of a city ordinance. The Supreme Court
found that the column headings in combination with the advertisements
produced "essentially the same message as an overtly discriminatory
want ad," and were "in practical effect an integrated commercial stategraphic techniques may not be used to indicate exclusiveness because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. If models are
used in display advertising campaigns, the models should be clearly definable as
reasonably representing majority and minority groups in the metropolitan area,
both sexes, and, when appropriate, families with children. Models, if used,
should portray persons in an equal social setting and indicate to the general public that the housing is open to all without regard to race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, and is not for the exclusive use of one

such group.
24 C.F.R. § 109.30 (a)-(b) (1990).
10. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 957.
11. Id (quoting, United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972)). The court in Hunter affirmed the lower court's injunction issued in a declaratory judgement action arising under § 3604(c) against a newspaper that
had printed a classified advertisement for a "white home." Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215.
12. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 957. The Ragin court cites Hunter,459 F.2d at 210, which
points to the statutory language making it "unlawful 'to make, print, publish, or cause to
be made, printed, or published' any advertisement prohibited by the Act." The Ragin
court further adopted the reasoning of the court in Hunter which goes on to explain that
"'landlords and brokers 'cause' advertisements to be printed or published and generally
newspapers 'print' and 'publish' them.'" Ragin, 726 F. Supp at 957 (quoting Hunter, 459
F.2d at 210).
13. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).

14. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 962 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)("The government may ban commercial speech related
to illegal activity .... ); Pittsburgh Press 413 U.S. at 388).
15. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 379.
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ment." 1 6 The Court upheld the ordinance, explaining that:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the
regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising
is incidental to a
17
valid limitation on economic activity.
Thus, Pittsburgh Press established that the state may regulate commercial
speech related to unlawful activity without satisfying the clear and present danger test applied in non-commercial speech cases.18
In Ragin, the Times argued that its role in printing advertisements
that emitted allegedly discriminatory signals was a "far cry" from the
active contribution of the column headings by the publisher in Pittsburgh
Press.19 The court rejected this passive/active distinction and stated that
only Congress could create an exception for passive publishers. 20 Similarly, the court rejected the argument that no cause of action had been
stated because the advertisements were not overtly discriminatory like
the advertisement in United States v. Hunter2 ' for a "white home."'2 2 The
court explained that "consistent use of exclusively or near-exclusively
white models may operate as the functional equivalent of more explicit
verbal racial messages." 23 For purposes of denying the Times' motion
to dismiss, the court found it possible that the plaintiff could show that
an ordinary reader would interpret the advertisements as indicating a
24
racial preference in the acceptance of tenants.
Relying on Bigelow v. Virginia,25 the Times argued that even if the
advertisements subtly implied a racial preference, the FHA improperly
shifted the burden of monitoring discriminatory advertising to the
press. 26 In Bigelow, the Court reversed the criminal conviction of an
editor of an underground newspaper which ran an advertisement for a
group which offered to help women obtain admittance to accredited outof-state abortion clinics. The Ragin court found Bigelow inapposite because "abortion is constitutionally protected whereas housing discrimi16. Id at 388.
17. Id at 389.
18. The clear and present danger doctrine originated with Justice Holmes' opinion in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)("The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are ofsuch a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."). The most commonly cited articulation of the modem test states:
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)(per curiam).
19. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
20. Id. at 963.
21. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d. 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
22. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
23. Id. at 963.
24. Id. at 957.
25. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
26. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
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nation is illegal." 27 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 28 the Ragin court found
that "the undoubted power of Congress to ban discrimination in housing necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising which indicates a discriminatory preference." ' 29 The Ragin court adopted the
reasoning in Posadas that the state may regulate commercial advertising
where the underlying subject of the advertisement does not involve con30
stitutionally protected activities.
Finally, the Times argued that sufficiently onerous advertising restrictions violate the first amendment even when the underlying activity
is not constitutionally protected.3 1 For purposes of deciding the motion
to dismiss, the court in Ragin disposed of this argument by noting that
the burden of monitoring real estate advertisements for indications of
discriminatory preference might be less onerous than the cost of moni32
toring other types of advertisements, such as classified advertisements.
The court determined it was not necessary to determine the actual degree of burden for the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss.33
The court concluded that the first amendment did not bar the section
3604(c) claim as a matter of law; accordingly, it denied the Times' mo34
tion to dismiss the claim.
27. Id at 963.
28. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986). Speaking for the Court in Posadas,JusticeRehnquist upheld, against a first amendment challenge, a local statutory scheme that permitted casino gambling in Puerto Rico
while prohibiting the advertising of such facilities to the public of Puerto Rico. The Court
stated that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling .... Id. at 345-46.
29. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
30. In Posadas,JusticeRehnquist distinguished the case at bar from two prior advertising cases on the ground that the prior cases involved constitutionally protected activities.
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345 (distinguishing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)(striking down a ban on contraceptive advertising), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)(reversal of a criminal conviction for advertising for an abortion clinic)).
Cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (advertisement for religious book cannot
be regulated as commercial speech).
31. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 963.
32. Id. at 964.
33. Id at 963-64. For anecdotal support the court remarked that the Washington Post
in Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 899 F.
2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), had agreed to monitor real estate advertisements in a similar situation; however, the court in Ragin had "a parochial reluctance to conclude that what the
Washington Post can do to eliminate all the ads unfit to print, the New York Times cannot do."
Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the Washington
Post had consented to monitor real estate advertisements by agreeing:
to require specified black representation in different kinds of advertisements; recordkeeping of real estate display sections for three years; and enforcement by
means of notices to advertisers, monitoring compliance, and prohibition of advertisements if the advertiser did not comply, all the while keeping copies of such
notices for plaintiffs' inspection.
Jd,
The Washington Post reportedly agreed to ensure that 25%o of the models appearing
in its real estate advertisements would be black. N.Y. Times, May 31, 1987, at L34, col. 2.
34. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964.
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HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES MADE EQUAL V. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,

35

Two months after Judge Haight issued the Ragin opinion, Chief
Judge Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio dismissed a similar section 3604(c) claim brought by HOME, a
non-profit corporation, against The Cincinnati Enquirer. The court in
HOME construed the Fair Housing Act claim without reference to the
36
Ragin decision.
The court in HOME determined that Congress intended to prohibit
two kinds of advertising by enacting section 3604(c). First, the statute
prohibits advertisements which communicate a discriminatory preference in an obvious and undeniable way, such as the ad in Hunter for a
"white home." 3 7T Second, the statute prohibits advertisements rendered
discriminatory through the proof of extrinsic circumstances which
demonstrate a discriminatory intent.3 8 The court found the complaint
failed to state allegations sufficient to state a claim under either theory
of liability.3 9 Significantly, the court in HOME specifically rejected the
notion that a newspaper could be held liable based on the racial composition of models in advertising, noting that "[s]ection 3604(c) cannot be
construed to require a newspaper to evaluate the racial proportions of
its advertising pages. The chilling effect of such a burden implicates
'40
First Amendment concerns."

In contrast, while the court in Ragin did not construe section
3604(c) as requiring strict proportionality, 4 1 it did find the plaintiffs had
stated a cause of action without making any allegations of extrinsic circumstances to support a finding of discriminatory intent. 4 2 Thus, as
35. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
36. The court did refer to the parallel case ofRagin v. Steiner, Clateman and Assocs.,
714 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); however, because this article discusses media liability
for publication of discriminatory advertising, Ragin v. Steiner should be distinguished because it involved the originator of the allegedly discriminatory advertising rather than the
publisher of the advertising as in Ragin v. New York Times. Judge Haight, in certifying the
Ragin v. New York Times order for interlocutory appeal, did refer to the HOME opinion.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ragin v. New York Times Co., No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CHS)
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2328). See also infra note
45.
37. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 (citing United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.
1972). In another case brought under § 3604(c), a federal district court enjoined three
Chicago neighborhood newspapers from publishing classified advertisements which expressed explicit preferences for tenants and buyers of various nationalities. Holmgren v.
Little Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Il1. 1971). The court in Holmgren did not address whether there were any potential first amendment implications.
38. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 (citing Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541,
546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'don other grounds, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
39. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804. The court noted that the Enquirer refused to change
its advertising practices after the plaintiffs requested such change, but concluded that "a
mere refusal to cease practices which are not actionable in the first instance does not provide evidence of intentionality." IL at 804 n.3.
40. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804.
41. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
42. Between the polar extremes of total exclusion, and strict proportionalism according to population percentages, the proof at trial may show sufficient numbers
of black models to achieve fair representation; or such a paucity of black models
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interpreted by the Ragin court, newspapers may be liable under section
3604(c) based solely on a genuine discrepancy between the racial composition of the models in advertising as compared to the racial composition in the target market without any extrinsic proof of discriminatory
intent. 43 This interpretation is irreconcilable with the HOME decision,
which specifically rejected the imposition of such a monitoring burden.4 4 Although neither decision engages in an extensive analysis of the
first amendment implications of this monitoring burden, 4 5 established
commercial speech doctrine provides the analytical framework to assess
the constitutionality of the Ragin court's interpretation of section
3604(c).

IV.
A.

ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Knowledge and Hardinessas Rationalesfor Regulation
of Commercial Speech

Commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction." 4 6 An advertisement that does
as to constitute "tokenism." The factfinder could, in my judgment, lawfully conclude that proof of the former does not violate the FHA; but that proof of the
latter does offend a statute prohibiting advertisements which indicate a racial
preference.
I.d at 961.
43. In discussing the lack of an exact proportionality requirement, the court in Ragin
relied upon Spann v. Colonial Village, 662 F. Supp. 541, 546 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In a subsequent case, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia characterized Spann v. Colonial Village as holding:
if in real estate advertisements some photographs feature white models, some
black models, and some of both, no violation of the [Fair Housing] Act occurs
merely because the races are not represented proportionately to population, or
because black models are not included in every display, unless an intention to
discriminate is shown by extrinsic evidence.
Spann v. Carley Capital Group, 734 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1988). This language is susceptible to more than one interpretation. The court in HOME read this language to preclude
any cause of action based upon the lack of proportionality alone, provided some black
models appeared. The court in Ragin seemingly limited the language to apply only "in
circumstances where there is no genuine discrepancy between the percentage of black
models used in an advertising campaign or practice and the percentage of blacks used in
the relevant community .. ." Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 960. Thus, according to the Ragin
court, where a genuine discrepancy does exist-as in Ragin where the plaintiffs alleged the
use of thousands of human models "of whom virtually none were black"-a cause of action could be stated based on the lack of proportionality without allegations of extrinsic
evidence of discriminatory intent. Id, at 961.
44. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
45. Indeed, in certifying the order denying the Times' motion to dismiss for appeal,
Judge Haight of the Ragin court noted that the court in HOME had reached "a conclusion
contrary to my own in what appears to be a comparable case (albeit, ifI may say so respectfully, without detailed analysis)." Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ragin v. New York
Times Co., No. 89 Civ. 0228 (CHS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1990)(1990 WL 26302, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2328).
46. Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(discussing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)). For discussions of the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, see Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1977); DeVore, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico: The End of the
Beginning, 10 HAS-TINGS COMM. & ENr. UJ. 579 (1988); Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Free Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
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not propose a commercial transaction is not treated as commercial
speech. 4 7 Thus, a political advertisement is not commercial speech
merely because a publisher is paid for its publication,48 or because the
speaker may have been motivated by financial gain. 49 In short, the existence of "commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing
the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment." 50 On
the other hand, a proposal for a commercial transaction cannot be elevated above commercial speech merely by linking the proposal to a cur51
rent issue of public concern.
Because commercial speech is regarded as less worthy of first
amendment protection 52 than non-commercial speech, 55 it received little constitutional protection 54 before the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.55 In Virginia Board, the Court struck down a ban on truthful
56
price advertising of prescription drugs on first amendment grounds.
While the Virginia Board decision dramatically increased the protection
(1971); Schmidt & Bums, Proofor Consequences: FalseAdvertising and the Doctrineof Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1273 (1988); Comment, Common Sense and Commercial Free Speech,
48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1121 (1987).
47. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)(political
advertisement treated as non-commercial speech in libel context).
48. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 818 (1975)(newspaper); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 (newspaper); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)(books).
49. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678,2684 (1989); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
50. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966), reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 934
(1966).
51. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028
(1989)(tupperware parties treated as commercial speech despite incidental teaching of
home economics); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983)(advertise-ments
treated as commercial speech even though condoms were linked to birth control and venereal disease); Central Hudson Gas & Elec., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5
(1980) (advertisements treated as commercial speech despite fact that electricity ads were
linked to energy conservation); Fargo Women's Health Org., v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176,
181 (N.D. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986)(advertisements for anti abortion counseling clinic linked to pro life movement).
52. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979)(arguing that commercial speech should receive no first
amendment protection).
53. The Court and commentators have "emphasized the role of the First Amendment
in guaranteeing our capacity for democratic self-government." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 n. 19 (1976). See also
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

54. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding conviction for violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 n.1, 54 (1942)(upholding statute prohibiting
distribution of any "handbill, circular . . . or other advertising matter whatsoever in or
upon any street" because "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(reversing criminal conviction of editor for printing advertisement for legal out of state
abortion clinic services).
55. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
56. Id at 773.
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previously afforded commercial speech, 5 7 the Court recognized that the
first amendment permitted greater regulation of commercial speech
than of other categories of speech.5 8 For example, the Court acknowledged the state's power to regulate false and misleading advertising. 59
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission,60 the
Court developed a four-part test for assessing the legality of restrictions
on commercial speech. According to the CentralHudson test, commercial
speech is unprotected if it is misleading or if it concerns unlawful activ61
ity. If the speech is protected, the government must demonstrate
three additional elements: (1) the government must show a substantial
state interest, (2) the regulation must directly advance the governmental
interest asserted, and (3) the regulation must not be more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.6 2 Unless the government can
meet all four elements of the Central Hudson test, an advertising regulation will be struck down. Nevertheless, the Central Hudson test permits
much greater regulation than the tests applicable to non-commercial
63
speech.
As justification for the lesser protection afforded commercial
speech, the Court in Virginia Board advanced two "commonsense differ57. In recognizing first amendment values underlying commercial speech, the Court
in Virginia Board remarked:

So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.
Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted)(footnotes omitted).
58. irginia Board,425 U.S. at 770. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978), reh'gdenied,439 U.S. 883 (1978), the Court, relying on Virginia Board, indicated
that the failure to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech:
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [first]
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than
subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial
expression.
Id at 456.
59. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771.

60. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
61. The burden ofjustifying the restriction is on the party seeking to uphold it. Id. at
570.
62. Idat 566. The last requirement has been relaxed since CentralHudson. The word
"necessary" does not imply that the means must be the least restrictive means available.
Rather, it merely means there must be a reasonable "'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.' " Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of
New York v. Fox, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989)(quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
63. For instance, while commercial speech may be regulated on the basis of its content, non-commercial speech generally cannot be so regulated. See, e.g., Erznoznik v.Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)(striking down content-based municipal ordinance
prohibiting the showing of films with nudity whenever the theater screen could be seen
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ences" between commercial speech and other categories of speech.6 4
First, the Court cited the "greater objectivity" of commercial speech:
"[t]he truth of commercial speech... may be more easily verifiable by
its disseminator than ...news reporting or political commentary, in that
ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows
more about than anyone else." 6 5 Secondly, the Court asserted that
"commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood
of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely." 6 6 Subsequent decisions, including Central Hudson, have consistently accorded
commercial speech less protection than other forms of speech on the
two common-sense distinctions of knowledge and
basis of 6these
7
hardiness.
1. The Knowledge Rationale as Applied to Newspapers
The first justification for permitting greater regulation of commercial speech turns upon the knowledge of the commercial speaker. Because commercial speakers are assumed to have extensive knowledge of
from the street). But see Note, The Content Distinctionin Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1904 (1989)(suggesting that the content distinction may be eroding).
The prior restraint doctrine is another example of the different level of protection
afforded commercial speech: "it is quite clear that prior restraint on commercial speech is
allowed to an extent which would not be allowed toward other forms of protected speech."
Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Iarson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 180 (N.D. 1986)(citing Virginia
Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
64. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See also Central Hudson 447 U.S. at 562;
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). For arguments that these two factors do not distinguish commercial speech from traditionally protected speech, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, supra note 46 at 385-86; Comment, Common Sense and Commercial Free
Speech, supra note 46 at 1133.
65. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
66. Id
67. In Central Hudson, the court found:
Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and
the lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.' CentralHudson, 447
U.S. at 564 n.6 (citation omitted).
Prior to Central Hudson, the Supreme Court in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)
stated:
Because [commercial speech] relates to a particular product or service, commercial speech is more objective, hence more verifiable, than other varieties of
speech. Commercial speech, because of its importance to business profits, and
because it is carefully calculated, is also less likely than other forms of speech to
be inhibited by proper regulation.
See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. 433 U.S. 350, 383 ("Since the advertiser knows his
product and has a commercial interest in its dissemination, we have little worry that regulation to assure truthfulness will discourage protected speech."). Cf.Dun & Bradstreet, v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)(citation omitted)("[T]h. speech here
[credit report], like advertising, is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state
regulation.... Arguably, the reporting here was also more objectively verifiable than
speech deserving of greater protection.").
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their products, "they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their
messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity."' 68 This assumption regarding the commercial speaker's knowledge significantly influences the legal tests applied to commercial speech. For example, as
Justice Stewart observed in his concurring opinion in Virginia Board,6 9
liability for factual inaccuracies rests upon the proof of actual malice in a
libel case involving a public figure, 70 whereas liability for factual inaccuracies in advertising may be imposed without such proof pursuant to
state and federal false and deceptive advertising statutes. 7 1 Similarly, in
non-commercial speech cases, the Brandenburg test, from Brandenburgv.
Ohio,7 2 requires a factual inquiry into the speaker's knowledge and intent to incite imminent unlawful action when the speaker is prosecuted
for speech inciting unlawful activity. 73 In stark contrast, the commercial
speech doctrine rests upon the assumption that commercial speakers
have extensive knowledge concerning their products. 74 Therefore, the
75
intent requirement is less stringent than in the Brandenburgtest.
As a practical matter, the Court's assumption of knowledge seems
appropriate when the speaker produces or markets the goods or services
being advertised. 7 6 This assumption, however, should not apply with
68. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
69. Virginia Board,425 U.S. at 776-77. Justice Stewart relied on the knowledge rationale to justify greater regulation of truth in commercial speech:
In contrast to the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from
sketchy and sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication
deadlines, the commercial advertiser generally knows the product or service he
seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates them.
Id at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-349 (1974).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988); see also Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294,
308-09 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980)(unwitting retailer not exempt from
operation of federal dissemination of false advertising statute). Some statutes regulating
the unlawful practice of unconscionable commercial advertising, however, exempt publishers when they have "no knowledge of the intent, design or purpose of the advertiser." See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-421(b) (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989).
72. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also supra note 18.
73. The Court explicitly recognized an intent element to the Brandenburg test in Hess
v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973). But see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Re-examined: Dissonancein the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1169 n.26 (1970) (contending that the intent requirement should be irrelevant). See generally Shiffrin, Defamatory
Non-Media Speech and FirstAmendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 947 n.205 (1978).
74. See supra text accompanying note 65, cf. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
Arguably, the reporting here [credit report] was also more objectively verifiable
than speech deserving of greater protection. In any case, the market provides a
powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accurate, since false credit
reporting is ofno use to creditors. Thus, any incremental "chilling" effect of libel
suits would be of decreased significance.
Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted).
75. See Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). Still, as the Fifth Circuit has vividly illustrated, a commercial speaker does not lose
constitutional protection "whenever the advertised product might be used illegally. Peanut butter advertising cannot be banned just because someone might someday throw ajar
at the presidential motorcade." Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).
76. Several commentators have questioned whether a commercial speaker's knowl-
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equal force to newspapers because they are poorly situated to evaluate
the truth of the claims made and the legality of the products being advertised in their publications. Recognizing the publisher's relative ignorance concerning the underlying products, courts before7 7 and after 78
Virginia Board have refused to impose tort duties upon publishers to verify information contained in advertisements appearing in their
publications.
The Court's "common sense" distinction regarding a commercial
speaker's knowledge cannot logically be extended to apply to newspapers. Instead of assuming a newspaper's knowledge, a court should
make a factual inquiry into the extent of the publisher's knowledge in
determining whether a publisher can be found liable for printing advertisements related to unlawful conduct. For instance, in Norwood v. Soldier
of FortuneMagazine,79 the plaintiff brought a negligence action against a
magazine for publishing advertisements for professional mercenaries
reading in part, "GUN FOR HIRE," "All jobs considered" and "NAM
sniper instructor." The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment because "[r]easonable jurors might conclude that a reasonable person shouldn't be especially surprised when he learns that the
gun that had been hired through his advertisement was used to do one
of the things that guns often do and are designed to do-hurt people." 80 Thus, the court in Norwood determined that publishers may lose
their first amendment protection when they fail to detect blatant advertisements related to unlawful activity. 81 Subsequent to this determinaedge is different from a political speaker's knowledge, even where the commercial speaker
is in the chain of distribution. See, e.g., Farber, Commercial Speech and FirstAmendment Theoty,
supra note 46, at 385-86 (arguing commercial speech is not necessarily more verifiable than
political speech).
77. See Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 NJ. Super. 207, 322 A.2d 824 (1974)(publisher had no
duty to investigate and test fireworks advertised in magazine); Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch,
129 Misc. 2d 477, 493 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1985)(summary judgment granted to defendant after
court found no duty to verify information in "personal" classified advertisements); Suarez
v. Underwood, 103 Misc. 2d 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1980)(court refused to impose on
newspaper the "onerous burden" of investigating safety of advertised scalp treatment).
But see Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (1969)(dismissal reversed in part, holding that magazine that endorsed defective shoes with "Good
Housekeeping's Consumers' Guaranty Seal" may be liable to purchaser relying on endorsement for subsequent injury).
78. See, e.g., Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir.
1989)(rejecting wrongful death claim arising out of classified ad), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 729
(1990); Pittman v. DowJones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987)("a newspaper
has no duty, whether by way of tort or contract, to investigate the accuracy of advertisements placed with it which are directed to the general public, unless the newspaper undertakes to guarantee the soundness of the products advertised"), aff'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1987); Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119, 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr.
101, 102-03 (1987)(declining to impose duty to investigate the safety of tampons advertised in magazine); Gutter v. DowJones, 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 490 N.E.2d 898 (1986)(allegations that reader relied on non-defamatory negligent misrepresentation of fact in a news
article in choosing a securities investment which resulted in financial loss insufficient to
state a claim).
79. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
80. Id. at 1402.
81. Id. at 1399-1400. Accord Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally
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82
tion, the Norwood case reportedly settled.
Courts have refused to impose tort duties where liability is based
upon more subtle solicitations for unlawful services or products. For
instance, when presented with a factual setting similar to the Norwood
case, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result in Eimann v. Soldier of
FortuneMagazine,8 3 albeit without reaching the first amendment issue. In
Eimann, the same magazine had published an advertisement reading in
part, "EX-MARINES--67-69 'Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialistjungle warfare, pilot, M.E., high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas. "84
The advertisement was answered by a man who offered $10,000 to have
his wife murdered.8 5 Finding the magazine was negligent for printing
the advertisement, a Texas jury awarded the decedent's mother and son
$1.9 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million in punitive
86
damages.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the judgment, stating that "[g]iven the pervasiveness of advertising in
our society and the important role it plays, we decline to impose on publishers the obligation to reject all ambiguous advertisements for products or services that might pose a threat of harm." 8 7 Consistent with the
analysis employed in Norwood, the court in Eimann found that "[w]ithout
a more specific indication of illegal intent than [the mercenary's] ad or
its context provided, we conclude that SOF [the magazine] did not violate the required standard of conduct by publishing an ad that later
played a role in criminal activity." 8 8 Thus, the traditional negligence
duty analysis applied by the courts in Norwood and Eimann does not assume, as the commercial speech doctrine does, that publishers have extensive knowledge of the products and services advertised in their
publications. Instead, the courts have consistently applied the reasona89
bleness standard.

2.

The Hardiness Rationale as Applied to Newspapers

The hardiness rationale for permitting greater regulation of commercial advertising is based upon the assumption that stricter regulation
will not chill commercial speech because of the economic benefits to be
derived from advertising. 90 This rationale, like the knowledge rationale,
could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes.").
82. "Gunfor Hire" Had Many Clients - Bumbling Gang ofKillers Left Trail of Death, Terror,
L.A. Times, Sept. 6, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
83. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir. 1989).
84. Id at 831.
85. Id
86. Id at 833.
87. Id at 838.
88. Id.
89. For an argument that liability in such situations should be imposed only when the
ad promotes a likelihood of lawless conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious
bodily harm, see Shapiro & Olson, Advertiser Liability: SoldierofFortune Cases Take Deadly Aim
at Publishers, 11 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 383 (1989).
90. See supra notes 64, 66-67 and accompanying text. Cf. South Carolina State Ports
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makes sense when applied to those in the chain of distribution, i.e., the
producers, marketers, and retailers of goods and services. Advertising
increases profits for those in the chain of distribution by increasing sales
of the underlying product. Consequently, those in the chain of distribution have an incentive to protect those profits by making investments to
comply with advertising regulations. If necessary, they can pass these
costs along to consumers in the form of higher prices for their products
or services.
Publishers, by contrast, have little economic incentive to expend resources to comply with advertising regulation. In particular, classified
advertisements depend on high volume and low cost for profitability.
Classified advertisements would no longer be profitable if newspapers
were forced to engage counsel to review each one. 9 1 Moreover, publishers generally do not receive greater advertising revenue in proportion to
the success of the products they advertise. Because the link between the
success of the advertised products and the bottom line is more attenuated for the publisher than for the producer, publishers do not have the
same economic incentive as producers to overcome the chilling effect of
92
regulation.
The court in Walters v. Seventeen Magazine,98 vividly illustrated the
danger of this chilling effect in affirming the dismissal of a complaint
seeking to hold the defendant liable for failing to investigate the safety
of tampons advertised in the defendant's magazine:
Such a tort would require publications to maintain huge staffs
scrutinizing and testing each product offered. The enormous
cost of such groups, along with skyrocketing insurance rates,
would deter many magazines from accepting advertising, hastening their demise from lack of revenue. Others would comply, but raise their prices beyond the reach of the average
reader. Still others would be wiped out by tort judgments,
never to revive. Soon the total number
of publications in circu94
lation would drop dramatically.
As the Walters court recognized, publications simply do not have the
same economic incentives or resources to comply with advertising regulation as those in the chain of production. Even if publishers had more
incentives, they would face an insurmountable burden in attempting to
Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 346,350 (D.D.C. 1987)(footnote omitted)(finding "little concern that 'regulation' by way of a negligence cause of action will
chill such expression or diminish the free flow of commercial data ....
The fact-based
expression exemplified by the Booz-Allen report should prove quite hardy against the
'threat' of negligence actions.").
91. See infra note 113.
92. In refusing to impose tort liability upon a publisher for failing to investigate fireworks advertised in a magazine, the court in Yuhas v. Mudge, 129 NJ. Super 207, 322
A.2d 824, 825 (1974) observed that "[itlo impose the suggested broad legal duty upon
publishers of nationally circulated magazines, newspapers and other publications, would
not only be impractical and unrealistic, but would have a staggering adverse effect on the
commercial world and our economic system."
93. Walters v. Seventeen Magazine, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1119,241 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1987).
94. Id at 1122, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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acquaint themselves with the particular facts concerning each of the numerous and varied products advertised in their publications.
B.

Monitoring Burden as a Function of Knowledge and Hardiness

While the Central Hudson test 9 5 provides no protection for speech
related to unlawful activity, the Court has acknowledged the distinction
between the prohibition of illegal activity and the imposition of monitoring burdens, noting that "the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of
distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful." 9 6 Accordingly, courts and
practitioners assessing advertising regulations as applied to publishers
should be sensitive to the chilling effect presented by such regulation,
particularly where the statute making the publication of the advertisement unlawful may contravene the first amendment.
The doctrinal foundation for such sensitivity is found in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.9 7 In Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute that granted political candidates the right to
equal space to reply to criticism by a newspaper, free of cost to the candidate. The Court held the statute invalid on two grounds: (1) the statute exacted a penalty based upon the content of the newspaper, since
the paper was forced to incur additional costs and devote additional
space to print the candidate's reply; and (2) the statute intruded upon
the editorial discretion of the editors, because, even if there were no
costs associated with the reply, the statute forced the editors to print
material they otherwise would not have printed. The Court observed
that:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment
98
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Thus, a regulation that intrudes upon a newspaper's editorial discretion
as it relates to non-commercial speech contravenes the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press.
Subsequent decisions have cited Tornillo in rejecting claims of private litigants seeking to compel newspapers to print their advertisements. 99 More significantly, the courts in Memphis Publishing Co. v.
95. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
96. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985).
97. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
98. Id. at 258.
99. See Cyntje v. Daily News Publishing Co., 551 F. Supp. 403, 406 (D.V.I. 1982)(refusing to compel newspaper to print advertisement containing plaintiff's political views);
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Leech 10 0 and News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Commissioners10 '
relied on Tornillo in rejecting attempts by regulators to impose monitoring burdens on newspapers to ensure compliance with content-based
advertising regulations.
In Leech, the court struck down a Tennessee statute that required
publications that printed advertisements from out-of-state liquor retailers to publish a warning 10 2 adjacent to each such advertisement. While
the court in Leech found no evidence that the statute would exact an unconstitutional penalty by decreasing advertising revenue, the court concluded the statute nevertheless interfered with editorial discretion in
"accepting and preparing the copy for commercial advertising." 10
Specifically, the court remarked that the "forced choice between foregoing copy or publishing that which would not otherwise be published is
04
the state-imposed dilemma which was disapproved in Miami Herald."'
The court in Leech distinguished Pittsburgh Press by noting that the ordinance upheld there regulated illegal commercial activity involving gender-based discrimination whereas the statute at issue in Leech involved
105
the regulation of advertising for legal liquor sales in other states.
Given that the regulation involved advertising for legal commercial activity, the court found the Central Hudson test applied rather than the
10 6
Pittsburgh Press analysis.
Similarly, the court in Sun-Sentinel struck down a local ordinance
making it a misdemeanor for a newspaper to publish advertisements for
contracting services without ensuring that contractors included their
"certificate of competency" number issued by the county. 10 7 Although
the ordinance arguably regulated advertising for unlawful activity, to wit,
Person v. New York Post, 427 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)(citation omitted)(refusing to compel newspaper to print "tombstone" advertisement announcing a securities offering because "[a] court may no more tell a privately owned newspaper what
not to print than what to print. That commercial advertising is involved makes no
difference.").
100. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982).
101. News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 693 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D. Fla. 1987).
102. The notice in Leech read: "WARNING: The importation or transportation of alcoholic beverages into the State of Tennessee by any person not possessing a permit from
the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission is a Criminal Offense which could be punished by FINE or IMPRISONMENT or BOTH." The notice had to "be printed in a space
equal to or greater than thirty percent (30%) of the total space devoted to each such advertisement in print no smaller than the largest print type employed in such advertisement." 539 F. Supp. at 407.
103. Id. at 411.
104. Id. at 410 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Torillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-58
(1974)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 411. But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)(arguably establishing rule that would permit more intrusive
regulation of advertising whenever the underlying commercial activity was not constitutionally protected, regardless of whether the legislature had banned the activity in
question).
107. In the alternative, the ordinance permitted the publisher to obtain an affidavit
from the contractor stating that a certification number was not required. Sun-Sentinel, 693
F. Supp at 1067.
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the unlicensed provision of contracting services, the court in Sun-Sentinel
did not find PittsburghPress controlling. Instead, the court distinguished
PittsburghPress based on the degree of the publisher's participation. The
publisher in Pittsburgh Press created the sex-designated help-wanted columns, whereas the publisher in Sun-Sentinel could not "be said to have
employed a policy which affirmatively or directly aided in the incompetent or fraudulent provision of contracting services."' 0 8 The court further distinguished Pittsburgh Press on the ground that the sex
discrimination ordinance upheld there did not impose a penalty on the
publisher.' 0 9 In contrast, the court found the ordinance in Sun-Sentinel
imposed a significant monitoring cost on an otherwise passive publisher,
rendering it constitutionally infirm. 1 10 The court in Sun-Sentinel engaged in a detailed examination of the ordinance's financial impact on
the paper and determined that complying with the ordinance would cost
$8,580 a year.' 1 ' The court recognized, however, that the burden of the
ordinance should not be considered in isolation:
Beyond the burden imposed by [the ordinance], the possible
imposition of additional burdens by the County (or the State)
must also be considered in order to fully gauge the Ordinance's
constitutional implications. The County might, for example,
place similar duties on the press concerning other types of
services or other types of advertising directed at consumers.
Other counties might do the same. The State could, of course,
pass legislation similar to [the ordinance], a practice which
could spread to other states. The cumulative burden which
might be placed on publications by such legislation "would impair, perhaps severely, their proper functioning." The threat
presented by [the ordinance] 2is, then, to the institutional viability of the press as a whole.'1
As the court in Sun-Sentinel recognized, if such ordinances were upheld, the number of regulations that could potentially apply to a publisher would be limited only by the types of products or services
advertised in the publisher's publication."13 Faced with increasing regu108. ld at 1071.

109. Id at 1072 n.15.
110. Id at 1072-73.
I11. The court found that compliance with the ordinance would require twenty workhours per week or an estimated $8,580 per year. Id at 1068.
112. Sun-Sentinel, 693 F. Supp. at 1072-73 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)(quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975)).
113.. The court in Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch declined to find a duty to monitor classified
advertisements after engaging in an analysis similar to the court in Sun-Sentinel:
The classified advertisements which run in its newspaper serve at least two functions-they are an integral part of and facilitator of commerce in the area served
by the paper, and they underwrite in part the cost of publication of the newscarrying vehicle. It demands little imagination to conceive the consequences with
respect to such advertisements if the publisher were required to verify authorization for publication of each classified ad-even by telephone communication as
suggested by plaintiff-or to run the risk of imposition of damages for mental
anguish which might follow publication of an unauthorized ad. With the volume
of classified ads printed daily (typified by the more than 3000 ads handled by
defendant's paper in a month), a need for pre-publication telephone authorization-surely involving multiple calls to make contact in at least some instances-
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latory penalties, publishers would be forced to choose between hiring
staffs of lawyers, engineers, and scientists to review proposed advertising copy for potential violations or foregoing advertising copy for entire
categories of products and services. 14 While such an imposition might
be justified when applied to other industries, Tornillo teaches that such
an imposition cannot pass constitutional muster when applied to the
5
press. 1

V.

THE FHA: KNOWLEDGE DECREASES BURDEN

Section 3604(c), as construed by the court in HOME, does not appear to impose an unconstitutional burden. In HOME, the court found
the plaintiff must show discriminatory intent by demonstrating either
that: (1) the advertisement was overtly discriminatory, or (2) that there
were extrinsic circumstances of discriminatory intent coupled with a disproportionate number of models of one race in the advertisements. 16
In the first instance, the newspaper's firsthand knowledge of the contents of the paper decreases the burden of ferreting out overtly discriminatory advertisements. 1 7 For example, the burden of identifying the
advertisement for a "white home" in Hunter 118 was no greater than the
burden of identifying an advertisement reading "gun for hire" in Norwould impose an unreasonable burden on a daily newspaper, accompanied of
course by increased cost in this form of advertising, so frequently used by the
casual advertiser.
Vaill v. Oneida Dispatch, 129 Misc. 2d at 479, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
114. Memphis Publishing Co. v. Leech, 539 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982)(statute
declared unconstitutional because it forced publishers to choose between foregoing copy
or publishing that which would not otherwise be published). Cf. Eimann v. Soldier of
Fortune Magazine, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989). In Eimann the court rejected imposition
of tort duty based in part on the fact that "the publication's editorial content would surely
feel the economic crunch from loss of revenue that would result if publishers were required to reject all ambiguous advertisements." Idl at 837.
115. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. See also Sun-Sentinel, 693 F. Supp. at 1073.
116. Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 731 F. Supp. 801,804
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
117. In United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972), the court determined that:
a publisher can readily determine from the face of an advertisement whether it is
intended to express a discriminatory preference. However the language of the
advertisement is couched, the purpose of an advertiser who wishes to publish an
advertisement in violation of the [Fair Housing] Act is to communicate his intent
to discriminate and a newspaper publisher can divine this intent as well as any of
his readers.
I- at 213. In Ragin, however, the alleged discriminatory preference is less overt than in
Hunter. Thus, even though the newspaper has access to the allegedly illegal product, the
monitoring burden could still be significant. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying
text.
118. The court in Hunter concluded that the first amendment did not bar injunctive
relief where the defendant newspaper had published an advertisement for a "white home."
In reaching this conclusion, the court gave little weight to the newspaper's "recital of possible economic damages to a publishing business operating under such a court order."
Hunter,759 F.2d at 213. Both HOME and Ragin support the application ofinjunctive relief
in cases involving such overt discrimination. The HOME opinion, however, is decidedly
more sensitive to the chilling effect of imposing monitoring requirements where the alleged discrimination rests upon the newspaper's ability to "predict a market fraught with
variables." HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2.

1991]

MEDIA LIABILITY

wood.19 Given the slight burden imposed, the first amendment poses
no bar to restricting this overtly discriminatory form of commercial
speech. The burden on speech is not increased under the second
method of demonstrating intent because the newspaper cannot be
found liable merely for failing to monitor the racial composition of the
models.1 20 Instead, as articulated by the court in HOME, this second
method requires the plaintiff to show extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent before liability will attach. 12 Thus, the burden again seems
permissible.
The Ragin court's interpretation of section 3604(c) presents more
troubling constitutional implications. Unlike the court in HOME, the
court in Ragin found that a plaintiff could state a viable cause of action
based upon a genuine discrepancy in the racial mix of models as compared to the racial mix of the relevant community.' 2 2 Arguably, the
knowledge rational articulated in Virginia Board113 applies with more
force to newspapers with respect to section 3604(c) claims than with respect to claims related to underlying products, such as product liability
claims, because section 3604(c) regulates an unlawful product that is
24
within the newspaper's sphere of knowledge, the advertisement itself.1
Thus, a plaintiff could argue that a newspaper may be presumed to have
extensive knowledge of this regulated product, just as any commercial
speaker is presumed to have knowledge concerning its product under
the analysis employed in Virginia Board.125 Based on this presumed
knowledge, the plaintiff could contend that applying section 3604(c) to a
newspaper is less onerous than imposing product liability tort duties on
newspapers because the burden of requiring newspapers to monitor the
contents of their own publication is far less burdensome than requiring
them to perform safety evaluations on products underlying their
26
advertisements.'
This argument, however, recognizes only a fraction of the potential
burden imposed under the Ragin court's interpretation of section
3604(c). Although the newspaper could determine the race of the models by looking to the four comers of the advertisement, it would also
have to measure each advertisement, or each real estate section, against
prior advertisements or sections to ensure that the individual advertisement or section was not part of a continuing pattern of discrimination. 12 7 Even if the newspaper could accurately index the racial mix of
119. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying note 65.
124. Section 3604(c) liability is not necessarily related to the underlying real estate
transaction. Indeed, section 3604(c) imposes liability for discriminatory advertising even
where the underlying real estate transactions are entirely legal. See Holmgren v. Little
Village Community Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
125. See supra text accompanying note 65.
126. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
127. The statute of limitations applicable to section 3604(c) claims exposes newspapers
to liability for advertisements printed before the two year limitation period if the plaintiff
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all its real estate advertisements over a period of time, that information
would be meaningless without a determination of the racial proportions
of the relevant market. The determination of the racial mix of a particular real estate market requires expertise outside a newspaper's knowledge. As the court in HOME explained, "[r]equiring real estate
advertisers, let alone news publications, to determine the racial mix of
the population within the boundaries of their target market in advance
of publishing an advertisement imposes an unrealistic and onerous duty
to predict a market fraught with variables."' 28 Thus, as construed by
the court in Ragin, section 3604(c) imposes a potential monitoring burden even greater than the burden imposed by the ordinance declared
12 9
unconstitutional in Sun-Sentinel.

Moreover, the hardiness rational articulated in Virginia Board13 0 is
lacking for newspapers attempting to comply with section 3604(c). A
realtor has significant economic incentive to perform the kind of sophisticated market analysis necessary to assess accurately the racial
demographics in real estate markets because the realtor stands to benefit directly from the sale or rental of the property. As the commercial
speech doctrine presumes, it is the realtor's business to know the
demographics of the market. While it may be the newspaper's business
to know about its advertising and advertising markets, it does not have
the same incentive to engage in the types of studies necessary to determine the racial composition of relevant real estate markets. The newspaper does not stand to benefit directly from the sale of the underlying
real estate. Given the newspaper's lack of knowledge and lack of economic incentive to acquaint itself with real estate demographics, the
chilling effect of section 3604(c) as construed by the Ragin court could
alleges a pattern of discrimination. Pursuant to the FHA, a private litigant must bring a
civil
action "not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice...." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1988). Where, however,
a plaintiff alleges that a series of advertisements form a "continuing violation," the complaint may be based on advertisements printed more than two years prior to the complaint, provided the last asserted occurrence of the practice falls within the two year
period. See Havens Realty, v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982)(footnote omitted)(where plaintiff alleges "unlawful practice that continues into the limitation period, the
complaint is timely when it is filed within [the limitations period] of the last asserted occurrence of that practice."); Spann v. Colonial Village, 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(claim of
continuing practice of discriminatory advertising held timely where last allegedly discriminatory advertisement fell within statutory period). The continuing violation doctrine dramatically increases the monitoring burden upon newspapers by extending the window for
liability beyond the two year period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1988).
128. HOME, 731 F. Supp. at 804 n.2.
129. In Sun-Sentinel, the newspaper could have avoided liability by examining a single
proposed advertisement to ensure it contained the advertiser's certificate of competency
number. This exercise involved no special skill or expertise. Nevertheless, the court declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it diverted resources away from the newspaper's other editorial functions. Under the standard imposed by Ragin, the diversion of
resources is even greater because a newspaper cannot avoid liability merely by examining
the advertisement itself. It must also determine whether the racial composition of the
advertisement, combined with other advertisements previously published, reasonably approximates the racial composition of the community. See supra note 127.
130. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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rise to a constitutionally impermissible level.13 1
Procedurally, the court in Ragin crafted its opinion within the context of a motion to dismiss. Thus, the door remains open to defenses
turning upon facts established during discovery or at trial. For example,
the order denying the Times' motion to dismiss arguably does not preclude a motion for summary judgment by the Times' raising a first
amendment defense based upon the burden of monitoring real estate
advertisements. As discussed above,1 32 that burden should not be considered in isolation. It may be difficult, however, for the Times to marshall sufficient facts to establish an onerous burden if the court
interprets the FHA as requiring only a loose fit between the proportion
of blacks featured in the advertising and the number in the relevant market. 133 On the other hand, the closer the court comes to requiring exact
proportionality, the more likely the Times can persuasively argue that it
lacks the knowledge of the target markets necessary to ensure mathematical proportionality. i3 4 Thus, the disposition of the Times' first
amendment arguments may well turn on how strictly the Ragin court
construes the proportionality requirements of section 3604(c).
At trial, the jury might be receptive to the Times' observation that
the allegedly discriminatory signals emitted by the use of white models
over time were less overt, and therefore less susceptible to detection by
the newspaper, than the explicit use of sex-designated column headings
in PittsburghPress or the use of the words "white home" in Hunter. Since
a violation of section 3604(c) occurs only when the advertisements indicate a racial preference "to the ordinary reader,"' 3 5 the Times may be
able to convince the jury that a reasonable person would not find the
advertisements discriminatory.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Even under the standards imposed by Ragin, it appears the first
131. But see Comment, Advertisingfor Apartheid: The Use of All White Models in Marketing
Real Estate as a Violation of the FairHousing Act, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1429 (1988)(arguing that
section 3604(c) passes CentralHudson test).
132. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
133. The decision in Ragin contains dicta that supports a loose fit requirement. For
instance, the court rejected the Times' assertion that the plaintiffs sought to require "a
specific number of black models in advertisements" as a "straw man argument." Ragin,
726 F. Supp. at 959. The court noted the plaintiffs had instead challenged the Times'
alleged" 'practice ofprinting and publishing advertisements with virtually all human white
models in a city with a significant population of blacks and other minorities ..... ' " Id
(quoting plaintiffs' brief). If the court subsequently adopts a loose fit interpretation, the
Times might be presumed to have knowledge of the contents of its own paper and the
existence of a significant minority population in New York City.
134. Significantly, the court in Spann noted that if§ 3604(c) did require that real estate
developers use exact mathematical proportionality in their advertisements there would be
"the broader problem of the chilling effect of such burdens on advertisers' ability and
desire to advertise, implicating First Amendment concerns." Spann, 662 F. Supp. at 546.
Based on the knowledge and hardiness factors underlying commercial speech doctrine, the
chilling effect of imposing an exact proportionality requirement on passive publishers
would be even greater than the effect on developers and realtors.
135. Ragin, 726 F. Supp. at 964.
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amendment bars the imposition of mandatory monitoring requirements
in two situations. First, a newspaper may be protected in those rare instances where the advertisement relates to a constitutionally protected
activity as in Bigelow. Second, a newspaper may be protected where the
cost of complying with the monitoring requirement would impose a significant financial burden on the newspaper as in Sun-Sentinel. In both
these classes of cases, counsel may be able to avoid litigation by persuading regulatory authorities that the application of the monitoring requirement to newspapers contravenes the first amendment.
In private actions falling in the second class of cases, the newspaper
should structure its legal arguments to demonstrate that it lacks the
knowledge of the underlying product necessary to monitor effectively
the truth and legality of the advertisements. The newspaper should also
emphasize that it lacks the economic incentive that endows the traditional commercial speaker with hardiness. Ragin cautions, however, that
the lack of hardiness may not preclude a plaintiff from piercing the first
amendment defense where the unlawful product is the advertisement
itself. Accordingly, the newspaper should emphasize aspects of the
monitoring burden that do not appear on the face of the advertisement
or that require knowledge outside the newspaper's expertise. Regardless of the ultimate disposition of the Ragin case, Judge Haight's denial
of the Times' motion to dismiss teaches that a newspaper confronts an
uphill battle in arguing that it faces a significant burden in monitoring its
own product for overt forms of discrimination.

DISSENT IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: DISCORD IN
SERVICE OF HARMONY
MATTHEW

P.

BERGMAN*

Judicial dissent is a practice deeply rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Except for a brief period during the first years of John Marshall's tenure as ChiefJustice, dissent has been a regular component of
Supreme Court decision making. Over this period, many dissenting
opinions have later been adopted by subsequent Supreme Court majorities as the law of the land. Even when not adopted, dissents strengthen
the quality of a court's jurisprudence by providing a theoretical counterprinciple with which the court must contend. While dissenting opinions
may destroy public perceptions ofjudicial infallibility, they also provide
living proof of the independence, fairness and conscientiousness of the
judiciary.
INTRODUCTION

After an arduous morning of oral argument, a three-member panel
ofjudges was deliberating over the disposition of a particularly difficult
appeal. The presiding judge turned to his junior colleague and exclaimed: "Frank, this case is frivolous! We must affirm the lower
court." "Oh no, Chief," replied the junior judge, "I cannot possibly
vote to do that!" "Oh well," smiled the Chief, "you're entitled to be
mistaken." He then turned to his more experienced colleague: "Lawrence, surely you agree that we must affirm?" "I'm afraid not Chief,"
said Lawrence, "I emphatically agree with Frank that we must reverse."
"Well, then," snorted the presiding judge, "the case will be affirmed;
you two argue between yourselves who will write the dissent!"'
The last term of the United States Supreme Court produced a windfall of far-reaching decisions touching on diverse areas of social life including first amendment limitations on political protest 2 and
patronage,3 the respective rights of parents and their children regarding
abortion, 4 religious activity in public schools 5 and the right to die. 6 In
each of these disparate cases, the Court's opinion has been accompanied
by a forceful dissent. While some of these dissents may be attributed to
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit; Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, J.D. (1989),
Reed College, B.A. (1986).
I. This dialogue is based on the dialogue which appeared in Brennan, In Defense of
Dissents, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 427, 429 (1986).
2. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
3. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
4. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
5. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S.Ct. 2356 (1990) (8 to 1 decision).
6. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (5 to 4 decision).
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the passing of the ideological old guard, 7 dissent cannot be explained
entirely by the liberal-conservative split on the Supreme Court. 8 To appreciate the habit of dissent on the Rehnquist Court, contemporary dissent must be viewed relative to its historical and jurisprudential
foundations.
I.

JUDICIAL DISSENT IN AMERICA

In colonial America, the courts of last resort from decisions of
American courts and British common law courts were the Privy Council
and the House of Lords. 9 However, most appeals were concluded in
one of the common law courts with subordinate appellate jurisdiction. 10
All published opinions of those tribunals were written seriatim; meaning
that each judge wrote out his individual rationale for deciding the
case."I It was these reports of the common law courts to which colonial
lawyers had access and it was the judicial practice of seriatim opinions
12
with which lawyers were most familiar.
Based on this colonial experience, the United States Supreme Court
continued the practice of seriatim opinions in the early days of the Republic. Each justice delivered an unabashedly individual response to
each case. 13 Thus, the first reported case of the Supreme Court, Georgia
v. Brailsford,14 contained holdings by Justices Johnson and Cushing contrary to the decision reached by Chief Justice Jay, and Justices Wilson,
Blair and Iredell. This practice continued in other early Supreme Court
cases.

15

The ascendancy of ChiefJustice Marshall in 1801 marked an abrupt
7. Ray,Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudenceof Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REv., 307 (1988).
8. Justice Brennan's opinion in United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990),
struck down a federal law banning flag desecration on first amendment grounds. Justice
Brennan was joined by conservative stalwarts Scalia and Kennedy, while the dissent was
written by Justice Stevens, usually perceived as a centrist.
9. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A Histoy ofJudicialDisintegration,44
CORNELL L.Q. 186, 187 (1959).
10. Id. at 190.
11. Dissenting votes of Privy Council members were kept secret while in the House of
Lords, the lower appellate court, each judge stated the reasoning behind his judgment
either orally or in writing. Simpson, Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. PENN. L. REv. 205, 207
(1923). The House of Lords apparently followed the early Germanic and Roman procedure whereby judgments were arrived at in public. See Nadelman, The JudicialDissent: Publication vs. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415 (1959).
12. ZoBell, supra note 9, at 191. Referring to the Kings Bench, Thomas Jefferson
wrote:
[F]rom the earliest ages of English law, from the date of the year-books, at least,
to the end of the Ild George, the judges of England in all but self-evident cases,
delivered their opinions seriatim, with the reason and authorities which governed
their decisions.... Besides the light which their separate arguments threw on the
subject... it shewed whether the judges were unanimous or divided, and gave
accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a precedent.
Id. at 190.
13. See Ray, supra note 7, at 308.
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
15. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfari, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 14 (1800); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 419 (1793). But see Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 365, 367 (1797) (ChiefJustice
Elsworth delivered the opinion of the court without other options).
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end to the practice of seriatim opinions. In one of many "significant acts
of audacity ...which made his career historic,"' 6 Marshall terminated
the practice ofseriatim opinions delivering the Court's opinion himself in
Talbot v. Seeman. 17 Thus, in the early years of the Marshall Court, the
Supreme Court wrote as a single unit; all dissension from the Court's
holding remained secret.1 8 However, Marshall's challenge to the established tradition of seriatim opinions was not met with universal accord.
Those opposed to the Marshall Court's expansion of federal power were
among the most strenuous critics of the new practice.' 9 President Jefferson criticized the Court's unanimous holdings as:
An opinion.., huddled up in a conclave, perhaps by a majority
of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lax or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who
sophisticates
the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own
20
reasoning.
While Chief Justice Marshall's practice of delivering unanimous
opinions was revolutionary, it was also short-lived. A scant four years
after Marshall's ascendancy, JusticeJohnson separately concurred in the
Court's opinion in Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass.2 ' Once broken, Marshall's rule of unanimity lost its sway over his colleagues and dissent was
once again seen in the Supreme Court. Marshall himself authored nine
dissents and one special concurrence 2 2 and his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders23 is widely viewed as his judicial masterpiece. 24 However, Marshall's focus on judicial unity remained prevalent throughout his tenure
and dissents rarely were published in more than fifteen percent of the
25
cases decided in a given term.
A new era of judicial dissent began with the appointment of Roger
Taney as Chief Justice. 26 Following Justice Johnson's example, Justice
Curtis assumed the dissenter's mantle, authoring the sole dissent in Dred
Scott v. Sandford.2 7 Dred Scott was the most famous dissent of the Taney
era, an era which was typified by deep conflicts over fundamental philosophies. 2 8 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Court was enlivened by a series of dissenting opinions by Justices Harlan, Miller and
Field. 2 9 Justice Field became famous for his dissents in the Slaughter16. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 16 (1919).
17. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 25 (1801).
18. This was an important precondition for the Court's deft assumption of power in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), wherein Marshall established the constitutional principle of judicial review.
19. ZoBell, supra note 9, at 194.
20. Id. (quoting letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), reprintedin 12 FORD, THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175 (1905)).
21. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (Johnson, J., concurring).
22. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 196.
23. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1987) (Marshall, CJ., dissenting).
24. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (1928).
25. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 196.
26. See Ganoe, The Passingof the Old Dissent, 21 OR. L. REV. 285, 286 (1942).
27. 60 U.S. (12 How.) 393, 564 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
28. See Ganoe, supra note 26, at 286.
29. See generally id. at 287.
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House Cases30 and Munn v. Illinois,3 1 while Harlan became a "judicial
32
folk-hero" for his lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.
In the early twentieth century, Supreme Court dissenting opinions
became more common. Under the leadership ofJustice Holmes, dissent
33
was fully legitimized and even surrounded with an aura of romance.
Much of Holme's fame is derived from his reputation as a dissenting
justice,3 4 despite the fact that he authored only half as many dissents as
Justice Harlan. 3 5 Unlike Harlan, however, Holmes lived to see many of
36
his dissents become majority opinions.
The habit ofjudicial dissent intensified in the early years of Franklin
Roosevelt's second administration. With the departure of conservative
stalwarts Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler and McReynolds, many expected a more unified Court.3 7 However, dissents increased throughout
the Roosevelt presidency and in the years following. Today, dissent remains an integral part of the Supreme Court's adjudication. If history is
any guide, the prevalence of dissent is unlikely to diminish despite the
growing conservative consensus on the Supreme Court. While judicial
dissent may be decried by some as ajudicial institution, it is here to stay.
II.
A.

THE FUNCTION OF DISSENT

Appealing to Future Generations

The hope of every dissenting judge is that today's dissent will become tomorrow's majority opinion. Dissenting opinions sow the seeds
for subsequent majorities, providing a "wholesome element" for the
growth of the law.3 8 In the words of Chief Justice Hughes:
A dissent ... is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes
the court to have been betrayed. 3 9
Although dissenting opinions are usually relegated to the dustbin ofjudicial history, there exist many examples of dissenting opinions which
were subsequently adopted.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson40 stands among the
most prophetic in American judicial history. Eight Justices joined in the
Court's opinion which upheld forced racial separation as constitutional,
"social" (as opposed to "political") discrimination. 4 ' Justice Harlan
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (FieldJ., dissenting).
31. 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting).
32. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Ray, supra note 7, at 310.
34. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 201.
35. Ray, supra note 11, at 310.
36. See ZoBell, supra note 9, at 202.
37. See, e.g., Ganoe, supra note 26, at 288.
38. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928, 43
HARV. L. REV. 33, 47 (1929).
39. HUGHES, supra note 24, at 68.
40. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
41. Id. at 544.
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cast the sole opposing vote. In an eloquent appeal to future generations, he urged that the folly of his contemporaries be undone:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color
when his civil rights
as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
42
land are involved.
It took sixty years for Harlan's vision of the fourteenth amendment to
prevail, but in Brown v. Boardof Education,4 3 his view was vindicated by a
unanimous Supreme Court.
In Lochner v. New York, 44 the Supreme Court struck down a state
regulation which limited the work hours for bakery employees. The
Court found the statute to be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of contract. 4 5 Justice Holmes castigated the majority for legislating
social Darwinism from the judicial bench:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ....
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.... It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitu46
tion of the United States.
The searing dissent of Justice Holmes laid the groundwork for the
Court's subsequent retreat from substantive due process and became
47
the majority view within six years.
Another dissent later adopted as the law of the land was that of
Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.48 In Olmstead, the Court held
that contents of telephone conversations surreptitiously apprehended
were not subject to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment.
Justice Brandeis's dissent went beyond the particulars of the case and
articulated an eloquent defense of individual rights which today continues to evoke the attention of constitutional scholars and lay individuals
alike.
42. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. Significantly, the Court's reasoning in Lochner was derived from Justice Field's dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1872) (Field, J.
dissenting), and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J. dissenting) in which
Justice Field castigated the Court for its subordination of substantive due process rights to
the economic regulation of the states. See generally Bloch, The Value of Dissent, LAw & Soc'y
J. 7, 8 (November 1930, February 1931).
46. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (state regulation of work hours does
not violate due process).
48. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a
49
violation of the Fifth.
While Justice Brandeis failed to carry the day, his reasoning ultimately
prevailed in Berger v. New York 50 and Katz v. United States.5 1
In Betts v. Brady, 52 the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants
were not constitutionally entitled to counsel in non-capital cases. Justice
Black vehemently dissented from the court's reasoning:
A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,' which subjects innocent men to
increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a
trial in which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible
to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of53certainty, that the
defendant's case was adequately presented.
Twenty-one years later in Gideon v. Wainwright,5 4 Justice Black had the
uncommon pleasure of living to see his dissent become the opinion of
the Court. In fact, he had the opportunity to author the opinion himself.
A final example of a dissenting opinion becoming the law of future
generations is Justice Douglas's dissent in Dennis v. United States. 5 5 Dennis arose out of the prosecution of several Communist leaders under the
Smith Act.5 6 The Supreme Court upheld portions of the Smith Act
which prescribed penalties for "advocating" the overthrow of the
United States government. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that because there was no clear and present danger that the defendants' advocacy would result in violence, such advocacy was protected by the first
amendment.
Free speech has occupied an exalted position because of the
high service it has given our society. Its protection is essential
to the very existence of a democracy. The airing of ideas re49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
380 U.S. 347 (1967).
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
28 U.S.C. § 2835 (1989).
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leases pressures which otherwise might become destructive.
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free
discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full
and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free
discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the
stresses and strains that work to tear all civiliza57
tions apart.
Six years later, Justice Douglas's view of the first amendment was largely
vindicated in Yates v. United States,5 8 wherein the Supreme Court recognized the distinction "between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action. .... 59
These cases are only some of the more famous examples ofjudicial
dissents which were subsequently adopted as the opinion of the Court.
Significantly, most of these now-famous dissents did not command widespread attention or support at the time they were written. Their "greatness" was left for future generations to determine. Consequently, it is
impossible to know today which dissenting opinions will be venerated
tomorrow and which will be relegated to deserved obscurity. If courts
are to preserve the opportunity for future generations to learn from
their mistakes by adopting the reasoning of their dissenting colleagues,
they must preserve all dissenting opinions and leave to their successors
the task of sorting the wheat from the chaff.
B.

Counter-Principleto the Majority's Reasoning

While every dissenting judge hopes that his reasoning will be
adopted by subsequent generations, most dissents never become the
law. EvenJustice Holmes, "the great dissenter," did not fare well; fewer
than one-tenth of his 173 dissents were adopted as the opinions of the
Court. 60 Therefore, if dissents are to be accepted in the regular course
ofjudicial decision-making, they must be justified by contemporary standards, not merely as an appeal to the future.
A dissenting opinion enunciates what Professor Unger refers to in a
different context as the "counter-principle" of the stated legal proposition. 6 ' A counter-principle represents the antithesis of the stated legal
position; the philosophical and jurisprudential consequences of the majority's reasoning. 62 By enunciating the legal principle opposite the
court's opinion, the dissent provides a "vitalizing influence" 63 on the
law by adding a second dimension to the court's analysis. Even when a
dissent does not become the law, it spotlights the reasoning utilized by
the court by articulating the logically opposite legal principle. 6 4
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
Id. at 318.
ZoBell, supra note 9, at 211.
See Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563, 618-33 (1983).
See id.
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 38, at 47.
See Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The HeatedJudicialDissent, 39 A.B.AJ. 794 (1953).
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This function of dissent as a spotlight on the majority's reasoning
exists even where the dissent is not followed by the majority. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr65 helped illuminate the extension
of federal and judicial power that the majority's opinion represented.
Justice Black's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut 66 has helped frame the
terms of the "right to privacy" debate. And Justice Jackson's passionate
dissent in Korematsu v. United States 6 7 stands as a grim reminder of how,
in times of national emergency, constitutional rights can become dangerously imperiled.
Dissenting opinions provide a talisman of where the Court is heading from which both the bench and bar can take their bearings in subsequent cases. If the legal principle enunciated by the Court survives the
criticism stated in the dissent, the Court's opinion is strengthened. Future opinions are similarly enhanced by addressing and incorporating
the criticisms contained in a prior dissent. As Chief Justice Stone
explained:
A considered and well stated dissent sounds a warning note
that legal doctrine must not be pressed too far. It sometimes,
for better or for worse, arrests a trend and sometimes reverses
it. Its appeal can properly be only to scholarship, history and
reason, and if the business ofjudging is an intellectual process,
as we are entitled to believe that is its, it must
be capable of
68
withstanding and surviving these critical tests.
III. JUDICIAL DISSENT AND ITS CRrrIcs
Dissenting opinions have been described as the enfant terrible of appellate practice.6 9 One judge opined that "[d]issents like homicide, fall
into three categories, excusable, justifiable and reprehensible." 70 Another writer has likened dissenting opinions to the weakling making
faces at the bully across the street from the protection of his front
porch. 7 1 The most widespread argument against dissenting opinions,
however, is that they detract from the authority of the court. 7 2 By publicizing dissension, the dissenting judge airs the court's dirty laundry
before the public and undermining public confidence in the wisdom and
universality of the judicial process. As one commentator has argued:
65. 369 U.S. 186, 277 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black,J., dissenting).
67. 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
68. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 78

(1942).
69. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L. REV.

211, 218 (1957).
70. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 928 (1962) (quoting Hirt, In the
Matter of Dissents InterJudicesdeJure, 31 PA. B.A.Q. 256, 258 n.1 (1960).
71. Wollman, The Stability of the Law - The Income Tax Case, speech reprinted in Evils of
Dissenting Opinions, 57 ALB. L. REV. 74, 75 (1898).
72. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White,J.,

dissenting) ("The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is to
weaken the effect of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of confidence in

the conclusion of the courts of last resort.").
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The outstanding objection to the habit of dissent is that it
weakens and injures the Court with the public. It makes the
impression that the Court is not as able as it should be; not as
learned, not as wise, not as harmonious, and, therefore, not entitled to the full confidence which it should have, and that dissentingjustices are too little inclined to subordinate themselves
in an effort to maintain the theoretical unity of the Court, and
the reverence and respect that ought to be felt toward the
73
Court.
Although compelling, this argument ultimately rests upon two
faulty premises. First, there exists such a thing as legal certainty. Second, public confidence in the judicial process is aided by unanimous judicial opinions.
Usually, cases are governed by a settled rule of law which dictates
the result. Where the holding is not absolutely clear from statutory or
case law, settled canons ofjudicial construction usually can lead to the
appropriate result. However, occasionally judges are confronted with
cases which are not governed by a settled rule of law or controlled by a
particular canon of construction. Those cases must be decided by a process ofjudicial reasoning from a legal principle. This involves an inherent choice between competing principles, a choice necessarily governed
by values. 74 But as Dean Pound explained, "the process of valuing"
rests ultimately upon "the conception one has of the ideal relation
among men and of the ideal of a civilized human society." '7 5 In contemporary society such ideals are far from settled. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the law to be settled and hold our legal certainty as an
76
obtainable goal.
Uncertainty in the law is not cause for alarm; it is endemic to democratic societies. As Justice Douglas explained, judicial dissent is merely
77
logical and natural in a democratic society:
When judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with
problems on which society itself is divided. It is the democratic
way to express dissident views. Judges are to be honored
rather than criticized for following that tradition, for proclaim78
ing their articles of faith so that all may read.
Dissenting opinions undeniably destroy the illusion of certainty in
the law, but the legitimacy of the judicial process ought not to rest upon
such illusions. 79 Rather, the legitimacy of the judicial system must rest
upon the public's knowledge that judges have dispassionately considered the issue on the merits and conscientiously attempted to apply neu73. Moore, The Habit ofDissent, 8 VIa. L. REG. 338, 341 (1922).
74. See Pound, supra note 64, at 794.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguardof Democracy, 32J. AM.JUDICATURE Soc'Y

104, 105
(1948) (In the words of Justice Douglas, "[P]hilosophers of the democratic faith will
rejoice in the uncertainty of the law and find strength and glory in it.").
78. Id. at 106.
79. Fuld, supra note 70, at 928.
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tral legal principles to volatile and emotive factual settings. While
dissenting opinions may destroy illusions of judicial inviolability, they
provide assurance to the public that judicial decisions are not perfunctory.8 0 As Chief Justice Hughes explained:
There are some who think it desirable that dissents should not
be disclosed as they detract from the force of the judgment.
Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice of conviction, it strongly commends the decision
to public confidence. But unanimity which is merely formal,
which is recorded at the expense of strong, conflicting views, is
not desirable in a court of last resort, whatever may be the effect upon public opinion at the time. This is so because what
must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the
character and independence of the judges. They are not there
simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they
should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they
cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should
be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be
secured through its sacrifice. 8 1
ChiefJustice Hughes' statement recalls the story of the circuit judge
who circulated a dissenting opinion to his colleagues on the panel after a
long period of advisement. The presiding judge acknowledged that the
case had given him much trouble and that he was not confident that his
vote at conference had been correct. He suggested to the dissenter:
"Why don't I reassign the opinion to you and we'll submit your dissent
as the opinion of the court." "Oh, no you don't," replied the dissenting
judge, "I only agreed to write a dissent. I never said I wanted my view
82
to become the law of the circuit!"
IV.

THE LIMITS OF DIsSENT

Although dissenting opinions play an integral role in contemporary
jurisprudence, in limited cases the benefits of unanimity outweigh the
costs of stifling dissent. Such cases arise when the judicial branch, as a
governmental entity, finds its institutional prerogatives threatened by
potential encroachments from another branch of government. As Alexander Hamilton understood, the judiciary is the least powerful branch of
government 83 and only can compel obedience through public acceptance of its legitimate authority. In those instances where the judiciary
finds its authority challenged by other branches of government or by
state authorities, it may be appropriate to strive for short-term unanimity to preserve the independence of the judiciary over the long-term.
An analysis of some of the pathbreaking Supreme Court opinions
supports the proposition that unanimity may at times be important to
protect judicial authority. The first major decisions that helped establish
80. Stone, supra note 68, at 78.
81. Hughes, supra note 24, at 67-68.
82. See Pound, supra note 64, at 794 (relating story in different context).
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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the structure of the federal government were all unanimous: Marbuy v.
Madison,8 4 McColloch v. Maryland85 and Gibbons v. Ogden.8 6 It can hardly
be doubted that ChiefJustice Marshall's deft assumption ofjudicial and
federal power in these cases could have been accomplished in the absence of such unanimity. More recent judicial history also supports the
view that, when the court's authority is itself in question, unanimity is a
worthwhile goal to achieve. In Brown v. Board of Education,"7 the Court
anticipated that its decision would be met with widespread derision. Accordingly, Chief Justice Warren invoked his tremendous personal authority among his brethren to 'produce a unanimous opinion
overturning the separate but equal doctrine. 88 This unanimity was influential in winning public acceptance of such a dramatic change in the
national value pattern and in providing legal legitimation to the struggle
against the "massive resistance" of the southern states.8 9
Similarly, in United States v. Nixon 90 the Court was faced with a constitutional conflict between the executive and the judiciary over whether
executive privilege protected the president from a court's subpoena
power. The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion resolved the opinion
in favor of the courts and helped diffuse the incipient constitutional crisis. In the absence of judicial unanimity, it is quite possible that the
Watergate crisis would have been prolonged to the detriment of the
presidency and the nation.
Finally, judicial dissent should be exercised sparingly and only in
the case of a fundamental disagreement over principles underlying the
outcome of a particular case. Ajudge should not dissent merely because
he or she would have composed an opinion differently. Where the disagreement is not central to the disposition of the case, a judge should
exercise restraint and await a later case where the disagreement is more
squarely presented. As an integral component ofjudicial decision-making, the institution of dissent should be exercised with the same care and
solicitude as any other component of judicial power. Only when sparingly exercised can judicial dissent maintain its full persuasive power to
present and future generations.
CONCLUSION

By appreciating the historical role of dissent in the judicial process,
judges and lawyers should view dissenters, not as spoilers, but as jurists
fulfilling an important judicial function. While the rancor surrounding
the publication of dissents may disrupt the pristine image ofjudicial harmony, courts usually are able to weather the storms of discord and return to an even keel of collegiality. Ultimately, the mutual affection and
84. Supra note 18.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Supra note 43.
See W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 114-15 (1980).
A. BARTH, PROPHETS WrrH HONOR 51 (1974).
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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admiration among judges provides the best bulwark against lasting discord resulting from judicial dissent. As Lord Justice Asquith said of his
colleagues on the English Court of Appeal, "the members of this court
are such nice and accomplished men [and women] that it is almost a
pleasure to be dissented from by them!" 9 1

91. Fuld, supra note 70, at 929 (quoting Asquith, J., Some Aspects of the Work of the Court

of Appeals, J. SOC'Y

PUBLIC TEACHERS OF

L. 350, 353 (1950)).

THE PEYOTE CASE: A RETURN To REYNOLDS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's April 17, 1990 decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,' denying the constitutional right
of Native American church members to use peyote as a sacrament, has
been decried as "deplorable," '2 "radical," '3 an exercise in "pure legal
adventurism," "a sweeping repudiation of nearly a century of humane
and enlightened legal precedent," and "an affront ... to our society's
'4
hard-won pluralism."
The Court unequivocally rejected the slowly eroding "compelling
interest" requirement for governmental interference with religious practices laid down by the Warren Court in the early 1960's, calling it a
"constitutional anomaly" 5 that "contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. ' 6 In its place, the Court offered "leaving accommodation [of religious rights] to the political process," brushing
aside the admittedly probable disadvantage to minority religions as an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government. ' 7 In Smith, the
Court regressed to pre-Warren Court interpretations of the free exercise clause.8 In so doing, it gutted the free exercise clause, leaving no
protection for the religious practices of minority religions.
This Comment briefly sketches the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the free exercise clause as a background against which to
focus the significance of the Court's regression from established precedent. It also examines the profound, perplexing implications of the
Court's conclusions and the means by which Justice Scalia, author of the
majority opinion, erects a smoke screen to hide those implications.
II.

PRIOR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

The first Supreme Court case interpreting the free exercise clause,
Reynolds v. United States,9 upheld a Mormon's conviction under a federal
law prohibiting polygamy. The Court held that while the free exercise
clause prevented government interference with religious belief and opinion, it did not prevent government interference with religious practices.10
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
2. "Peyote Decision Threatens Religious Liberty of All Americans Says Jewish Organization," PR Newswire, April 20, 1990.
3. The National Law Journal, June 18, 1990, at 13 (quoting Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 9th Cir.).
4. L.A. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, Part B (Metro), at 6, col. 1 (Home Edition).
5. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
6. It at 1604.
7. let at 1606.
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ......
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
10. lE at 166.
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This "belief/action" distinction has been widely criticized and discredited as divesting the free exercise clause of any function and meaning
because the constitutional guarantee of free expression includes protection of religious belief and opinion." It survived for several decades,
12
however, proving an impossible obstacle to free exercise claims.
Next followed an era in which the only victorious free exercise
claims were those in which the free speech aspects of the claims were
considered.' 3 Two cases, both involving the right of Jehovah's Witnesses' children to abstain from saluting the flag at school, bring this
4
principle into relief. In the first case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,1
the Court upheld the state's expulsion ofJehovah's Witnesses' children
from public school for refusing to salute the flag, never mentioning the
free speech issues involved. The Court held that the free exercise guarantee did not relieve a citizen from his duty to obey a generally applicable law' 5 and that courts were not competent to provide an exemption
because of religious beliefs where the legislature had not seen fit to do
so. As long as the government's ends were legitimate (in this case, promoting national unity), the means would be left to legislative
discretion.16
In contrast, three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,1 7 the Court considered the same claims in the context of free
speech as well as free exercise, rejected the reasoning of Gobitis and held
that requiring children to salute the flag in order to receive the benefits
of public education infringed first amendment liberties.' 8 The Court
stated that "individual freedom of mind"' 9 was to be preferred over "officially disciplined uniformity" 20 and that freedoms of speech and worship could not be infringed on the "slender grounds" 2' 1 that the
legislature may have had a "rational basis" 22 for adopting certain restrictions. In Barnette, the Court presaged its later strict scrutiny of free
exercise claims, saying that freedoms of speech, press, assembly and religion could be restricted only to prevent "grave and immediate danger to
23
interests which the State may lawfully protect."
11. See, e.g., Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1989); Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternativesfor
the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309 (1981); Tribe, Church and State in the Constitution, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 37-38 (D. Kelley ed. 1982).
12. See, Lupu, supra note 11, at 938; Pepper, supra note 11, at 325 & n.70; Braiterman
& Kelley, When Is Governmental Intervention Legitimate?, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, supra note 11, at 175.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See, Pepper, supra note 11, at 326-27.
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 597-98.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
id at 637.
Id.
Id at 639.
Id
Id.
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In Braunfeld v. Brown 24 and more forcefully in Sherbert v. Verner, 25 the
Warren Court implicitly rejected the Reynolds belief/action distinction
and articulated a stricter standard for evaluating free exercise claims resulting from state action burdening religious conduct:2 6 if a state action
directly burdens the free exercise of religion, the state must show a compelling interest that justifies the burden and also must demonstrate that
alternative non-burdensome means of accomplishing its purposes are
not available. 2 7 In Sherbert, the Court held that a Seventh-Day Adventist
could not be denied unemployment benefits for failure to accept work
without cause because she refused jobs that required her to work on
Saturday. It found that the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of
the unemployment compensation fund was not compelling enough to
justify the substantial infringement of the Seventh-Day Adventist's first
28
amendment right to practice her religion.
Although the results of applying the Sherbert standard have not always been entirely predictable or consistent,2 9 the Court has used it,
with minor variations,3 0 for thirty years. It has been used to uphold religious claims as well as to support the state's compelling interests. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 1 the Court decided that the free exercise clause mandated an exemption for the Amish from Wisconsin's requirement that
children attend school through the age of 16. The Court rephrased the
Sherbert standard in even stronger language: "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion."'3 2 The Court specifically rejected
the Reynolds belief/action distinction, stating that "belief and action can33
not be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."
A restriction of the application of the Sherbert standard followed the
expansion of its application represented by Yoder. Recent decisions have
narrowed the Sherbert standard by heightening the severity of the burden
required and by focusing on whether the challenged government action
"directly burdens" the free exercise of religion.3 4 For example, in 1972
the Yoder Court unquestioningly accepted the assertion that requiring
Amish children to attend school through the age of 16 (two years more
than the Amish wanted) would cause the demise of the entire Old Order
24. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

26. See Lupu, supra note 11, at 939.
27. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-10. This standard is referred to throughout as the "Sherbert standard" or "Sherbert test."
28. Id. at 407.
29. See id. at 417 (Stewart, J., concurring) (maintaining that the Sherbert decision was
inconsistent with the Braunfeld decision, which denied Saturday Sabbatarians' free exercise
claims against a state law declaring Sunday a day of rest).
30. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 529-30 (1986)(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summary of variations of the Sherbert standard).
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id at 220.
34. See generally Lupu, supra note 11, at 942-46 (detailing the Court's recent use of the
"burden" threshold).
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Amish church community. Thus, the Court found a severe enough burden to satisfy the threshold of the Sherbert test.3 5 In contrast, in 1988 the
Court decided against religious adherents in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association.3 6 That case involved a free exercise challenge to the United States Forest Service's decision to build a road
across sacred Indian lands in a federally owned forest. Although the
Indians had proved that the road would physically obliterate practices
necessary to all of their ceremonies and rituals and would cause the demise of their religion, 3 7 the Court held that no legally cognizable burden on the Indians' religious practices existed because the road-building
did not indirectly or directly coerce, penalize, or prohibit religious practices. 38 The government was thus not required to justify its decision to
build the six-mile segment of road that two lower courts had found all
39
but useless.
The narrowed application of the Sherbert standard exemplified by
40
Lyng and other recent decisions has caused apprehension and dismay.
Until Smith, however, the Court continued to protect religious beliefs
practices from all but "compelling" governand at least some religious
41
ment interference.

III.

THE SMITH CASE

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Alfred Smith and Galen Black were counselors employed by the
Douglas County Oregon Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment, a non-profit private drug abuse rehabilitation clinic.
As a matter of policy, their employer required all counselors not to use
alcohol or non-prescription drugs. Smith and Black were fired after they
admitted they had ingested small amounts of peyote as a sacrament
while participating in a ceremony of the Native American Church, of
which both were members. Possession of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug,
42
is a felony under Oregon law.
Smith and Black applied for unemployment compensation benefits
and were determined ineligible for benefits under Oregon law because
they had been fired as a result of work-related misconduct. 43 They chal35. 406 U.S. at 212, 218.
36. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
37. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 447-53.
39. Id. at 462-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 316
(1986); Lupu, supra note 11, at 945-46; Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedomfor Indigenous
Americans, 65 OR. L. REv. 363 (1986).
41. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987);
Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), af'g per curiam, Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d
1121 (8th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
42. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.605(2), 475.992(4)(a) (1987).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987) ("An individual shall be disqualified from
the receipt of benefits.., if... the individual... [h]as been discharged for misconduct
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lenged the rulings, 4 4 asserting that because their peyote use was religiously motivated, the denial of benefits burdened the free exercise of
their religion. 45 After several administrative hearings and appeals, the
46
denial of benefits was upheld in both cases.
In Black's case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, applying Sherbert,
held that the denial of benefits was a substantial burden and that the
state's only interest, preventing depletion of the unemployment compensation fund, was not compelling.4 7 The court specifically rejected
the state's contention that its compelling interest was to prohibit illegal
drug use, stating that this interest was irrelevant because the challenged
state action was the denial of benefits, not criminal prosecution for drug
use. 4 8 Smith's case was reversed and remanded for further considera49
tion in light of the decision in Black.
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
analysis, reiterating that the illegality of possessing peyote was not determinative or even relevant in these cases because commission of a felony unrelated to work was not grounds for disqualification from
unemployment benefits, and law enforcement was not the purpose of
the unemployment compensation program.50
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari5 1 because it
disagreed with the Oregon Supreme Court's reasoning that the criminality of peyote possession was irrelevant to the constitutional claims. 52
The Court indicated that whether Smith's and Black's peyote use would
be afforded free exercise protection turned on whether religiously motivated peyote use was illegal as a matter of Oregon law. If the state had
criminalized religious peyote use without offending the free exercise
clause, the state would be allowed to impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits. 53 The Court remanded the
case for a determination of whether religiously motivated peyote use

54
was illegal under Oregon law.

On remand, the Oregon court decided that the first amendment, as
connected with work .... "); OR. ADMIN. R. 471-30-038(3) (1986) ("[Misconduct is a
wilful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of
an employee [,] . . . wilful disregard of an employer's interest, or recurring negligence
which demonstrates wrongful intent .... ").
44. Smith's and Black's cases advanced separately through administrative proceedings
and through the Oregon courts, but were consolidated when certiorari was first granted in
the United States Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v.
Smith, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
45. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 71, 763 P.2d 146, 147 (1988).
46. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 n.5

(1988).
47. Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274 (1985).
48. Id. at 1280.

49. Smith v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985).

50. Black v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221, 225, 721 P.2d 451, 453 (1986); Smith v.
Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 218-19, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (1986).
51. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
52. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 661 (1988).
53. Id. at 670.
54. Id. at 674.
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interpreted by Congress, mandated an exemption from the state's criminal laws for religiously motivated peyote use. 55 A second appeal to the
Supreme Court resulted in the decision that is the subject of this
Comment.
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court, holding
that the free exercise clause did not require an exemption from Oregon's criminal laws for sacramental peyote use. 56 Joining in the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Kennedy, and Stevens.
The Court stated that while government may not control religious
belief, it may enforce generally applicable, neutral laws that incidentally
prohibit religious conduct. 57 The Court announced that it would not apply the Sherbert standard because it would produce a "private right to
ignore generally applicable laws," 58 and instead advocated reliance on
the political process to protect religious freedoms. 59
C. Justice O'Connor's ConcurringOpinion
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice O'Connor
in Parts I and II of her concurrence. Justice O'Connor rejected the belief/action distinction, stating that the first amendment did not make
such a distinction. 60 She further contended that the first amendment
did not distinguish between "neutral" laws and laws that discriminate
against religion, and that the Sherbert standard should be applied to all
laws that significantly burden religion. 6 1 She maintained that criminal
laws, even more than civil laws, burdened the free exercise of religion
and should be strictly scrutinized. 6 2 She argued that the first amendment's purpose was to protect religious rights by withdrawing them
63
from the political process.
In Part III of the opinion, she concluded that religious peyote use
need not be exempted from criminal laws, but reached this conclusion
by applying the Sherbert standard. She found that Oregon's criminal pro55. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 307 Or. 68, 74-76, 763
P.2d 146, 149-50 (1988). In 1978, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), making it "the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian ....including but not limited to
access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites." See also H.R. Rep. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2
(1978) ("[I]t is established Federal law that peyote is constitutionally protected when used
by a bona fide religion as a sacrament.").
56. 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
57. Id.at 1599.
58. Id.at 1604.
59. Id.at 1606.
60. Id.at 1608 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
61. Id. at 1610.
62. Id.at 1611.
63. Id.at 1613.
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hibition placed an undeniably severe burden on respondents' exercise of
their religion, 6 4 but that the state's interest in prohibiting the peyote
possession for the health and safety of its citizens was compelling. 65
Since the state could not accommodate the religious use of peyote without compromising its health and safety goals, the first amendment did
66
not require the state to grant an exemption.
D. Justice Blackmun's Dissenting Opinion
Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun contended that Justice O'Connor's characterization of the state's interest
was overbroad, and that the state's precise interest in disallowing an exemption from its laws for sacramental peyote use was not sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the free exercise claim. 6 7 He argued that the
state's insistence on the importance of uniform enforcement of its criminal law was contradicted by the fact that it had not attempted to prosecute respondents for their peyote use and had not claimed to have
enforced the law against other religious peyote users. 6 8 He also thought
it significant that the state had offered no evidence that the ritual use of
peyote had ever harmed anyone. 69 To the contrary, peyotism had been
instrumental in helping many of its adherents overcome alcoholism, /a
much greater problem among Indians than peyote abuse. Thus, religious peyote use was compatible with the state's health and safety
70
interests.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORrrY OPINION

The Court returns to Reynolds by stating that although government
may not regulate religious belief, it may regulate religiously motivated
conduct, as long as the regulation is generally applicable, neutral and
does not represent an attempt to intentionally burden the exercise of
religion. 7 1 The Court imposes no requirement of necessity or even reasonableness as long as the burden on religious practices, no matter how
severe, is only an incidental effect of the regulation.
As Tribe says, the distinction between beliefs and actions is shallow,
because the government never attempts to interfere with beliefs, only
conduct. In almost every case the issue is whether the government
should be allowed to prohibit or interfere with one's conduct "because of
one's beliefs, or despite one's beliefs." 7 2 The Court prevents only government interference with conduct "because of one's beliefs," 7 3 but
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1614.
Id.
l at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id at 1617.
Id. at 1618.
Id. at 1619-20.
IdL at 1599-600.
Tribe, supra note 11, at 38. See also Braiterman & Kelley, supra note 12, at 175, 190.
Tribe, supra note 11, at 38.
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provides no protection at all from government interference "despite
one's beliefs." 74 As Justice O'Connor indicates, few legislatures would
blatantly enact a law whose stated purpose was to prohibit a religious
practice as such. 7 5 Yet this is the only kind of law that would merit first
amendment scrutiny under the Court's new formulation.
Another problem with the application of this new standard is that it
does not address the difficulty of distinguishing genuinely neutral laws
from laws that only appear to be neutral, but whose underlying purpose
is to interfere with unpopular religious practices. Just three years prior
to writing the Smith opinion, Justice Scalia was aware of the impossibility
of discerning the subjective motivation of legislators:
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite ....

[F]or example, a particular

legislator... may have thought the bill would provide jobs for
his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction
of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have
been a close friend of the bill's sponsor .... or he may have
hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fund
raising appearance for him ....or he may have been mad at his
wife who opposed the bill .... or he may have accidentally

voted "yes" instead of "no," or, of course, he may have had...
a combination of some of the above and many other motivais
tions. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator
76
probably to look for something that does not exist.

If discerning the real purpose or purposes behind a law is impossible,
courts will rely on the state's ad hocjustifications of statutes. Rarely will
a state's attorneys be incapable of formulating a believable and legitimate purpose for the statute in question other than blatant religious discrimination. 77 History shows that "legitimate" purposes have been
used to justify a great deal of discrimination. 78 Intolerance of minority
religions can easily be couched in terms of public health, safety, and
79
morality.
After granting government all but unlimited power to regulate religiously motivated conduct, the Court attempts to show that this power
has always resided in the government. The Court inaccurately asserts
that it has "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate." 8 0 It supports this assertion by citing dis74. Id
75. 110 S. Ct. at 1608.
76. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (rejecting the suggestion that the Court should investigate the actual purpose motivating the
legislature in an equal protection context).
78. See, Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1940) (Stone, J.,

dissenting).
79. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). For a list
of books on religious persecution perpetrated by the state, see Lupu, supra note 11, at 961

n.105.
80. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1600.
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credited cases and by misusing and mischaracterizing precedent. For
example, the Court cites Gobitis for the principle that "mere possession
of religious convictions" 8 1 does not relieve the individual from obedience to a generally applicable, neutral law, and cites Reynolds in support
of the widely discredited8 2 belief/action distinction.8 3 The Court fails
to mention that it is reviving previously rejected interpretations of the
first amendment.
The Court lists other precedents it contends stand for its new principle in which religious exemptions to generally applicable laws were
denied. Again, the Court fails to mention that the exemptions were denied only after the Court had applied the Sherbert test and had found that
the state's interest was compelling and could be served in no less burdensome way. In no case did the Court reach its result merely by finding that the laws were generally applicable, valid, and neutral.8 4 By
emphasizing only the results of the cases and not the principles they
stand for, the Court dishonestly attempts to appear to be applying wellestablished precedent rather than discarding it.
The Court's assertion that it has "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate"8 5 is plainly wrong.
In Yoder the Court held exactly that. Relying exclusively on the free exercise clause, the Yoder Court specifically rejected the Smith Court's new
rule, stating that even a facially neutral regulation may be constitution86
ally offensive if it burdens the free exercise of religion.
Rather than acknowledging that its new rule is contrary to established precedent, the Court dismisses Yoder and other cases that have
held generally applicable and neutral laws subject to free exercise scrutiny. The Court states that these cases were "hybrids" involving not just
free exercise claims but also free speech claims or parental rights
claims;8 7 however, in none of the cases cited does the Court attribute its
81. It
82. See id at 1607-08 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing the fallacy of the Reynolds
belief/action distinction); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("[B~elief and
action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.").
83. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
84. See id. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Specifically, in U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 259-60 (1982), the Amish were not exempted from the mandatory payment of Social
Security taxes because of the impossibility of accommodating numerous religious exemptions while maintaining a functional social security system. In Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S.
437, 462 (1971), the Court refused an exemption to the draft for persons who opposed a
particular war on religious grounds because the burden on free exercise was not severe
and was "strictly justified by substantial governmental interests ....
In Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961), the Court determined thatJewish merchants would
not be exempted from Sunday closing laws because these laws imposed only an indirect
burden on religious observance and because the state's purpose for having one common
day of rest would be defeated by allowing exemptions. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944), the Court decided that the state's compelling interest in protecting children justified denying Jehovah's Witnesses an exemption from child labor laws.
85. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
86. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-20.
87. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
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results to the presence of other rights. Although, as the Court states, in
these cases the Court "specifically adverted to the non-free exercise
principle involved," 8 8 they did so only in passing. The Court appears to
be asserting that if a decision could have been reached on other
grounds, it has no value as precedent, or that the free exercise clause, if
it has any meaning at all, is entirely subsumed within free speech and
parental rights. The first assertion would render almost any decision
non-precedential, while the second assertion is a judicial amendment of
the Constitution.
The Court then discusses its reasoning for finding that the Sherbert
test applies only to the unemployment compensation field. It explains
that even though it appears to have applied the Sherbert test in other
settings, the Court has not really done so. In other settings the Court
has always found the test to be satisfied.8 9 Again, this assertion is inaccurate. For example, the test was applied in McDaniel v. Paty,90 in which
Tennessee's disqualification of ministers of religion from membership in
the Legislature was found to violate a minister's free exercise rights.
The law burdened a minister's right to exercise his religion by conditioning it on the surrender of his right to seek office, and Tennessee
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in excluding the ministers

from the Legislature. 9 1 In Larson v. Valente,9 2 the Court struck down an
act requiring only those charitable organizations that received less than
half of their total contributions from members to report to the state.
Although the state asserted a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from abusive solicitation practices, the state had failed to show that
the act was "closely fitted to further the interest."9 3 In Wooley v. Maynard,9 4 using the Sherbert test and finding no compelling government interest, the Court invalidated a law requiring the display of the New
Hampshire state motto "Live Free or Die," a slogan offensive to respondents' religious beliefs, on license plates of passenger vehicles.
In Smith, the Court states that even if the Sherbert standard still ap-

plies in some situations, it certainly does not apply to the challenge of a
criminal law. 95 But as Justice O'Connor emphasizes, the Sherbert stan-

dard should apply with even greater force where the free exercise of
religion is criminally prohibited, because this burden is the most substantial of all the burdens a state can place on free exercise. 96 For example, in denying the Indians' free exercise challenge to the government's
plan to build a road across sacred lands in Lyng, the Court relied on the
concept that the key word in the free exercise clause was "prohibit," and
88. Id. at 1601 n.1.
89. Idl at 1602.
90. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
91. Id. at 626.
92. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
93. Id- at 248.
94. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
95. 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
96. See id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (A criminal law is more burdensome
than a civil statute.).

1991]

THE PEYOTE CASE

since the government had not prohibited the practice of religion, the gov97
In Bowen v. Roy, 98
ernment had not infringed free exercise rights.
ChiefJustice Burger concluded that the free exercise clause was not violated by the denial of welfare benefits to an Indian father who refused to
provide a social security number for his young daughter because he
feared impairing her spirit. Government regulation merely requiring a
choice between obtaining a government benefit and exercising religious
beliefs was not a legally cognizable burden, while the threat of criminal
sanctions to refrain from religious conduct would have been. 99 Even
though ChiefJustice Burger advocated applying rational basis review to
claims for government benefits, he recognized that criminal prohibition
should be more strictly scrutinized: "[T]he nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the
burden."1 0 0
The Court explains that the Sherbert test is a "constitutional anomaly" because judges are incompetent to determine the centrality of the
proscribed conduct to the individual's beliefs, and judges have no business contradicting a believer's assertion that certain conduct is central to
his religion. 10 1
This reasoning overlooks the fact that a large part of a trial court's
job consists of judging credibility. Courts are capable of judging the
credibility of a claimant's assertions as to the centrality of the religious
practice in question without having to rule on the actual centrality of the
religious practice. 10 2 As Professor Lupu says, any standard of review
stricter than rational basis will involve the court in some value judgments, and when the courts can be trusted more than other governmental branches to make a just decision, allowing the courts to make the
value judgments is justified. 10 3 As Justice Jackson said in Barnette, "[W]e
act in these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of
1 0° 4
our commissions."
Justice Scalia suggests that it is "horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws
the significance of religious practice." 10 5 As Justice Brennan concludes
97. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 451

(1988).
98. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).

99. led at 703-04.
100. Id. at 707.
101. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1604. The centrality of the religious conduct was not an issue
in this case. It was never disputed, even by the state's attorneys, that peyote use was not
crucial to the Indians' religious practices. A great majority of the courts that have decided
the issue of whether peyote use is central to the religious practices of the Native American
Church have decided that peyote use is fundamental to the practice of the religion. See, e.g.,
State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), petition denied, 110 Ariz. 279,
517 P.2d 1275, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 39 Cal Rptr.
912, 394 P.2d 728 (1964); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d
813 (1964); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App., 1977).
102. Pepper, supra note 40, at 328 & n.117.
103. Lupu, supra note 11, at 950 n.66.
104. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
105. 110 S. Ct. at 1606 n.5.
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in his dissenting opinion in Lyng, "the Court's apparent solicitude for
the integrity of religious belief and its desire to forestall the possibility
that courts might second-guess the claims of religious adherents leads to
far greater inequities than those the Court postulates." 10 6 The greater
inequity is that judges can no longer balance these competing interests,
but must now uphold general, neutral laws, no matter how trifling, and
no matter how significant the religious practices they prohibit.
Without some evaluation of the significance of the religious conduct
in question, two alternatives remain, as the Court suggests.10 7 Either
the free exercise clause has no meaning, or religious persons are totally
insulated from all state
control or intervention, l1 8 in which case we are
"courting anarchy." 10 9 Obviously, having limited itself to these two
choices, the Court is forced to choose the lesser of two evils, and thus
avoid starting courts down the "slippery slope," of allowing exemptions
for religious conduct ranging from child neglect to cruelty to
animals. 1 0
"Slippery slope" arguments are inapposite when it is proven that
other decision makers are capable of understanding and applying the
doctrinal lines drawn.'
All of the claims for exemption for religious
conduct cited in Scalia's "parade of horribles" were denied by courts
applying the Sherbert standard. Although courts consistently reached the
result the Court presumably would have reached, the Court still feels
the need to simplify courts'jobs so that they no longer have to deal with
the inconvenience of deciding each case.
Finally, the Court proposes to leave these sensitive decisions to the
political process. The scope of the state's police power includes health,
safety, and morals.' 12 Morality is so closely intertwined with religious
beliefs that the two are almost inseparable. Thus the state, through the
political process, can legislate according to majority religious beliefs and
preferences.
Smith is a good example of that principle. In most mainstream religions, it is immoral to use hallucinogenic drugs such as peyote, but
moral to use alcohol in moderation. According to the beliefs of Native
American Church members, it is immoral to use alcohol, but moral to
use peyote in moderation.' 1 3 Experts agree that sacramental peyote use
does not injure the user, and that peyotists are no more likely to become
addicted to drugs than non-peyote-users." 4 That claim cannot be made
about the use of alcohol. Health risks are easily quantifiable in each
case. Sacramental peyote use is obviously not as harmful as alcohol con106.
(1988)
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 475-76
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1604-05.
Lupu, supra note 11, at 952-53.
Smith, I10 S. Ct. at 1605.
Id. at 1605-06.
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 372 (1985).
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 108 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 S. Ct. at 1619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722-23 (1964).
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sumption, even in moderation. Why, then, is alcohol consumption not
forbidden? Because the majority no longer thinks alcohol consumption
is immoral.
The government will never intentionally or even inadvertently regulate in such a way as to infringe the rights of politically powerful religious majorities. It will, however, inadvertently or even intentionally
dictate the majority's moral and religious choices to the detriment of the
15
rights of religious minorities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The profound question before the Court was whether the government would be allowed to impose the majority's opinions and attitudes
on the individual, not just for a compelling reason but for no reason at
all. The Court answered that question "yes," and entrusted the protection of the constitutional rights of unpopular religions to the very institutions that threaten them. Laws that protect a particular set of moral
views while outlawing others for no compelling reason, no matter how
facially "neutral" they appear to be, are discriminatory. As a consequence of the Smith decision, such laws no longer warrant the strict scrutiny formerly deemed essential to the protection of religious rights.
Theresa Cook

115. Pepper, supra note 40, at 314.

IN RE ROMERO:1 STERILIZATION AND COMPETENCY
I.

INTRODUCTION

What circumstances justify forcing a mentally disabled adult to be
sterilized? The once acceptable practice of sterilizing retarded individuals is no longer presumptively acceptable. Mentally impaired people are
entitled to the same protection of fundamental procreation rights as
other individuals. Courts have required satisfaction of a high burden of
proof before ordering sterilization. A multitude of tests have been developed to ensure protection of these protective rights.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently confronted forced sterilization of a mentally disabled adult in In re Romero, overturning the lower
court order granting sterilization, and effectively preserving Romero's
liberty interest. The means used by the court, however, were untraditional and incomplete as a guideline for future cases. The court's decision focused upon the competency of Romero in making her own
decision regarding sterilization. First, the court defined a test for determining competency. Applying this test, the court found Romero competent to make her own decision; however, the court did not strictly follow
their own definition when they applied the competency test.
Traditionally, appellate courts regard a competency test as the preliminary question before ordering sterilization. Appellate courts usually
establish the test and remand to the trial court to determine facts according to the test. In contrast, the Colorado Supreme Court determined the competency test and applied the test without remanding, in
essence serving as fact finder. Though the court found Romero competent, their opinion provided no guidance for the appropriate sterilization test in cases of mental incompetency.
This Comment provides the evolution of attitudes toward sterilization resulting in the Colorado Supreme Court's position today. An
overview of different tests courts have used in determining sterilization
provides a comparison to aid in understanding the Colorado Supreme
Court's approach. This Comment focuses on the development and application of the competency test as part of a sterilization decision, as well
as the implications of Romero to future forced sterilization cases.
II.

BACKGROUND:

UNDERSTANDING

STERILIZATION

Sterilization of retarded or mentally defective individuals was widely
2
accepted in the early twentieth century under the theory of eugenics.
1. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990).
2. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado Supreme Court
defines eugenics as "the science of improving the qualities of the human race by the careful selection of parents." Id. at 368 n.2. "'Positive eugenics would accomplish this by
encouraging reproduction of those with favorable traits; negative eugenics, such as sterili-
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Justice Holmes captured the general attitude toward eugenic sterilization of institutional patients when he proclaimed "three generations of
imbeciles are enough" in Buck v. Bell.3 Buck stands as the high water
mark for eugenic sterilization as an appropriate expression of governmental authority. 4 After Buck, thirty states enacted statutes authorizing
compulsory eugenic sterilization. 5
Near the middle of the century, eugenics faced constitutional challenges because of the development of scientific evidence which discred6
ited many premises of eugenic sterilization.
Skinner v. Oklahoma established procreation as a fundamental constitutional right,7 marking the demise of court-enforced eugenic sterilizations. In Skinner, the Supreme Court overturned a statute providing for
sterilization of thrice convicted felons for crimes involving moral turpitude because it invidiously discriminated against certain types of individuals in the exercise of a fundamental right.8 Although Skinner did not
explicitly overrule Buck v. Bell, courts and commentators have often
stated that Buck would not hold up under the strict tests applied to sterilzation, would discourage or prohibit the reproduction of those with unfavorable traits.'"
(Id. quoting Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER LJ. 631 (1969)).
3. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Buck upheld a statute authorizing sterilization of institutionalized mental patients. The Court decided that Carrie Buck, mentally impaired and
the daughter of a mentally deficient woman, was the probable "potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring," and that preventing a third generation of imbeciles sufficiently outweighed due process and equal protection claims against the statute. Id. But see O'Hara &
Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEo. LJ. 20, 31 (1956). A sociologist who reviewed the
evidence used by the Court in Buck found both Carrie Buck and her mother to be morons,
not imbeciles. Carrie's daughter was reportedly very bright.
4. Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, supra note 2, at 633.
5. Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 (citing Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizingthe Retarded-Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 945 (1982)). Sterilization may
either be voluntary or compulsory. Sterilization is compulsory when the state imposes
sterilization despite the objections of the individual or of one who represents her interests.
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 473 (1981). Romero involves a non-consensual or
compulsory sterilization. The court in Romero also notes that Colorado has never enacted
a compulsory sterilization statute. Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 n.7 (citing In re A.W., 637 P.2d
at 368 n.3).
6. See Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated,Institutionalized
and Incompetent Women, 13 NovA L.REv. 405, 415 (1989). The campaign to sterilize the
mentally retarded slowed down partly because the eugenics movement, responsible for
much of the sterilization activity, became discredited by association with Hider. Hitler
modeled his programs upon a law developed by an American eugenicist. Id. Three factors
have stimulated the reform of sterilization law: (I) the discrediting of the eugenic theory;
(2) the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive privacy; and (3) the
changing conception of mental retardation. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, DurE LJ. 806, 809 (1986).
7. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Skinner court stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the
State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic
liberty.
Id. at 541.
8. Id.
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ization statutes today. 9 The 1960's and 1970's marked a wave of challenges to eugenic sterilization statutes, resulting in the repeal of many. 10
In contrast to the compulsory, eugenics-based statutes, consensual
sterilization statutes permit sterilization under certain circumstances.
Colorado, and many other states, currently have consensual sterilization
statutes. 11 In addition to sterilizing by statutory authority, courts rely
1
on their parens patriae 2 authority to consider sterilization orders. 3
Sterilization laws must withstand constitutional challenge as an intrusion on an individual's fundamental right to procreate and to prevent
procreation.1 4 The decision whether to beget or bear a child is at the
very heart of constitutionally protected choices.1 5 Courts apply strict
scrutiny to statutes that interfere with fundamental rights. 16 A statute
will survive strict scrutiny only if the state can show a compelling interest
in enforcement of the statute and nonexistence of any less intrusive
7
means to accomplish the same goal.'
9. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 368; In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 472; Eugenic Sterilization
Statutes: A ConstitutionalRe-Evaluation, 14J. F m. L. 280, 297 (1975); Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit - Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. LJ. 591, 602-04 (1966); Eugenic Sterilization -A
Scientific Analysis, supra note 2, at 633.
10. Stefan, supra note 6, at 417. Colorado enacted a statute limiting consensual sterilization and prohibiting forced sterilization. COLO. REv. STAT. sec. 27-10.5-128 (1989).

Sterilization

-

limitations:

1) Any person with developmental disabilities who is over eighteen years of
age who has given consent may be sterilized, subject to the following...
(2) No personwith developmental disabilitieswho has not given consent shall be sterilized. (emphasis added).
The Colorado Supreme Court circumvented this law. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 373 (en
banc)(Lohr,J., specially concurring). The court decided that the statutes regulating sterilization applied to adults and the statutory exclusion of minors did not prohibit the court
from acting to sterilize a minor.
11. See COLO. REv. STAT. sec. 27-10.5-128 (1989).
12. Parenspatriaepower comes from the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign
to protect persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because of a legal disability. In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 561, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381 (1982). For a general discussion, see 88 CJ.S. Parens Patriaeat 159 (1978).
13. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821; In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 374; In re Grady, 426 A.2d
at 479-80; In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In
re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635, 637-39 (1980). But Cf Wade v. Bethesda Hosp.,
337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (judge not immune for granting sterilization order
where this was outside his jurisdiction).

14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental right to procreate). The right to prevent procreation was first confronted in Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the "penumbral" right of privacy in marriage was created,
barring state intervention in decisions of contraception. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), extended Griswold's logic to unmarried persons. See also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(right to privacy of procreation extends to minors as well as
adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(woman's qualified right to terminate
pregnancy).

15. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
16. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
17. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. When fundamental rights or personal liberties are
involved, constitutional standards require an overriding, compelling state interest and
strict scrutiny of the legislation serving that interest. The legislation must be both necessary and the least intrusive measure in method or implementation. The Supreme Court
has established procreative rights as fundamentally encompassed by a recognized zone of
privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Note, Sterilization of the Developmentally
Disabled: Shedding Some Myth Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 599, 611-12 (1981).
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Courts apply various tests to weigh the competing interests in sterilization cases. Their analysis generally includes a two-step process to determine whether sterilization is appropriate. First, the individual must
be proven incompetent to make her own sterilization decision before the
court will make this decision for her.18 Determining competency is a
crucial step in the analysis. If the person is capable of making her own
decision, the state's interests must yield to her autonomy. To prove
someone incompetent to make a sterilization decision, courts require
dear and convincing evidence of incompetency.' 9
Once incompetency is determined, courts then decide whether to
grant the sterilization petition by examining the interests of the incompetent. Courts have generally applied three tests to determine whether
to grant a sterilization petition: (1) substituted judgment, 20 (2) best interest, 2 1 and (3) medically essential. 22 Courts using the substituted
judgment 23 test consider such factors as: (1) physical capability to procreate; (2) existence of less intrusive means of birth control (before ordering sterilization the court must find all other means unworkable and
inquire if sterilization reversal might soon become available); (3) medical necessity for the procedure; (4) the nature and extent of the disability (considering spousal help and prognosis for treatment of the mental
disability); (5) likelihood of sex resulting in pregnancy; and (6) risks of
sterilization weighed against risks of pregnancy. The court may also
take the ward's desires and religion into consideration before ordering
24
sterilization.
The "best interest" test is similar to the substituted judgment test.
The goal of the best interest test is to do what is in the best interest of
18. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819; In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366; In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Grady, 85 NJ.
235, 426 A.2d 467.
19. See In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980); In re Grady, 426 A.2d
at 483; In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635, 640. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979)(clear and convincing standard of proof for institutional commitments). The
court in Romero also adopted this standard. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822. Many nonconsensual sterilization petitions involve minors whose competency to make sterilization
determinations is not an issue. Minors are considered "protected persons" and require
either parental consent for many things or a guardian if there is no parent. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. 15-14-101(2) and 15-14-204 (1987). But see In re G.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska
1981)(where court used statute determining incapacitated person to presume incompetence to make own sterilization determination).
20. See In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 720-21.
21. In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 782-83 (Me. 1985).
22. In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375-76.
23. "Substituted judgment" means deciding for the person as if she were deciding for
herself.
[W]e have to compare very carefully and very honestly the value of being spared
the consequences of "wrong" decisions with the value of being left free to make
one's own decisions. Do we not all make "wrong" decisions from time to time even very costly and harmful ones? And yet, on balance, I don't think very many
of us would be prepared to sacrifice our personal autonomy for the still somewhat
uncertain security of having someone else, presumably brighter than us and presumably well-intentioned, make all our critical decisions for us.
Endicott, Decision-Making Time on Guardianship, 3 ENTOURAGE 17, (1988).
24. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 723.
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the retarded person. 25 This test adds a good faith requirement and re26
quires a clear and convincing burden of proof.
The "medically essential" test requires a determination by medical
expert witnesses that sterilization is clearly necessary, to preserve the
27
life or health of the person to be sterilized.
III.

A.

INSTANT CASE: IN RE ROMERO

FactualBackground

In Romero the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order to sterilize Romero. 28 At the age of thirty-three, LaVista Romero
suffered oxygen deprivation from complications associated with diabetes. Brain damage resulted. 29 Romero is the mother of two children,
who were not in her custody.3 0 Ms. Harvey, Romero's mother, had Romero declared an incapacitated person3 l and had herself appointed
guardian3 2 when Romero was thirty-seven years old.
In 1988, Harvey petitioned the district court to order Romero's
sterilization.3 3 A guardian ad litem was appointed for Romero. 3 4 After
25. Id. at 720.
26. In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (1981).
27. In re A. W. 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981).
28. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. 1990).
29. Id.
30. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 1988).
31. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820 n.1. An incapacitated person is defined as:
Any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication,
or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his
person.
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-101(1) (1987).
32. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-301 to 314
(1987) (provisions for appointment of guardians for incapacitated persons).
33. The statute mandates the proceedings that must be followed in a sterilization consideration. The statute requires a petition be filed with the court. The petition must set
forth the logistics of the hearing. Furthermore, the person with the disability must be
present at the hearing and if the person is indigent, counsel must be appointed to the
person for whom sterilization is being considered. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-129
(1989).
34. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990), rev'd 790 P.2d
819 (Colo. 1990) (Appellant argued that Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-10.5-129(3), (4) requires
counsel be appointed for the developmentally disabled person whose sterilization is in
dispute. The trial court, however, did not appoint counsel, and instead appointed a guardian ad litem, as in In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981). Appellants argued that a guardian
ad litem paternalistically acts only in the best interest of a person, which may mean ignoring
the person's desires. Counsel, however, acts on behalf of the person's desires, not paternalistically.). See COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-314 (1987) (guardian ad litem is appointed to:
(1) A special fiduciary appointed by the court to represent and protect in the
proceedings, the interest of the minor....
(2) A guardian ad litem shall diligently take such steps as he deems necessary
under the circumstances to represent and protect the interests of the person for
whom he was appointed....
(3) The guardian ad litem, may, but need not be, an attorney....
In re Grady stated that a guardian ad litem should represent "zealously the interests of his
ward" in appropriate ways. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467. The Grady standard
indicates that a guardian ad litem acts paternalistically. The court in Romero was not bound
by the requirements of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-314 (1987) because Romero's develop-
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hearing the testimony of Harvey, Romero, three doctors, and a social
worker on the staff of the nursing home where Romero resided, the trial
court ordered Romero sterilized.5 5 The three expert witnesses agreed
that sterilization was medically necessary.3 6 The trial court found that
Romero lacked the mental capacity to consent knowingly to sterilization
and the ability to judge matters requiring forethought. 37 The court also
found Romero's competency to make decisions unlikely to improve in
the future.3 8 Though Romero was capable of reproduction, the trial
court found that alternative forms of birth control were not available.3 9
On appeal, Romero challenged the constitutionality of the Colorado statute 4 ° regarding sterilization and argued that less intrusive
forms of birth control were available. 4 1 The Colorado Supreme Court,
however, reversed the decision without addressing the statute's constitutionality and without determining the availability of less intrusive alternatives. The court reversed the sterilization order on the threshold
issue of competency. Reviewing the trial court record, the court held
that Romero was not proven incompetent by "clear and convincing" evidence. 42 Consequently, the court never reached other issues.
B.

Majority Opinion

The Romero majority determined that Colorado had no statute that
applied to Romero's situation. Because she was brain damaged after the
age of twenty-two, Romero did not fit under the definition of "developmentally disabled."'43 The court relied on its parenspatriae authority for
mental disability occurred at age 33, and the statute applies to persons whose disability
manifested before age 22. The court, however, should have considered the purpose
served by counsel and appointed counsel though not statutorily required. Doing so would
have best protected the desires, as well as the interests, of Romero.
35. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 2 (At the guardian's request, the trial court
ordered Romero sterilized by tubal ligation). Tubal ligation entails tying the fallopian
tubes. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820 n.2 (citing The Sloane-DorlandAnnotated Medical-Legal
Dictionary 416 (1987)).
36. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 2.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. Birth control alternatives were not practical because Romero was too unreliable to use them, and they risked being improperly implemented. A vasectomy of her partner was not appropriate, and constant supervision was not a solution because Romero's
right to privacy, more fundamental than her right of procreation, would be violated.
40. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128, 130 (1989).
41. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 824 n.15.
42. Id. at 824.
43. See CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128 to 130 (1989), which provide for sterilization
of developmentally disabled persons. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-102(10)(a) (1989).
(10)(a) "Developmental disability" means a disability that is manifested before the person
reaches twenty-two years of age; constitutes a substantial handicap to the affected individual; and is attributable to mental retardation or related conditions which include cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, autism or other neurological conditions when such conditions result in
impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of mentally retarded persons.
The Court rejected appellant's argument that the statute controlled this case. Appellants argued that COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-130(2) provides that a person proven incompetent to consent should not be ordered sterilized. Brief for Appellant at 3, In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-130(2) (1989). "If the court deter-
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jurisdiction, 44 and noted that Colorado has never enacted a compulsory
45
sterilization statute.
In its opinion, the court explained the development of fundamental
procreative rights, recognized the seriousness of sterilization, and set
forth criteria for a decision to sterilize. The threshold question was
whether the person was competent to make a sterilization determination
for herself.4 6 The court required proof by clear and convincing evidence before the individual would be deemed incompetent to make this
decision. 4 7 Additionally, competency must be unlikely to improve in the
future. 48 The court pointed out that retardation in itself does not necessitate a conclusion of incompetency. 4 9 Instead, a person should understand what sterilization is as well as the responsibilities of parenthood. 50
The court set forth a test for competency that must be satisfied
before an individual may consent to sterilization. The individual must
understand (1) the nature of the district court proceeding; (2) the link
between sexual activity and reproduction; and (3) the consequences of
sterilization. 5 1 In addition, the court rejected the notion that the lack of
mines that a person is incompetent to give consent to sterilization ... or such consent has
not been given, the court shall order that no sterilization... be performed." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 27-10.5-130 etseq., revised in 1985, changed the language from "mentally retarded" to "developmentally disabled." Appellants argued that the change was unintentional and made for no apparent reason other than to include persons not residing in a
facility.
"What changes were made to the rights and sterilization sections?"
Current statutes pertain only to residents of facilities ...We have expanded the
definition of resident and facility to be all inclusive, and conformed the language
to assure that the rights and sterilization sections are applicable to all persons
served under Title 27, Article 10.5.
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1985 Questions and Answers sec. 12 at 6.
Appellants argued that the statute clearly forbade involuntary sterilization in 1975
and an unintended change should not affect the original legislative intent. Brief for Appellant at 4, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819. The trial court addressed this issue, stating that the
1975 statute applied in the case In reA. W., but neither the majority nor concurring opinions recognized that the statute defeated the "trial court's jurisdiction to consider sterilization with respect to persons deemed to be outside the purview of the statutory scheme
itself." In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 5.
44. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 374-75 (involving a
minor wherein the court used its parens patriaeauthority because no statute applied). The
parenspatriaeauthority has been used by several courts in sterilization cases. In re Moe, 385
Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712; In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467; In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
45. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 n.7 (citing In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 368 n.3).
46. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d at 721; In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 482; In re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641.
47. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822.
48. Id. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
293 Md. 685, , 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re Grady,
426 A.2d at 483; In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 565,450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982); In
re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641.
49. Romero, 790 P.2d at 822-23.
50. Id. at 822 n. I1(referring to Murdock, Sterilization of the Retardd: A Problem or Solution?, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 917, 933-34 (1974) (Most mentally retarded are competent to appreciate the responsibilities and the implications of parenthood.) See also In re Grady, 85
NJ. at , 426 A.2d at 482-83.
51. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823; See also In re Moe, 385 Mass 555, ,432 N.E.2d 712,
721-22 n.8; In re Grady, 405 A.2d 851, 865 (N.J. Super. 1979), aff'd, 426 A.2d 467
(NJ.1981). Compare In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (holding individual incom-
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a technical understanding of bodily functions and a complete understanding of the risks of both pregnancy and sterilization was not determinative of incompetency. 5 2 The Court also refused a paternalistic
approach to sterilization. Instead, it chose to extend to the mentally deficient the same rights enjoyed by competent persons. If a person otherwise incompetent has the understanding required by the competency
test, the court must accept her sterilization decision, no matter how
unreasonable. 53
Commenting on the evidence, the court explained that Romero's
I.Q. indicated mild brain damage at worst. 54 Romero's testimony was
articulate and demonstrated that she understood the nature of the district court's proceedings. She understood further the relationship between pregnancy and sexual conduct and the consequences of
sterilization. 55 Only one expert testified about Romero's competency,
and the expert deemed Romero incompetent to consent to sterilization
because of her inability to look at things "in terms of future consequences." 5 6 This testimony, however, was insufficient to meet the burden of clear and convincing evidence.
The Colorado Supreme Court criticized the district court for focusing on reasonableness rather than competency. 5 7 The court also decided that Romero understood the risks of pregnancy. 5 8 The court,
however, did not include an understanding of the risk of pregnancy as
part of its competency test because it refused to judge the wisdom of
Romero's decision. 59 Finding that the threshold issue of competency
was not met by clear and convincing evidence, 60 the court did not reach
issues regarding the constitutionality of the Colorado statutes, or the
61
availability of less-intrusive contraceptive alternatives.
C.

Dissent

The dissent argued that the decision in In re A. W. 62 should control.
In A. W., the court directed the district judge to interview the individual
and to consider her desires. The individual's desires, although relevant,
petent according to statute determining incapacity; whereas Colorado court distinguishes
incapacity from incompetency, without presuming incompetency from incapacity).
52. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823. See also In re Moe, 385 Mass at - n.8, 432 N.E.2d

at 721-22 n.8.

53. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823; See also Scott, supra note 6, at 840.
54. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823. Mild brain damage was described as "educable;
can live independently or in group homes." Id. at 823 n.13 (although the classifications
were based on impairments manifested prior to age eighteen, the Romero court relied on
the classifications) (citing American Psychiatric Association, Diagnosticand StatisticalManual
of Mental Disorders 32-33 rev.3d.ed. (1987)).
55. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823-24.

Id.

56. Id. at 824.
57. Id.
58. She stated she would like to have a child, "when and if her diabetes was cured."
59. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 824.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 824 n.15.
62. 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).
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would not be conclusive. 63 The preliminary test is that the person must
be proven incapable of making her own decision, by clear and convincing evidence, and her competency should be unlikely to improve in the
future. She must also be proven capable of reproduction. 6 4 Before ordering sterilization, the court must find by dear and convincing evi6
dence that sterilization is medically necessary. 5
The dissent disagreed with majority's competency test. Although
the court addressed Romero's understanding of the risks of pregnancy
and childbirth as part of its test, the majority rejected these as part of the
competency test. 66 The dissent, on the other hand, strongly argued that
to prove competency the individual must understand the risks of childbirth and pregnancy. 6 7 The dissent then concluded that Romero was
unable to understand the risks of pregnancy. 6 8 Romero's view of her
disease and its implications, the dissent concluded, appeared illusory,
and her hopes of an improved condition wishful and unrealistic. 69 The
dissent also emphasized Romero's understanding of the risks in the future, as opposed to her understanding in the courtroom, because during
70
the trial she was being reminded of the implications.
The dissent also argued that this presented a case of first impression and the majority had developed a test which was not available to the
72
trial court. 7 1 They criticized the majority for not remanding.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Romero, the Colorado Supreme Court preserves a competent
adult's right to decide her own procreative destiny. Disagreeing with
the trial court's conclusion, the court explicitly provides the test to determine a person's competency to decide whether to be sterilized. The
court then goes on to apply this test based on the trial court's findings of
fact. This approach differs from the traditional remand that other courts
63. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 825 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).

64. Id.
65. Id. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981).

66. The majority concluded that Romero understood the risks of pregnancy and
childbirth. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 825 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 826.
68. Q. Do you understand if you got pregnant that it might be risky for your
health?
A. No.
Q. Because you've got diabetes it might male it unsafe for you to be pregnant?
A. It didn't hurt me the first time. I mean the second time is what I should say.
0. Even if there was a risk would you want to get pregnant and have another
baby? A. Not at the nursing home, no.
Q. What about if you are out of the nursing home? What if you were married to
Dean?
A. Yes, I would want a baby then.
Q. Even though it would be risky for you?
A. Yes. I'll take that chance.
Id. at 825-26.
69. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 826 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 826-27 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
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have commonly used. 73 Also, the court does not provide a complete
test to be used to determine whether to order sterilization. The court
spoke only to competency and provided no guidance on which test
should be utilized to evaluate the interests of the incompetent.
In many sterilization cases, competency is not an issue because it is
either undisputed or involves a minor. Where incompetency is presumed, courts focus on which test to apply to determine whether the
incompetent person should be sterilized. Romero differs because it concentrates only on the threshold test of competency.
Sterilization affects a fundamental right, whether it is the right to
procreate or the right to prevent procreation. 7 4 Incompetents enjoy the
same constitutional protections as all other people, and their rights
should be carefully guarded. The courts, therefore, must take all steps
to prevent abuses of these rights. 75 The Colorado Supreme Court does
so by delaying consideration of the sterilization issue until after incompetency is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 76 A more lenient
standard would indicate the procreative rights at stake are less than fundamental, contradicting Skinner and its progeny7 7 and compromising
these rights more often. The higher burden of proof is necessary to
prevent the court from acting where the person is competent to act for
themselves.
The competency criteria used in Romero differ from those used in In
re A. W., on which the district court relied, because A. W. involved the
sterilization of a minor. These criteria do not include an understanding
of the risks of pregnancy. 78 The dissent strongly argued, however, that
the risk requirement was essential to the competency determination.
Should people be able to decide their own procreative destiny if they are
not even able to understand how pregnancy is likely to affect them?
Whether an understanding of pregnancy risks should be an element
73. See In re A.W., 637 p.2d 336, 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813 (N.C. App.
1983); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486; In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. Super.

1982).
74. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821-22.
75. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (court ordered, cc parte and
without notice and hearing, sterilization of somewhat retarded woman, who was told she
was having her appendix removed and who discovered her sterility two years later when
she married and tried to conceive).
76. The trial court relied extensively on In re A. W. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip
op. (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 1988). See Legal Center Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 7, In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819. In re A. W. involved a minor, presumed incompetent to make
decisions. Romero, however, involved an adut with a disability. Since a presumption of
incompetence would be clearly erroneous, Romero is consistent with other decisions.
77. Appellees argued in their brief that the court should not go beyond the standards
adopted in In re A. W. by applying the clear and convincing test of Grady, though A. W.
involved a presumptively incompetent minor. Brief for Appellee at 8, In re Romero, 790
P.2d 819.
78. The court, which had to determine by clear and convincing evidence if the youth
would ever be capable of making an informed decision, did not list any criteria for making
this determination. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981). The court in A. W. acknowledged the difficulty of proving the minor's future competence. In contrast, adults
make independent decisions for themselves; thus a test of present competency is crucial to
proceedings which potentially strip adults of their decision-making power.
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of the court's test depends on what role the court wishes to act. If the
court wants to adjudge a person's decision-making wisdom, then the risk
analysis should be included. On, the other hand, if the court prefers objectivity, understanding of pregnancy risks should be excluded from the
test.
The majority found that Romero's testimony indicated an understanding of pregnancy risks. Nevertheless, the court deemed her understanding not a necessary factor to their competency test. The risk factor
requires forethought. 79 To require demonstration of ability to perceive
things in the future would be a difficult standard to meet, and would
require inquiry into the person's wisdom. The risk understanding and
decision wisdom that follows from it would result in a narrower definition of competency, thus rendering less protection to fundamental procreative rights. Rejecting a risk understanding, and requiring merely
that the person understand the proceedings, creates a broader definition
of competency and offers greater protection to individual rights. In Romero, the court opted for the more limited inquiry, rejected a risk understanding, and protected fundamental rights by broadly defining
competency in the sterilization context.
The Colorado Supreme Court further preserved procreative liberties by resorting to an activist form of appellate review, departing from
the practices of other courts as well as from its own.8 0 Appellate courts
predominantly defer to trial courts for fact finding.8 1 Trialjudges, present at hearings, gain first-hand impressions of the evidence and an opportunity to consider the relative credibility of facts.8 2 For example,
where testimony of the parties is contradictory, the trial court is the best
fact finder.8 3 Particularly in cases involving mentally retarded individuals, appellate courts usually set the standards to be used and remand to
84
the trial court to apply these standards.
Determining competency is difficult. Many courts have recommended or required that the judge personally interview the individual as
a means of getting a sense of the person's demeanor.8 5 The person's
79. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Colo. Sept 9, 1988), rev'd, 790 P.2d

819 (Colo. 1990).
80. See generally In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813
(N.C. App. 1983); in re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (1981); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376,
1383 (Pa. Super. 1982).
81. See In reA. W., 637 P.2d at 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 813; Inre Grady, 85
NJ. at -, 426 A.2d at 486; In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
82. "The sanctity of trial court findings is derived from the recognition that the trial
judge's presence during the presentation of testimonial evidence provides an unparalleled
opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded the
evidence which is before the court." Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 313, 592 P.2d 792, 796
(1979). See Baumgartner v. Tweedy, 143 Colo. 556, 354 P.2d 586 (1960).
83. Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d at 796. Contradictory testimony made it impossible to
determine from the record whose testimony should be given credit. "In such cases, the
difficult task of finding those facts is best left to the trial court." Id.
84. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 376 (Colo. 1981); In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258,
292, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813 (1983); In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 272-73, 426 A.2d 467, 486
(1981).
85. See, e.g., In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
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desires are considered but not taken as conclusive. This is important
because her desires are given some weight and she is given a chance to
be heard. 8 6 The individual is often put on the witness stand in the trial
court's sterilization proceeding.8 7 An appellate court has access to the
trial court's record, but they have no means of observing the demeanor
of the individual whose liberty is at stake. An appellate court must rely
on the trial court as the fact finder for these impressions.
In Romero, however, the appellate court usurped the trial court's
fact-finding function. The appellate court's actions were unusual because appellate courts usually only make independent decisions on undisputed facts 8 8 and the facts in Romero are not undisputed.
When an appellate court becomes a fact-finder as well as a
lawmaker, its burden increases immensely. In addition, the process of
going through the trial court becomes merely an exercise. An appellate
court that attempts to make factual determinations should grant the individuals involved the same rights as trial courts must. Due process is
violated when a litigant does not have an opportunity to argue a case to
a fact finder.8 9 While appellate courts can make findings of law, to preserve the judicial process and the due process rights of litigants, they
should leave the fact finding to the trial courts because trial courts have
access to the people. To preserve fundamental rights so carefully by
law, but to ignore them in application, makes the law meaningless.
Conversely, an appellate court's determination of factual issues
would be judicially efficient where the facts are not in dispute. But in
Romero, the facts of Romero's competency were disputed, yet the court
concluded from the record that Romero was competent, without the
critical first-hand perspective unique to the trial court. Also, the court
created a test for competency, but did not allow the parties to challenge
its specific requirements.
Had the court defined the competency test and remanded the case
to the trial court to determine competency, Romero would stand as
stronger precedent. The competency test would have been subjected to
rigorous and fair challenge, and would emerge as better guidance for
future cases. By circumventing the trial process, it remains unclear
293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re
Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482; In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 565-66, 450
A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982).
86. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; In re Grady, 85 NJ. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482; In re
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980).
87. The trial court put Ms. Romero on the stand. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823
(Colo. 1990).
88. An appellate court should refrain from retrying a case or reweighing conflicting
evidence. The appellate court's concern should be whether reasonable inferences have
been drawn in favor of the verdict on appeal and whether there is substantial competent
evidence to support the verdict and judgment. "Legal sufficiency alone, as opposed to
evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal." Tibbs v. State,
397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
89. The Colorado Supreme Court previously remanded a sterilization case after specifying which standards the trial court should use. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 376 (Colo.
1981). Yet in Romero, the court did not remand.
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whether the test will survive future appeals. Though the court may have
had concerns over judicial efficiency, efficiency should yield to fairness,
particularly when fundamental rights are at stake.
Romero also provides little guidance on the issue of which sterilization test should be applied were Romero deemed incompetent. A Colorado case involving a sterilization petition for an incompetent adult will
be a case of first impression because Romero is limited to determining
competency. The court mentions the medically essential test used in In
re A. W. and the best interest test without embracing or delineating criteria for either. The Colorado Supreme Court would probably adopt
the medically essential test used in In re A. W.9 0 Though the medically
essential test was applied to a minor in A. W., this fact would likely not
distinguish A. W.'s test from application to persons incompetent for reasons other than status as a minor. The medically essential test is the
more objective and less paternalistic of the three established sterilization tests. The substituted judgment and best interests tests would require consideration of reasonableness, an inquiry specifically criticized
in Romero. Given that the court applied the least-paternalistic test to a
minor in A. W., and that a strong policy against paternalism pervades its
opinion in Romero, the court would likely apply the medically essential
test to an incompetent adult.
Reliance on Romero as precedent is further limited. The court circumvented addressing two important issues to sterilization: the constitutionality of the Colorado statute and the availability of less-intrusive
alternatives. Both of these issues are central to forced sterilization, yet
Romero offers no guidance. Less intrusive alternatives, as an amicus brief
points out,9 1 are presently available, and more are expected to be technologically and practically feasible in the near future.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Romero, the Colorado Supreme Court assured the right to determine procreational destiny for legally-competent adults. Romero established a test for competency as the threshold inquiry in forced
sterilization. A person need only understand sex, pregnancy, and the
nature of the sterilization proceedings to be competent. A risk understanding is not required. An adult deemed competent under this test
will not be forced to undergo sterilization. An adult deemed incompetent under this test will or may not be subjected to sterilization. The
Romero court did not address the test that would be applied to determine
whether to sterilize an incompetent adult. Though an open question,
the medically essential test for sterilization likely would be applied.
Romero presents a further anomaly in that the court did not remand,
but instead determined Romero competent, thus acting as fact-finder.
90. 637 P.2d at 376.
91. Amicus Curiae A.C.L.U. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819
(Colo. 1990) (No. 89SA248).
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Even more unusual, the facts in the trial record do not necessarily satisfy
a finding of competency under the competency test that Romero itself
established. The Colorado Supreme Court encroached on the trial
court's fact-finding function and risked an imprecise application of its
competency test in future sterilization cases. The fundamental procreative rights at issue in sterilization deserve the protection afforded by accurate and fair application of tests designed to prevent intrusion on
those rights.
Future sterilization cases in Colorado have a plethora of tests with
which to contend. These tests are designed to cautiously guard fundamental rights involving procreation. Future Colorado litigants have a
clearer standard by which they can determine competency in sterilization cases, but they still face uncertainty in the final sterilization
decision.
Julie Marcus

